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' ABSTRACT 
I n t h i s dissertation I have attempted to present both an 
exposition and an interpretation of Hegel's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
philosophy. The broad outline of my argument i s sinrply that the 
unique feature of Hegel's i n t e l l e c t u a l development i s that h i s 
thought did not grow out of purely philosophical considerations 
about the nature and l i m i t s of knowledge, but out of a certain 
p r a c t i c a l problem facing the German i n t e l l i g e n s i a of his day. 
The problem i n question which Hegel shared with the other young 
German i d e a l i s t s of h i s generation was the feeling of alienation 
and estrangement from the moral and p o l i t i c a l culture i n which they 
l i v e d . As Hegel conceived i t , there was a disharmony between the 
ideals which informed the p r a c t i c a l aspirations of man - or at least 
the educated middle c l a s s of which Hegel himself was a notable 
representative - and the inherited e t h i c a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l and 
r e l i g i o u s order which they were forced to accept. I t i s nty thesis 
that Hegel's thought takes i t s point of departure from the problem 
of discord and dissonance experienced by the modem consciousness 
and attempts to resolve t h i s c o n f l i c t i n an a l l embracing system i n 
which freedom and r a t i o n a l i t y are ultimately restored. I t i s further 
toy t h e s i s that the solution to t h i s p r a c t i c a l problem which led Hegel 
to elaborate a systematic and coherent p o l i t i c a l philosophy 
constitutes his unique contribution to German idealism. 
I n chapter one I undertake a close examination of some of 
Hegel's very e a r l i e s t manuscripts, posthumously edited under the 
somewhat dubious t i t l e Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, written 
as a student at Stuttgart and Tubingen and as a Hauslehrer at Berne 
and Frankfurt. These works deal primarily with the relationship 
between p o l i t i c s and r e l i g i o n and i t was Hegel's contention, at l e a s t 
i n i t i a l l y , that only the resurrection of something akin to the 
ancient Greek c i v i c r e l i g i o n s could bring about a p o l i t i c a l r e v i v a l 
i n Europe. Chapter two deals v/ith Hegel's Jena writings and the 
a f f i l i a t i o n with previous German i d e a l i s t s i s scrutinized i n some 
d e t a i l . Here I attempt to show how for Hegel the r i s e of philosophy 
i s motivated by the need to resolve the fragmentation and discord 
encountered i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e . P a r t i c u l a r attention i s given to h i s 
then unpublished lecture notes and his discussion of the role of 
economics and labour i n human a f f a i r s i s compared to the l a t e r 
theories of Marz. Chapter three i s e s s e n t i a l l y a c r i t i c a l analysis 
of the Philosophy of Right as the apotheosis of Hegel's p o l i t i c a l 
thought. Here i t i s stressed that Hegel's p o l i t i c a l philosophy 
cannot be a r b i t r a r i l y detached from h i s general system of metaphysics, 
but that the two are i n t e g r a l l y linked to one another. I t i s my 
view that at l e a s t a rudimentary knowledge of the methodological 
underpinnings of Hegel's mature "system of science" i s a prerequisite 
for an adequate understanding of his p o l i t i c a l views. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before attempting a reconstruction of the development of Hegel's 
thought, a word concerning my general approach i s perhaps i n order. 
I n treating t h i s subject I have adopted a f a i r l y t raditional h i s t o r i c a l 
method of following Hegel's ideas upon p o l i t i c s and society from h i s 
e a r l i e s t utterances as a student i n the p o l i t i c a l l y charged atmosphere 
of southern Germany i n the 1790s to the works of his maturity as a 
professor of philosophy i n the peace and tr a n q u i l i t y of Restoration 
B e r l i n . I have also attempted to demonstrate the relationship 
between Hegel's thought and that of previous philosophy and i n 
pa r t i c u l a r the philosophy of c l a s s i c a l German idealism. This genetic 
approach to the study of Hegel's thought i s to a large extent 
legitimized by Hegel himself who understood h i s system i n terms of an 
h i s t o r i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n with the great philosophical systems of the 
past, especially those of Kant, Pichte and Schelling. There i s i n 
Hegel's view, as well as i n the views of many c r i t i c s of Hegelian 
thought, a necessary evolution from the Critique of Pure Reason, to the 
V/issenschaftslehre, to the System of Transcendental Idealism and 
f i n a l l y to Hegel's own works. And i t i s often argued that the l a t t e r 
made possible the future t r a n s i t i o n to Marx and Engels. 
While Hegel's conception of the hist o i y of philosophy has 
ce r t a i n l y proved fecund, i t i s not without d i f f i c u l t i e s . The main 
d i f f i c u l t y , i t seems to me, i s that encountered by any philosophical 
idealism which tr e a t s thought exclusively on the le v e l of ideas with 
no reference to the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l milieu i n which these ideas 
are formed. I t therefore runs the r i s k of treating ideas as 
disembodied abstractions without being, at leas t to some degree, 
conditioned by external, material circumstances. What, I believe, 
primarily distinguishes Hegel from h i s forerunners Kant, Fichte and 
Schelling i s that h i s thought developed not from a set of s t r i c t l y 
philosophical considerations, but from an e s s e n t i a l l y p r a c t i c a l 
problem posed by the age i n which he live d , the age of the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire. This problem, as he came to 
understand i t , i s that i n modem society man i s forced to l i v e a 
dual existence, torn between the ideal world of his dreams, hopes 
and aspirations on the one hand and the misery, wretchedness and 
want of the prevailing s o c i a l order on the other. Indeed no one 
liv e d t h i s problem more intensely than did Hegel for whom the 
es s e n t i a l freedom and dignity of man was everywhere contradicted by 
the o f f i c i a l culture of the society i n which he li v e d . I t was t h i s 
sense of alienation from existing r e a l i t y or what i n the Phenomenology 
of Mind he would c a l l the experience of the "unhappy consciousness" 
which Hegel f e l t was the central problem of the modem world which 
must be resolved i f man's p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s to prove morally 
sa t i s f a c t o r y . 
This attempt to understand Hegel's mature philosophy as an 
outgrowth of his early non-philosophical concerns necessarily e n t a i l s 
a f a i r l y detailed account of his early writings composed during the 
1790s under the dire c t influence of the French revolutionary 
experience. This approach to Hegel's l a t e r works v i a his juvenalia 
i s no doubt bound to offend some c r i t i c s who maintain that the study 
of these notoriously unsystematic early writings has done nothing to 
i n any way illuminate our understanding of Hegel's mature position. 
This c r i t i q u e of the genetic approach to Hegel's thought has been 
l e v e l l e d by such diverse commentators as J.N. Findlay and Franz Gregoire 
who are both more concerned with Hegel's completed philosophical system 
than with h i s overall i n t e l l e c t u a l development. V/hat i s important for 
these c r i t i c s i s not the evolution of Hegelian philosophy, but the 
logic of i t s argument, i t s coherence and i t s general i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . 
As opposed to t h i s type of commentary which confines i t s e l f to a 
l o g i c a l analysis of the structui-e of Hegelian language, what t h i s study 
attempts to provide i s an h i s t o r i c a l understanding of Hegel's thought. 
For an h i s t o r i c a l understanding what i s of moment i s not simply the 
most authoritative or mature expression of Heffel's p o l i t i c a l position, 
but with how and why i t was that he came to arrive at t h i s position. 
Here the point i s to show how Hegel's mature doctrine did not simply 
a r i s e ex n i h i l o as a set of arbitrary and idiosyncratic philosophical 
g e n e r a l i t i e s , but to show where t h i s doctrine i s both a development of 
and a departure from his ea r l y thoughts and experiences. I t i s thus 
i n an h i s t o r i c a l context that Hegel's Jugendschriften are significant 
for these expressly point out the s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and religious 
origins of h i s l a t e r philosophy. 
There i s , of course, nothing i n i t s e l f novel about an h i s t o r i c a l 
understanding of Hegel's thought. Ever since the discovery of his 
early manuscripts i n the f i r s t years of t h i s centuiy, historians have 
attempted to locate properly these texts within the corpus of his 
entire work. But unlike most h i s t o r i c a l accounts which presuppose a 
slow, uninterrupted continuity i n Hegel's development, i t i s my view 
that i t was Hegel's i n a b i l i t y to s a t i s f a c t o r i l y resolve the problem 
analyzed i n these early writings which ultimately led him to jo i n 
Schelling i n providing a philosophical account of the whole of r e a l i t y 
which alone can lay the i n t e l l e c t u a l basis for reconciling man to . 
ordinary experience. Only the discovery of a new metaphysics, he 
came to believe, could overcome the sense of estrangement between 
man and the world by bringing out the inherent r a t i o n a l i t y of the 
exis t i n g order of things. I t was t h i s conception of philosophy 
and the philosophical enterprise that Hegel adopted only after I8OO 
which led him to the conclusion that p o l i t i c a l society, 
philosophically comprehended, contained the key to i t s own 
regeneration. As i t w i l l be shown, t h i s decision to adopt philosophy 
as h i s me'tier represents something of a break i n Hegel's development 
which i s only completely i n t e l l i g i b l e v/hen considered as a response 
to the p r a c t i c a l problem of alienation and fragmentation diagnosed 
i n h i s youthful, non-philosophical writings. 
One more point should perhaps be made cle a r from the outset. 
This study i s concerned with Hegel's s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l philosophy 
not as a peripheral or incidental aspect of h i s system as a whole, 
but as a central feature of i t . I have therefore attempted to 
r e l a t e the p a r t i c u l a r problems of h i s p o l i t i c a l theory proper to his 
metaphysical doctrine generally, but without necessarily providing a 
d i r e c t commentary on t h i s doctrine as expressed i n such works as the 
Phenomenology, the Logic and the Ene.yclopedia. Such a commentary 
has been omitted for two reasons. F i r s t , i t would require a separate 
study i n i t s e l f which would f a r exceed the more modest scope of t h i s 
volume and since several such commentaries already exist anything 
which I might add would probably be redundant. Second, anything 
l e s s than a f u l l scale commentary, such as a b r i e f condensation of 
Hegel's metaphysics as an introduction to his p o l i t i c a l thought, could 
only be t r i t e and jejune and would inevitably r a i s e more questions 
that i t could possibly hope to resolve. I hope ba s i c a l l y to find a 
happy medium between these two extremes by showing that Hegel's 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy comprises a separate body of doctrine, but i s 
nevertheless related to h i s wider metaphysical concerns as well. 
And i n any respect, i n so f a r as the l a t t e r has a bearing on the 
former, i t has been examined not necessarily i n i t s own right, but 
i n r e l a t i o n to other Hegelian texts. 
I n preparing t h i s study I have had occasion to use several 
different editions of individual works by Hegel both i n the original 
German as well as i n English translation. This has been necessary 
because as yet the complete, c r i t i c a l edition of Hegel's work has not 
been prepared, although i t i s at present underway at the Hegel-Archiv 
at Bochum under the supervision of Otto Poggeler. When quoting 
d i r e c t l y from Hegel I have used where possible suitable English 
tran s l a t i o n s , but i n many cases without e x p l i c i t l y acknowledging t h i s 
i n the text i t s e l f . I have also at times taken the l i b e r t y of 
modifying certain translations to accord with what I take to be a 
more accurate rendering of Hegel's meaning. When c i t i n g an already 
exis t i n g translation, however, I give the pagination of both the 
English and the German edition of the text i n question so as to enable 
the reader to consult either with r e l a t i v e ease. A l l other 
translations from the German are my own. A complete guide of a l l the 
sources u t i l i z e d may be found i n the bibliography appended to the end 
of t h i s study. 
I n preparing t h i s study I would li k e to give special thanks to my 
supervisor Mr. Henry Tudor whose c r i t i c a l acumen has contributed greatly 
to my understanding of Hegel and the history of ideas generally. Also 
my wife Susan, whose keen s e n s i t i v i t y to the nuances of particular terms 
and concepts has proved an invaluable aid; her unflagging encouragement 
has been a constant source of inspiration without which t h i s study 
would no doubt never have been completed. F i n a l l y I would l i k e to 
record my profound thanks to my parents for t h e i r enduring f a i t h and 
good w i l l . I t i s to them that t h i s work i s dedicated. 
Durham, June, 1976. 
CHAPTER I 
THE YOUNG HEGEL : POLITICS AND RELIGION 
Hegel's e a r l i e s t thoughts on the subject of p o l i t i c a l culture 
are set forth i n a school essay i n which the f u l l y integrated and 
harmonious nature of the Hellenic world i s favourably contrasted to 
the divided and fragmented character of modem society. I n t h i s 
essay e n t i t l e d "On some Characteristics which Distinguish Ancient 
Poets"^-"-^ the young Hegel assumes from the outset that i n t h e i r 
best days the ancient Greeks and Romans had attained a le v e l of 
culture and c i v i l i z a t i o n which posterity could never hope to reach. 
This, he suggests, i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the superiority of the ancient 
poets over the modems. One reason for the superiority of the 
ancient poets, he argues, was t h e i r a b i l i t y to identify with the 
aims and aspirations of the entire community. But i n the modem 
world, where society i s divided into classes each of which i s 
h o s t i l e to the others, t h i s i s no longer a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . 
The appearance of classes has led to the collapse of a sense of 
sheired experience and a common p o l i t i c a l culture: "The ideas and 
culture of the c l a s s e s " , he remarks, "are too d i s t i n c t for a poet 
(2) 
of our times to be read and universally understood".^ ' Hence a 
modern epic poet - and here i t i s f a i r l y evident that Hegel i s 
thinking of Klopstock - could never hope to reach the whole of his 
people. 
(l)G.W.F. Hegel, Dokumente zu Kegels Entwicklung. ed. J . Hoffmeister, 
Stuttgart, 1936, pp.48-51; henceforth cited as Dokumente. This 
essay i s dated 7 August I788. 
( 2 ) l b i d . , p.49. 
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For Hegel, the distinguishing feature of the ancient poets 
was t h e i r s i m p l i c i t y : "Simplicity actually consists i n t h i s , that 
the poets present us with a f a i t h f u l image of the thing, that they 
do not t r y to render i t more interesting through subtlety and 
a r t i f i c e and that they do not make i t more b r i l l i a n t and r i c h by 
departing from the truth as we demand t o d a y " . T h e ancients 
were content to describe each experience without d i s t i n c t i o n and 
without i s o l a t i n g the various aspects of the whole. I t i s only 
the moderns who f e e l the need to dissect experience into so many 
discrete e n t i t i e s and i n so doing they rob i t of i t s v i t a l i t y . 
The s i m p l i c i t y of the ancient world as manifest i n the unity of i t s 
people, i t s culture and i t s p o l i t i c a l constitution i s here held up 
as a model for the present to emulate. I n contrast to t h i s antique 
s i m p l i c i t y , Hegel deplores the abstract complexity of modern l i f e i n 
which, as he would put i t l a t e r , "the individual finds the abstract 
form ready made".^^^ He obviously does not yet see the development 
of abstractness and complexity as a natural feature of the 
phenomenology of human consciousness. 
What underlies Hegel's argument here i s a view of two d i s t i n c t 
s t y l e s of pedagogy. The ancient s t y l e was based upon action and 
dire c t p r a c t i c a l experience. I n t h i s way everyone was forced to be 
original as each developed his own system of thought independently 
from the others. I n modern times, by contrast, learning comes only 
through books. The deeds of famous men, for instance, are no 
longer "entwined i n our constitution" nor are they preserved through 
(3) l b i d . 
(4) G.W.F. Hegel, Phahomenologie des Geistes. ed. J . Hoffmeister, 
Hamburg, 1952, p.30; G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, 
trans. J.B. B a i l i e , London, 1971i p.94. 
an oral t r a d i t i o n . Rather they are learned through history books 
many of which are even written by foreigners. Thus words and ideas 
are implanted i n the head and remain there without any a c t i v i t y and 
use. I t i s only through experience that they come to acquire 
meaning. Indeed i t was for t h e i r emphasis upon direct concrete 
experience that Hegel sides with the ancients i n t h i s early essay. 
Hegel's musings on the differences between ancient and modern 
p o l i t i c a l society continued throughout his student years at the 
Tubingen theological seminary (1788-93). Due perhaps to the 
influence of h i s professors F l a t t and Storr he came to the view 
that the unity of the antique experience was maintained primarily 
through r e l i g i o n . Religion was the bond which held everything 
together i n a perfect cosmos. Hegel draws attention to the primacy 
of r e l i g i o n i n an unfinished essay of t h i s period i n which he 
categorically states that: "Religion i s one of the most important 
concerns of our l i f e " . ^ ^ ^ . I t i s through r e l i g i o n that the s p i r i t 
or p r a c t i c a l consciousness of a people finds i t s manifest embodiment. 
Hegel i s not, however, so much concerned with traditional theological 
questions such as personal b e l i e f and individual salvation, but with 
the influence of r e l i g i o n upon p o l i t i c s and i t s a b i l i t y to foster 
C i v i l peace. 
(5) Dokumente, op.cit., pp.49-50' 
(6) G.W.P. Hegel, Kegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. H. Nohl, 
Tubingen, I907, p.3j henceforth cited as Nohl. The Nohl edition 
of Hegel's early writings i s s t i l l the most philo l o g i c a l l y sound 
c o l l e c t i o n available even though recent advances i n Hegelforschung 
have shown that i t i s f a r from perfect. For a report on these 
refinements see Giesela Schiiler, "Zur Chronologie von Kegels 
Jugendschriften" i n Kegel-Studien, I I , 1963, pp.111-59J see also 
Sofia Vanni-Rovighi, "Osservazioni s u l l a cronologia dei primi 
s c r i t t i di Kegel" i n I I Penserio. V, 196O, pp.157-75* 
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I n t h i s essay Hegel i s primarily interested to distinguish between 
what he c a l l s subjective and objective r e l i g i o n . A subjective 
r e l i g i o n i s a r e l i g i o n of the heart which i s capable of inspiring great 
actions as i t derives from human feeling (Empfindung) and not the 
i n t e l l e c t alone. For the young Hegel, man i s a being dominated by 
sense impulses and blind i n s t i n c t and for whom reason plays only an 
incidental role. This sort of r e l i g i o n , as Jean Hyppolite has 
observed, i s similar to that of Rousseau's Savoyard vicar i n that i t 
( 7 ) 
opposes a simple spontaneous f a i t h to an erudite but barren theology. 
I n f a c t i t i s known that throughout h i s stay at the Ttfbingen S t i f t 
Hegel was an enthusiastic devotee of Rousseau and i t i s very probably 
Rousseau's emphasis upon the effective and emotive aspect of human 
nature that attracted him.^^^ 
An objective or positive r e l i g i o n , on the other hand, appeals 
s o l e l y to the understanding (Verstand) and i s therefore responsible 
for creating a schism within the human personality. This sort of 
r e l i g i o n "suffers i t s e l f to be arranged i n one's mind, organized into 
(q) 
a system, set forth i n a book, and expounded to others i n discourse". 
I n contrast to subjective r e l i g i o n which i s active and a l i v e i n the 
heart of the believer, objective r e l i g i o n k i l l s whatever i t touches. 
While the former i s picturesquely compared to the " l i v i n g book of 
nature" the l a t t e r i s likened to "the cabinet of the naturalist wherein 
the insects have been k i l l e d , the plants dried, the animals stuffed or 
(7) Jean Hyppolite, Introduction a l a philosophie de I ' h i s t o i r e de Hegel, 
P a r i s , 1948, p.18. 
(8) CP. Dieter Henrich, "Leutwein uber Hegel. E i n Dokument zu Hegels 
BiogrE?)hie" i n Hegel-Studien, I I I , I965, pp.39-77 for the various 
influences on Hegel during his years at the Tubingerstift. 
(9) Nohl, op.cit., p.6. 
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pickled, and the things that nature divided are put side by side, a l l 
organized for one single end where nature had interlaced an i n f i n i t e 
v a r i e t y of ends i n a friendly bond!!.^^°^ This sort of r e l i g i o n i s 
the product of what Michael Oakeshott has i n a different context 
c a l l e d a "technical knowledge" i n that i t can be learned by heart, 
repeated by rote and applied mechanically.^^^^ Hegel's argument i s 
that t h i s i s not r e l i g i o n at a l l . True r e l i g i o n i s a matter of the 
heart, of p r a c t i c a l experience, and cannot therefore be either taught 
or learned, but only imparted and acquired. I t exi s t s only i n i t s 
actual practice. An objective r e l i g i o n i s l a i d down i n the form of 
laws and statutes which the individual i s constrained to obey. I t 
i s a r e l i g i o n of blind, unquestioning obedience which i s the handmaiden 
to any tyrannous or despotic p o l i t i c a l regime. This i s precisely 
the form of r e l i g i o n which Hegel saw practiced i n the Germany of h i s 
own time, one which did not emanate from fe e l i n g or the heart, but 
which was merely an o f f i c i a l doctrine designed to ensure passive 
conformity. Hence he turned against t h i s and the state which 
supported i t , as contrary to the essential freedom and dignity of man. 
Ultimately the foundation of any r e l i g i o n must be i t s a b i l i t y to 
promote the e t h i c a l well-being of a people and an objective r e l i g i o n 
which r e l i e s upon the understanding alone i s eminently incapable of 
doing t h i s . For Hegel, the enlightenment of the i n t e l l e c t i s not a 
s u f f i c i e n t condition for e t h i c a l behaviour: "The understanding 
serves only objective religion....But i t i s never through understanding 
that p r i n c i p l e s are rendered p r a c t i c a l . The understanding i s a 
courtier who adapts himself complaisantly to the caprices of h i s 
(10) l b i d . , p.7. 
(11) Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism i n P o l i t i c s and Other Essays, 
London, 1962, pp.10-11. 
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lord....Enlightenment of the understanding makes us cleverer certainly 
(12) 
but not better".^ ' To i l l u s t r a t e h i s point Hegel uses the example 
of a boy who, to improve h i s moral conduct, reads and memorizes the 
maxims contained i n Campe's Theophron. The r e s u l t of t h i s enterprise 
i s not the intended perfection of character, but rather a morbid and 
gloomy disposition which the youth soon finds intolerable.^''"^^ 
Hegel's advice i s , then, to do away with popular handbook morality 
as morality i s not something learned i n t h i s fashion but only acquired 
through long years of experience. 
I f morality cannot be sustained through the understanding, i t can 
be sustained through feeling and the heart. I t i s evident that Hegel 
i s here attacking Kant's rigorously formalistic moral philosophy which 
had dubbed "pathological" any action not carried out s t r i c t l y through 
respect for the law of reason. Hegel remarks that even i f feeling i s 
pathological, i t i s also disinterested i n that i t does not calculate 
beforehand the joys that may or may not arise from some action. I t 
merely acts and accepts whatever consequences may follow.^^^^ Feeling 
i s thus no longer subservient to reason as philosophers from Descartes 
to Kant had assumed, but i s rather the spring for a l l good actions. 
S t i l l Hegel finds i t necessaiy to distinguish between true moral 
sentiment and mere "sensuousness" and i t i s , he says, the task of 
education and culture to nurture these f i n e r feelings which nature has 
implanted i n the hearts of a l l men.^^^^ Only a subjective r e l i g i o n 
which stres s e s the primacy of f e e l i n g i s able to inspire genuine moral 
conduct. This r e l i g i o n i s , as i t were, the basis of morality. 
(12) Nohl, op.cit., p.12. 
(13) l b i d . , pp.12-13. 
(14) l b i d . , p.18. 
(15) l b i d . , p.8. 
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The d i s t i n c t i o n between subjective and objective r e l i g i o n leads 
Hegel to another equally important d i s t i n c t i o n between private 
r e l i g i o n and the r e l i g i o n of a people. This second d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
obviously meant to correspond to Christianity and the pagan c i v i l 
r e l i g i o n (Volksreligion) respectively, and here again Hegel shows 
himself enthralled with the cult of antiquity. The pagan f o l k 
r e l i g i o n was inextricably bound up with the collective l i f e of the 
community. Indeed the harmonious p o l i t i c a l culture of the antique 
c i t y i n which there was an immediate i d e n t i t y between the individual 
and the general w i l l was best expressed through the r e l i g i o n of i t s 
people. Hegel i s not clear about the precise nature of t h i s r e l i g i o n 
except to say that i t must be simple and must not burden the memory 
and understanding with a l o t of useless theological t r i v i a . Instead 
of laying down absolute commandments such as "thou shalt not steal" 
i t should concentrate on ennobling the s p i r i t of a people by 
inculcating a sense of p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e : "Polk religion,"he says, 
"which generates and nourishes noble dispositions goes hand i n hand 
with freedom".^•'•^^ I n t h i s manner the r e l i g i o n of a people i s 
inseparable from the p o l i t i c a l constitution and thereby fosters good 
c i t i z e n s . 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , on the other hand, i s a preeminently private 
r e l i g i o n . I t severs man from the particular community of which he 
i s a part and t i e s him to the entire human species. Here an 
individual i s regarded irrespective of his p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n . 
But i n the former case, t h i s bond i s of a purely human t e r r e s t r i a l 
one, while i n the l a t t e r i t i s elevated and projected outside the 
world. What i s created i s not a p o l i t i c a l society but a transcendental 
( I 6 ) l b i d . , p.27. 
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one i n which men relate to one another qua souls and sons of God: 
"Our r e l i g i o n aims to educate men to be citizens of Heaven whose 
gaze i s ever directed t h i t h e r so that human feelings become alien 
(17) 
to them."^ " This v i t r i o l i c treatment of Christianity owes a 
great deal to Rousseau who i n the Social Contract remarks that 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i s "fundamentally more injurious than useful to a 
(iQ) 
strong p o l i t i c a l constitution". ' Since Christianity i s occupied 
with other worldly matters i t s s p i r i t , Rousseau says, i s very 
(19) 
favourable to tyranny: "True Christians are made for slavery". 
While neither Rousseau nor Hegel would want to deny that some 
Christians might, of course, be good citizens, they do argue that 
C h r i s t i a n i t y tends to sublimate man's p o l i t i c a l i n s t i n c t s . The 
cosmopolitanism and lack of patriotism of Christian doctrine i s 
a n t i t h e t i c a l to the Volksgeist or established national character 
of a people. 
The concept of the Volksgeist i s perhaps the most important to 
appear i n Hegel's Tubingen essay and therefore i t requires a word of 
ezplanation. This term i s used to encompass the whole of a people's 
conditions of existence: "The s p i r i t of a people, i t s histozy, the 
level of p o l i t i c a l freedom, cannot be treated separately either with 
(17) l b i d . 
(18) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The P o l i t i c a l Writings, ed. C.E. Vaughan, 
2 vols., Oxford, 1962, I I , p.128, 
(19) l b i d . , p.131; see also p.166: "The p a t r i o t i c s p i r i t i s an 
exclusive one, which makes us regard a l l men other than our 
compatriots as strangers, and almost as enemies. Such was the 
s p i r i t of Sparta and Rome. The s p i r i t of Christianity, on the 
other hand, makes us regard a l l men as our brothers, as children 
of Grod. Christian charity does not permit i t s e l f to make the 
odious d i s t i n c t i o n between our comrades and foreigners; i t i s 
good f o r making neither republicans nor warriors, but only Christians 
and men; i t s ardent zeal i n d i f f e r e n t l y embraces the entire human 
race. I t i s thus that C h r i s t i a n i t y i s , by i t s very saintliness, 
contrary to the p a r t i c u l a r i s t social s p i r i t ? . 
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respect t o t h e i r mutual influence, or i n characterizing them i n 
i s o l a t i o n . They are woven together i n a single bond".^^^^ I t 
i s , then, equivalent to a nation's collective experience as 
embodied i n i t s t r a d i t i o n s , customs and b e l i e f s . I t has been 
observed that t h i s concept i s very similar to what Montesquieu 
called the "esprit ge'nerale" of ,a nation. ^ ^^ ^ Indeed Hegel even 
applauds Montesquieu's attempt to view the s p i r i t of people within 
i t s p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l context and not abstracting i t from i t s 
spatial-temporal l i m i t a t i o n s . For both Montesquieu and Hegel, 
the concept of s p i r i t i s devoid of any transcendental connotations. 
There do remain, however, certain crucial differences between 
Montesquieu and Hegel on t h i s issue. For the former, the s p i r i t 
of a nation i s essentially the product of the interaction of 
various material forces, e.g. geographical conditions. I t i s not 
at a l l surprising that on the publication of L'Esprit des l o i s 
Montesquieu was denounced by his Jesuit c r i t i c s as a disciple of 
Spinoza and Hobbes. But while Montesquieu never embraced 
mat e r i a l i s t determinism - "Can anything," he asked,"be more absurd 
than to pretend that a blind f a t a l i t y could ever produce i n t e l l i g e n t 
(22) 
Beings?"^ - the s p i r i t always remains a secondary phenomenon, the 
r e s u l t of other more fundamental factoTB. Hegel's V o l k s g e i s t , on 
the contrary, has a f a r more mythological, i d e a l i s t i c quality about 
(20) Nohl, op.cit., p.27. 
(21) For an excellent comparative account of the t h o u ^ t of Montesquieu 
and Hegel see Guy Planty-Bonjour, "L'Esprit ge'nerale d'une nation 
selon Montesquieu et l e 'Volksgeist' hegeiienne" i n Hegel et l e 
siecle des lumieres, ed. Jacques D'Hondt, Paris, 1974j PP.7-24. 
(22) Quoted from Kingsley Martin, French Liberal Thought i n the 
Eighteenth Century; A Study of P o l i t i c a l Ideas from Bayle to 
Condorcet, New York, 1962, p.154. 
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i t : "The s p i r i t of a people i s drawn down to earth and held fast 
by a l i g h t bond which res i s t s through a magical sfpell a l l attempts 
(23) 
to break i t , f o r i t i s completely intertwined i n i t s essence".^ ' 
I t i s not so much the product of the empirical arrangements of a 
pa r t i c u l a r society as i t i s the creative power behind t h i s society. 
F i n a l l y Hegel might have used the term Volksgeist as a polemical 
device to counter the natural law construction of the state and 
society. For the natural law theorists, p o l i t i c a l association i s 
the r e s u l t of a contract between autonomous individuals. Hegel 
i s sceptical of t h i s as i t implies that the state i s produced by the 
a r b i t r a r y w i l l of the i n d i v i d u a l . For him there i s no such thing 
as the autonomous in d i v i d u a l . Any such notion i s merely the product 
of i n t e l l e c t u a l abstraction. Rather the individual i s always a part 
of a wider s p i r i t u a l t o t a l i t y . Following A r i s t o t l e , Hegel assumes 
that t h i s t o t a l i t y must be p r i o r to the individual f o r the reason 
that the whole i s p r i o r to i t s parts. Arjy being who i s not by 
nature included w i t h i n t h i s t o t a l i t y would either be a poor sort of 
creature or a being higher than man.^^^^ 
By now i t should be clear that f o r the young Hegel, the antique 
c i t y with i t s public f o l k r e l i g i o n represented the ideal form of 
p o l i t i c a l community. The Greeks, f o r him, were the happy people of 
history f o r whom private r i g h t s and public duties were inseparable 
one from the other. I n contrast to the coniplexity and divisiveness 
of modem society, t h e i r rather primitive r u s t i c community seemed l i k e 
the golden age. I t was only as an active participant i n the 
(23) Hohl, op.cit., p.27. 
(24) A r i s t o t l e , The P o l i t i c s , trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford, 1957, 
pp.6-8. 
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beautiful public l i f e of the c i t y that the individual found his 
ver i t a b l e raison d'gtre. Hence the only problem was one of a 
p r a c t i c a l nature, that i s , how the classical Volksgeist could be 
resurrected i n the modern world. I t was to f i n d an answer to 
t h i s p r a c t i c a l problem that Hegel turned to the writings of Kant, 
Fichte and S c h i l l e r . 
During his student years Hegel was highly c r i t i c a l of Kant 
as representative of the a r i d rationalism of the Aufklarung. The 
harsh precepts of Kant's moral imperative seemed to him to 
disregard the needs of f e e l i n g and imagination. Only l a t e r would 
Hegel take a more serious look at Kant's pr a c t i c a l philosophy as 
set f o r t h i n the Critique of Practical Reason and Religion within 
the Limits of Reason Alone, although he had read the l a t t e r at 
Tubingen. Needless to say, since his interests at t h i s time were 
more with the p r a c t i c a l transformation of the world than with 
philosophical concerns such as logic and epistemology, he steered 
studiously clear of a systematic confrontation with the Critique of 
Pure Reason. S t i l l there i s an element i n the Kantian philosophy 
of which Hegel did approve and t h i s i s the thesis that a l l social 
and p o l i t i c a l problems are ultimately problems of morality and 
r e l i g i o n . This i s a notion which he could conscientiously square 
with his c l a s s i c i s t p r o c l i t i v i t i e s as f o r the Greeks, too, p o l i t i c s 
was understood as the doctrine of the good and just l i f e . I t s 
subject matter i s the just and the excellent and i s therefore a 
continuation of ethics. Thus Hegel began to see the Kantian 
conception of moral freedom based as i t i s upon the principle of 
individual self-determination as the best means of recreating the 
ethos of the ancient republic. 
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I t should be mentioned, however, that there i s a crucial 
ambivalence i n Kant's writings on precisely t h i s matter. I n his 
formal philosophy Kant writes as t h o u ^ morality has nothing at 
a l l to do with p o l i t i c s and that the free w i l l of the moral man i s 
completely severed from the pr a c t i c a l world. I n his Fundamental 
Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals he constructs an ideal 
"kingdom of ends" where each man respects the r i g h t s of others, 
but denies that t h i s can serve as a model f o r the reform of p o l i t i c a l 
(25) 
society where men necessarily i n f r i n g s upon each others r i g h t s . ^ ^' 
Rather than acting from the disinterested principles of the categorical 
imperative, men i n society are governed by t h e i r passions and l u s t f u l 
appetites. I|y thus separating p o l i t i c s from morality Kant, unlike 
Rousseau, despairs the p o s s i b i l i t y of ever r e a l i z i n g a t r u l y ethical 
republic. 
S t i l l Kant was too wedded to the buoyant optimism of his age to 
despair altogether. I n his p o l i t i c a l writings, which, i t might be 
argued, play only a peripheral role i n his system as a whole, he 
shows himself f a r more amenable to the proposition that man i n society 
can be swayed by moral considerations. I n the Idea f o r a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose he argues that man has been 
furnished with an "unsocial s o c i a b i l i t y " by which he i s progressively 
driven towards freedom. Yfliile i n t h i s work he claims that man i s a 
being " i n need of a master" thereby j u s t i f y i n g monarchical r u l e , he 
i s s t i l l attempting to draw some sort of connection, however loose, 
(26) 
between moral and p o l i t i c a l man. ' Despite his sympathy f o r the 
(25)lmmanuel Kant, V/erke i n sechs Banden, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, 
Frankfurt a/M, 1956-64, IV, pp.11-102. 
( 2 6)lbid., V I , pp.31-50. 
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French revolutionary experience, Kant always remained extremely wary 
of mass movements i n i t i a t e d from below. For him, a l l revolutionary 
movements are, i n the l a s t instance, u n j u s t i f i a b l e and he maintained 
to the end of his l i f e that v a l i d p o l i t i c a l reforms must be 
(27) 
predicated upon- "a true reform i n the ways of thinking". ^  Only 
when man becomes s u f f i c i e n t l y educated w i l l he cease to be dominated 
by his i n s t i n c t s and become a genuinely moral being. Thus does 
Kant resolve, or attempt to resolve, the problem of the r e l a t i o n 
between morals and p o l i t i c s . 
I t was t h i s suggestion that the p o l i t i c a l world i s ultimately 
susceptible to moral theorizing that f i r s t attracted Hegel to 
Kantianism. Another reason could possibly be the impact of the 
(2Q) 
French Revolution upon German l i f e . ^ ' For Hegel and a l l the young 
philosophical i d e a l i s t s , the revolution had carried out i n practice 
what Kant had vindicated i n theory, the r i g h t of thought and reason 
to structure r e a l i t y . Hegel f i r s t equates Kantianism with the 
p o l i t i c a l acquisitions of the revolution i n a programmatic l e t t e r to 
Schelling: "From the Kantian system and i t s ultimate conclusion, I 
expect a revolution i n Germany - a revolution which w i l l take i t s 
point of departure from already existing principles and which only 
(29) 
needs to be generally applied to a l l previously existing knowledge."^ ^' 
Hegel goes on to state categorically that i t i s the duty of philosophy 
to l i b e r a t e enslaved humanity from the chains of despotism: 
(27) l b i d . , V I , pp.51-61. 
(28) The best study on t h i s subject i s Jacques Droz, L'Allemagne et l a 
Revolution Francaise, Paris, 1949. 
(29) Letter from Hegel to Schelling, 16 A p r i l I795 i " G.W.F. Hegel, 
Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. J. Hoffmeister, 3 vols., Hamburg, 
1952-54» I> p.23; henceforth cited as Briefs. 
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I believe that there i s no better sign of the times 
than the fact that humanity i s being represented as 
worthy of dignity and esteem i n i t s e l f ; i t i s a 
proof that the halo which surrounded the heads of 
oppressors and gods of the earth has disappeared. 
The philosophers demonstrate t h i s d i g n i t y , the 
people w i l l learn to fe e l i t ; and they w i l l no 
longer be content to demand t h e i r r i g h t s which have 
been reduced to dust, but w i l l seize them, 
appropriate them. Religion and p o l i t i c s go hand 
i n glove. The f i r s t has taught what despotism 
has wanted to teach; contempt f o r humanity, i t s 
i n a b i l i t y to realize anything good, to be something 
by i t s own e f f o r t s . Thanks to the propagation of 
ideas which demonstrate how things ought to be, the 
indolence of those v;ho confer eternity on everything 
that exists i s disappearing. The v i t a l i z i n g power 
of ideas - even i f they do always carry a l i m i t a t i o n 
such as country, constitution, etc. - w i l l elevate 
the s p i r i t s and they w i l l learn to devour these 
ideas. (30) 
What i s contained i n t h i s l e t t e r i s a not uncommon assumption that 
philosophy i s somehow i n advance of p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y and that 
p o l i t i c a l revolution w i l l be possible only when a p r i o r revolution i n 
the realm of ideas has taken place. Indeed the revolutionary ardour 
of these words provides a s t r i k i n g contrast to Hegel's l a t e r assertion 
about the ex post facto nature of thought and his strictures against 
those who would e n l i s t ideas f o r the purpose of changing the world. 
Hegel's early radicalism, as expressed i n the above l e t t e r , was 
no doubt influenced to some degree by his association with Schelling. 
A word about t h i s association i s therefore i n order. Hegel and 
Schelling had been fellow students at Tubingen where both had indulged 
t h e i r enthusiasm f o r the French Revolution. I t i s well known that 
along with Holderlin they planted l i b e r t y trees and i t was thought 
that Schelling even translated the "Marseillaise" into German. But 
Schelling had early abandoned his theological studies f o r philosophy. 
(30)Ibid., I , p.24. 
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His f i r s t published philosophical work e n t i t l e d On the Ego^ '^*'^  was 
intended to continue the work inaugurated by Kant and Fichte. I n • 
t h i s book Schelling attempts to demonstrate that the true point of 
departure f o r c r i t i c a l as opposed to dogmatic philosophy i s not 
substance or the objective world but the ego or absolute. What 
Schelling means by the ego i s not the self of empirical psychology 
but what Kant had called "the synthetic unity of apperception" 
which i s the s e l f abstracted from a l l external objects met with i n 
experience. The condition of hermetic i s o l a t i o n produced by what 
he would l a t e r c a l l an act of " i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n " i s the only 
state i n which man i s t r u l y free: "The alpha and omega of 
(32) 
philosophy,"he says,"is freedom".^ ' Only through t h i s act of 
i n t u i t i o n i s the ego able to destroy a l l the conditions which l i m i t 
and condition the world around i t . I n t h i s way the ego accomplishes 
the "destruction" of the world. This extreme statement of 
philosophical subjectivism bears the unmistakable imprint of 
Pichte's Wissenschaftsiehre a work i n which he attempts a 
philosophical deduction of r e a l i t y from an i n i t i a l act of the ego 
positing i t s e l f v/hich he c a l l s the Grundsatz. This, as we shall 
see i n the next chapter, constitutes a veiy d i f f e r e n t position from 
Schelling's l a t e r philosophy i n which he abandons Pichtean 
subjectivism i n favour of a form of objective idealism with i t s 
Spinozist implications. 
Hegel was i n i t i a l l y ^ v e r y sceptical about Schelling's philosophical 
speculations. Since Hegel's early views were dominated by t h e i r 
(31) P.W.J. Schelling, Werke, ed. Manfred Schroter, I4 vols., Munich, 
1927, I , pp.73-168. 
(32) Letter from Schelling to Hegel 4 February 1795» Briefe, op.cit.. 
I , Po22; of. also Schelling, op.cit.. I , p.101: "Der Anfang und 
das Ends a l l e r Philosophie i s t - Freiheit!". 
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pr a c t i c a l bent, i t i s not surprising that he found his friend's 
achievements fa r too esoteric f o r his tastes. V/hile refraining 
from condemning him e x p l i c i t l y , he does say that a philosophy of 
the ego i s unlikely to take root i n the popular consciousness. 
The problem with Schelling's views, as Hegel sees i t , i s that 
freedom i s never actualized i n the world of prac t i c a l a c t i v i t y and 
experience. While man may attempt to structure the world i n 
accordance with his i n t r i n s i c freedom, the world always remains a 
"realm of necessity" governed by stubborn and recalcitrant causal 
laws. Hence the material world, the non-ego, can never correspond 
to the freedom inherent within the thinking ego. The only answer, 
according to Schelling, i s then, a mystical withdrawal from the 
world i n t o a vacuum of pure contemplation. Since f o r Hegel, 
freedom i s always a pr a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l concern, Schelling's 
philosophy seemed to him to be advocating an e l i t i s t a r i s t o c r a t i c 
a t t i t u d e toward human a f f a i r s . I t should be said that Schelling 
i s not completely unaware of t h i s problem and i n both his 
Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism^^^^ and his New 
Deduction of Natural Right^^^^ he sets out to r e c t i f y i t . mile 
he does not repudiate his e a r l i e r views on freedom, he maintains 
that the philosopher must dedicate himself to making others aware 
of t h e i r freedom as we l l . Rather than withdrawing from the world, 
the philosopher has a moral responsibility to his fellows. I n t h i s 
manner does Schelling t r y to give his philosophy a practical function 
i n the world. 
(33) Schelling, op.cit., I , pp.205-65. 
(34) I b i d . , I , pp.169-204. 
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The one thing that i s p a i n f u l l y evident to the philosopher i s 
that' freedom i s t o t a l l y lacking i n the sphere of state and society. 
Here i s how Schelling expresses t h i s i n his "Earliest System-Programme 
of German Idealism": 
Prom nature I come to the work of man. The idea of 
mankind being premised, I shall prove that i t gives 
us no idea of the state, since the state i s a mechanical 
thing, any more than i t gives us the idea of a machine. 
Only something that i s an objective of freedom i s an 
idea. So we must go even beyond the state! - for every 
state treats free men as cogs i n a machine; and t h i s i t 
ought not to do; so i t must stop. (35) 
Prom here, he says, i t i s tscessary to outline the principles f o r a 
history of mankind i n which "the whole wretched human work" of state, 
government, constitution and the legal system w i l l be l a i d bare. 
Prom t h i s w i l l follow the rooting up of a l l ignorance and superstition 
as well as the exitripation of the clergy. Only then w i l l the 
achievement of absolute freedom be possible i n which " a l l s p i r i t s who 
bear the i n t e l l e c t u a l world i n themselves and cannot seek either God 
or immortality outside themselves". 
I t i s generally conceded that the "System-Programme" i s a work 
of Schelling's which was l a t e r copied down i n f u l l by Hegel which 
would seem to imply that i t at least represents a project of which he 
approved.^^^^ I t was during these early years as radical c r i t i c s of 
(35) Dokumente, op.cit., pp.219-20. 
(36) While i t has generally been agreed that t h i s fragment was o r i g i n a l l y 
w r i t t e n by Schelling and then sent to Hegel which he then copied 
down i n his own hand, t h i s has been recently challenged by c r i t i c s 
who argue that i t was an o r i g i n a l piece by Hegel; see i n particular 
H.S. Harris, Hegel's Development Toward the Sunslight, Oxford, 1972, 
pp.249-57 and Otto Poggeler, "Hegel der Verfasser des altesten 
Systemprogramms des deutschen Idealismus" i n Hegel-Studien, IV, I969, 
pp.17-32. Herbert Marcuse i n his Reason and Revolution: Hegel and 
the Rise of Social Theory. London, 1954» pp.11-12 also seems to 
argue that the "Systemprogram" was an o r i g i n a l piece of work by 
Hegel, although he provides no real argument f o r his case. 
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exi s t i n g society that Schelling and Hegel found themselves a l l i e d . 
But i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to see with i n t h i s sketch a latent, as yet 
unstated difference between them which would l a t e r become manifest. 
Vfliat Schelling r e a l l y wants i s a transcendental freedom beyond the 
state which entails the complete annihilation of the f i n i t e , temporal 
world. What Hegel wants, however, i s merely the destruction of one 
p a r t i c u l a r kind of state, the state which treats men as "cogs i n a 
machine". For Hegel, the state i s a condition of, not a l i m i t a t i o n 
t o , human freedom and t h i s freedom i s only possible within the 
confines of the t e r r e s t r i a l world. Hence while Schelling desires a 
l i b e r a t i o n from the statie, Hegel desires a regeneration of state and 
society along the l i n e s of the ancient world. 
Another of the most marked influences on Hegel during these early 
years was Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man which 
Hegel immediately hailed a "masterpiece". I n these l e t t e r s S c h i l l e r , 
l i k e Hegel, sets out to contrast the harmony and cohesion of the 
ancient Greek world to the fragmentation and d i v i s i o n of modem society. 
He lays p a r t i c u l a r blaxne on the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the d i v i s i o n of 
labour as a source of t h i s fragmentation. Through the specialization 
of functions, man's fa c u l t i e s have become enervated and ossified u n t i l 
he i s now only a p a r t i a l , abstract caricature of what he once was. I n 
the c r u c i a l s i x t h l e t t e r S c h i l l e r c a l l s f o r a restoration of the whole, 
concrete man: " I t must be i n our power", he proclaims, "to 
re-establish i n our nature the t o t a l i t y that the a r t i f i c e of 
(37) 
c i v i l i z a t i o n has destroyed, to restore i t by a superior art".^"^ ' But 
despite t h e i r common b e l i e f that the Greek experience provides the only 
(37)J.C.F. S c h i l l e r , Werke (Nationalausgabe). ed. L. Blumenthal and 
B. von Weise, Weimar, I962, XX, p.328. 
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v a l i d norm f o r society, Schiller and Hegel d i f f e r fundamentally over 
how the t o t a l i t y of l i f e can be restored. For Schiller, t h i s 
restoration i s only possible through a lengthy "aesthetic education" 
i n which man's play i n s t i n c t (Spieltrieb) i s liberated and he would 
be free to develop a l l his f a c u l t i e s . For Sch i l l e r , as f o r Kant 
and Pichte, the realm of p o l i t i c s can at best provide only a setting 
f o r man's moral and a r t i s t i c development. Hegel, on the other hand, 
admires not so much the a r t i s t i c l i f e of the Greeks, but t h e i r f u l l y 
integrated republican community. A r t , f o r him, i s merely the 
expression of t h i s unfragmented social and p o l i t i c a l state. Hence 
his emphasis i s upon p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y rather than play. There i s 
also another significant difference between them. There i s a 
profoundly pessimistic note that runs throughout Schiller's Aesthetic 
Letters. According to him, the Greek world remains an ideal which 
i s i r r e t r i e v a b l y l o s t : "The phenomenon of Grecian humanity was 
undoubtedly a maximum which could be neither maintained nor 
surpassed".^^^^ There i s , on the contrary, a keen optimism i n 
Hegel' s early writings that with the advent of the Kantian and the 
French revolutions the r e b i r t h of classical wholeness and humanism 
i s imminent i n the near future. 
As a student Hegel had apparently been content simply to 
juxtapose what he called an objective r e l i g i o n to a subjective 
r e l i g i o n , the r e l i g i o n of a people to the private Christian r e l i g i o n . 
^ now there can be no doubt that his syinpathies were with the 
subjective f o l k r e l i g i o n of the ancients. This r e l i g i o n was happily 
expressed through the harmonious relationship between the individual 
and the community, man's active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n public p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
( 3 8 ) l b i d . , p.326. 
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I t was only with the b i r t h of Chri s t i a n i t y that there occurred a 
bi f u r c a t i o n between the earthly and the heavenly c i t i e s and t h i s 
b i f u r c a t i o n gave r i s e to what Hegel i n the Phenomenology of Mind 
would c a l l the "unhappy consciousness". I t was only a f t e r 
leaving Tubingen f o r Berae where he was tuto r to the wealthy 
von Steiger family that Hegel addressed himself to the h i s t o r i c a l 
question of how t h i s unhappy consciousness arose from the decline 
of the ancient world. I n fact i t was from t h i s Berne period 
(1793-96) that Hegel f i r s t attempts an h i s t o r i c a l explanation of 
(39) 
man's contemporary malaise.^ 
I I 
Hegel's major work of the Berne period i s a lengthy essay 
e n t i t l e d "On the P o s i t i v i t y of the Christian Religion".^4°^ As i n 
the e a r l i e r Tubingen essay Hegel i s here not concerned with r e l i g i o n 
per se, but with the social implications of religious experience and 
i n p a r t i c u l a r the r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s . But while 
the basic conceptual problematic has remained the same, he spells out 
i n f a r more d e t a i l and with a wealth of examples how positive 
Christian r e l i g i o n has h i s t o r i c a l l y served as a p i l l a r to despotism 
and oppression. I t does not follow from t h i s , however, as Georg Lukacs 
has argued, that Hegel's theological period can be dismissed as a 
(39) This i s Yihat Oakeshott c a l l s the "practical a t t i t u d e " to the past 
i n Rationalism i n P o l i t i c s , op.cit., pp.153-55 esp. 
(40) Nohl, op.cit., PP0I52-239; t h i s essay has been translated by 
T.M. Knox i n Hegel, Early Theological Writings. Chicago, I948, 
pp.67-167, but as Knox includes the pagination from the Nohl 
ed i t i o n and as he excludes a great deal of the material contained 
w i t h i n Nohl, I shall continue to c i t e the l a t t e r . 
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"reactionary legend created and fostered by the apologists of 
imperialism".^^^^ Even while Hegel i s vituperative i n his attack 
upon C h r i s t i a n i t y , he i s s t i l l searching f o r something akin to the 
non-positive, subjective f o l k religions of classical antiquity which 
can unite men i n freedom and d i g n i t y . Indeed such a r e l i g i o n i s a 
necessary prerequisite f o r any harmonious, non-divisive form of 
p o l i t i c a l society. 
Before undertaking an analysis of t h i s essay, we must f i r s t 
examine i n some d e t a i l exactly what Hegel means by a "positive" 
r e l i g i o n . What Hegel here c a l l s a positive r e l i g i o n i s very similar 
to what he had e a r l i e r called an objective r e l i g i o n . I t i s r e l i g i o n 
l a i d down i n the form of laws and statutes which the individual i s 
constrained to obey: 
A positive f a i t h i s a system of religious propositions 
which are true f o r us because they have been presented 
to us by an authority which we cannot f l o u t . I n the 
f i r s t instance the concept implies a system of religious 
propositions or truths which must be held to be truths 
independently of our own opinions, and even i f no man 
has ever perceived them or even i f no man has ever 
considered them to be t r u t h s , nevertheless remain truths. 
The truths are often said to be objective truths and what 
i s required of them i s that they should now become 
subjective t r u t h s , truths f o r us. (42) 
(41) Georg Lukacs, Per Junge Hegel: Ij'ber die Beziehungen von Dialektik 
und Okonomie, 2 vols., Frankfurt a/M, 1973, I , p.56. Luk£cs' 
att i t u d e towards Hegel's religious views i s extremely ambivalent. 
While he rejects his so-called theological period as a "reactionaiy 
legend" he also remarks that i t i s characteristic of philosophical 
idealism to vastly over emphasize the role of r e l i g i o n i n human 
a f f a i r s . And elsewhere he remarks that unlike Kant who suffered 
certain "materialist deviations" (Lenin), Hegel throughout his l i f e 
remained consistently an i d e a l i s t . The r e s u l t , to borrow a rather 
crude phrase from Marx of which Lukacs i s fond, i s a "manure of 
contradictions". For another interpretation of Hegel's early 
period see Walter Kaufmann, "Hegel's Early Antitheological Phase" 
i n Philosophical Review, L X I I I , I954, pp.3-18. 
(42) Nohl, op.cit., p.233. 
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This sort of r e l i g i o n i s , then, authoritarian and despotic i n that 
i t commands absolute obedience from vibich there i s no court of appeal. 
I t i s a r e l i g i o n of unfreedom which completely negates the individual's 
moral autonon^. 
I n contrast to the positive Christian r e l i g i o n , Hegel holds 
f o r t h a moral r e l i g i o n based upon the supremacy of man's practical 
reason (praktische Vernunft). I n both the essay on p o s i t i v i t y and 
somewhat e a r l i e r i n his b r i e f "Life of Jesus" Hegel assumes that t h i s 
r e l i g i o n takes as granted only the existence of God, the freedom of 
the w i l l and the immortality of the soul. Any attempts to complicate 
these basic tenets must be viewed as an aberration from genuine 
re l i g i o u s sentiment. As against a positive r e l i g i o n which maintains 
that man's duties stem from divine commandments, t h i s r e l i g i o n 
maintains that duty i s the law of man's own reason and that he need 
have no other motive f o r obeying i t than the love of reason alone. 
Hegel now began to see reason as that aspect of man which partakes 
i n the divine: "Pure reason which i s above any l i m i t a t i o n or 
r e s t r i c t i o n i s the diety i t s e l f " . ^ ^ - ^ ^ And l a t e r he remarks: "That 
fac u l t y which man can c a l l his own, elevated above death and decay... 
announces i t s e l f as reason. I t s law making depends on nothing else, 
nor can i t take i t s standards from any other authority on earth or 
i n h e a v e n " . O n l y a moral r e l i g i o n based upon simple truths 
gleaned i n the l i g h t of reason alone i s able to remove the 
transcendental element which Hegel sees as detrimental not only t o 
true r e l i g i o s i t y , but to social and p o l i t i c a l harmony as w e l l . This 
non-positive natural r e l i g i o n of man's practical reason can be seen 
as a reinterpretation of the Greek f o l k r e l i g i o n i n which God i s 
(43) l b i d . , p.75. 
(44) I b i d . , p.89. 
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perceived not as a transcendent e n t i t y , but as embodied i n the 
democratic c o l l e c t i v i t y of the p o l i s . 
I t was, according to Hegel, with the destruction of the antique 
c i t y and the subsequent r i s e of Christendom that r e l i g i o n became 
posi t i v i z e d and freedom vanished from the earth. I n fact the 
predominance of p o s i t i v i t y which has successfully pervaded every 
aspect of social and p o l i t i c a l l i f e remains i n his view a central 
motif i n contemporary times. I t i s only because men are unfree 
that they f a l l back upon b e l i e f and superstition thus abdicating 
the free use of t h e i r c r i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y : 
Recourse must be had, therefore, to a higher faculty 
before which reason must f a l l s i l e n t . Faith i s 
erected in t o a duty and removed int o a supernatural 
world to which the understanding has no access - and 
i n t h i s context f a i t h means a configuration of events 
presented to the imagination while the understanding 
constantly searches f o r a di f f e r e n t explanation. And 
. what prevents the understanding from entering t h i s 
world i s duty, i . e . fear of a mighty r u l e r which 
compels the understanding to collude i n a c t i v i t i e s 
abhorrent to i t . (45) 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , therefore, divests men of t h e i r reason i n order that 
they can more easily accept a doctrine based upon miracles and other 
obvious absurdities. By thus opening the flood gates of 
superstition C h r i s t i a n i t y creates a slavish demeanour incompatible 
with a free people. 
What Hegel means by " p o s i t i v i t y " i s , therefore, a renunciation 
of man's "inalienable r i g h t " to moral self-determination. For the 
positive Christian r e l i g i o n , the moral law i s not sa@sfthing derived 
from the autonoiny of the subject, but i s rather external to him, 
something "given" as such. Hegel's critique of positive Christianity 
(45)Ibid., p.236. 
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i s aimed at freeing man from ecclesiastical domination and returning 
to him the r i g h t to act and think f o r himself, to l e t reason follow 
i t s own course and pursue i t s own laws. Through increased awareness 
of t h e i r moral reason, men could dispense with Christianity and 
recover t h e i r freedom lost under the hegemony of p o s i t i v i t y . This 
freedom which Hegel believed was imminent i n his own time could not 
be actualized, as Schelling had imagined through the ego's act of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n , but only through the pract i c a l a c t i v i t y of a 
c i t i z e n i n a republic. Hegel's answer to the persistent problem of 
p o s i t i v i t y i s , then, the creation of a republican community, supported 
by a moral r e l i g i o n of man's own reason which teaches not some other-
worldly mysticism, but a broad social ethic designed to foster a 
sense of p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e . 
The bulk of "On the P o s i t i v i t y of the Christian Religion" i s 
given over to an analysis of how Chri s t i a n i t y , which emerged as a 
non- p o l i t i c a l sect from a subject people, the Jews, conquered the 
pagan c i v i l r e l i g i o n which f o r centuries had been intimately bound 
to the p o l i t i c a l constitution. Hegel rejects as too f a c i l e the 
usual e ^ l a n a t i o n that C h r i s t i a n i t y triumphed over paganism because 
of i t s r a t i o n a l superiority. To counter t h i s view he remarks rather 
caustically that the pagans too had i n t e l l e c t s and that " i n everything 
great, b e a u t i f u l , noble, and free they are so f a r our superiors that 
we can hardly make them our examples but must look up to them as a 
di f f e r e n t species at whose achievements we can only marvel".^^^^ I n 
any case i t i s hardly l i k e l y that the subjective, imaginative 
r e l i g i o n s of the ancients could have been supplanted by the cold, 
(46)Ibid., p.221 
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s y l l o g i s t i c , metaphysical reasoning of positive Christianity. 
I f the r i s e of Chr i s t i a n i t y cannot, tJierefore, be explained on 
purely i n t e l l e c t u a l terms, i t can be explained by certain social 
and p o l i t i c a l factors: "Great revolutions which stri k e the eye at 
a glance must have been preceded by a s t i l l and secret revolution 
i n the s p i r i t of the age, a revolution not v i s i b l e to every eye, 
especially imperceptible to contemporaries, and as hard to discern 
as to describe i n words".^ This secret revolution consists i n 
the h i s t o r i c a l t r a n s i t i o n from the ancient to the modern world. 
What emerges time and again i s Hegel's obvious idealization of the 
ancient democracies and the contrast they present to the fragmented 
and divided p o l i t i c a l culture of contemporary times. I t i s clear 
that the thought of the French Revolution and i t s promise to revive 
the ethos of antique republicanism i s never f a r from Hegel's mind. 
The c i v i l r e l i g i o n of Greek and Roman antiquity was dependent 
upon the harmonious p o l i t i c a l culture of the c i t y , i t could not 
survive apart from the social l i f e of the people. I n the eyes of 
the c i t i z e n , the republic was the highest form of r e a l i t y before 
which his own i n d i v i d u a l i t y seemed i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Here i s how 
Hegel describes the antique republic: 
As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws l a i d 
down by themselves, obeyed men whom they had themselves 
appointed to o f f i c e , waged wars on which they had 
themselves decided, gave t h e i r property, exhausted 
t h e i r passions, and sacrificed t h e i r l i v e s by thousands 
fo r an end which was t h e i r own. They neither learned 
nor taught (a moral system) but evinced by th e i r actions 
the moral maxims which they could c a l l t h e i r very own. 
In public as i n private and domestic l i f e , every 
individual was a free man, one who l i v e d by his ovm laws. 
' The idea of his country or of his state v/as the i n v i s i b l e 
and higher r e a l i t y f o r which he strove, which impelled 
him to e f f o r t ; i t was the f i n a l end of his world or i n 
his eyes the f i n a l end of the world, an end which he 
found manifested i n the r e a l i t i e s of his daily l i f e or 
(47)I b i d . , p.220. 
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which he himself co-operated i n manifesting and 
maintaining. Confronted by t h i s idea, his own 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y vanished; i t was only t h i s idea's 
maintenance, l i f e , and persistence that he asked 
f o r , and these were things which he himself could 
make r e a l i t i e s . I t could never or hardly ever 
have struck him to ask or beg f o r persistence or 
eternal l i f e f o r his own i n d i v i d u a l i t y . Only i n 
moments of i n a c t i v i t y or lethargy could he feel 
the growing strength of a purely self-regarding 
wish. Cato turned to Plato's Phaedo only when 
his world, his republic, hitherto the highest 
order of things i n his eyes, had been destroyed; 
at that point only did he take f l i g h t to a higher 
order s t i l l . (48) 
One central feature which contributed to the harmony and cohesion 
of the ancient republic was, according to Hegel, the basic equality 
of wealth and the absence of a s o c i a l l y d i v i s i v e class system. I t 
w i l l be recalled that as early as his school essay on the ancient 
poets the young Hegel held the existence of classes as a basis f o r 
d r i t i c i z i n g modern society. He returns to t h i s question again i n 
one of his so-called " h i s t o r i c a l studies" w r i t t e n at approximately 
the same time as the essay on p o s i t i v i t y . Here Hegel makes the 
perceptive observation that i n the modem state security of property 
i s the axis around which a l l l e g i s l a t i o n revolves and to which a l l 
the r i g h t s of the c i t i z e n pertain.^^^^ This i s quite d i f f e r e n t from 
the free republic of antiquity i n which the state frequently found i t 
necessary to encroach upon the r i g h t of property. I n Athens, f o r 
example, affluent citizens were usually stripped of t h e i r wealth by 
assigning them to public offices which would require great expenses. 
I f , however, such a c i t i z e n should f i n d another wealthier than himself 
and the l a t t e r claimed to be poorer, he could propose an exchange of 
possessions which could not be refused. Hegel argues that history 
(48) I b i d . , pp.221-22. 
(49) Dokumente, op.cit., p.268. 
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proves i n the cases of Periclean Athens, the period of the Gracchi 
i n Rome and Florence i n the days of the Medici how the vast 
accumulation of wealth i n the hands of a few inevitably leads to 
the destruction of p o l i t i c a l freedom. 
Thus Hegel stands f o r the greatest equality of wealth possible 
as a means of maximizing p o l i t i c a l freedom. This freedom i s the 
f r u i t of putting the common interest before one's private interest 
and not the f r u i t of enjoying the use of a f r e e l y disposable property. 
He makes i t quite clear that his position i s similar to that of the 
radical phase of the French Revolution: "Perhaps the system of 
Sansculottism", he says, "has been done a grave i n j u s t i c e by those 
who see rapacity as the sole motive underlying t h e i r wish f o r a 
greater equality of wealth".^^^^ 
I t nevertheless remains to be seen how t h i s classical democracy 
f e l l i n t o decline. Hegel elaborates an ingenious h i s t o r i c a l 
explanation no doubt borrowed from the "pragmatic" historians of the 
Enlightenment, Gibbon and Montesquieu. Despite the strictures against 
inequality, successful campaigns abroad brought about the increase i n 
wealth and luxuries and the r i s e of a wealthy and indolent a r i s t r o c r a t i c 
class. The free republic which was based upon a very ascetic and 
severe way of l i f e could not sustain these changes and the s p i r i t of 
v i r t u e slowly l o s t i t s vigour. When the aristocracy usurped p o l i t i c a l 
power and established a dictatorship maintained through force of arms, 
there occurred the extinction of a l l freedom and l i b e r t i e s . Here 
again i t w i l l be necessary to quote Hegel at length as a paraphrase 
does less than justice to his portrayal of t h i s phenomenon: 
(50)lbid., p.269. 
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The picture of the state as a product of his own 
energies disappeared from the citizen's soul. 
The care and oversight of the whole rested on the 
soul of one man or a few. Each individual had 
his own a l l o t t e d place, a place more or less 
r e s t r i c t e d and d i f f e r e n t from his neighbor's. 
The administration of the state machine was 
intrusted to a small number of citizens and these 
served only as single cogs deriving t h e i r worth 
solely from t h e i r connection with others. Each 
man's a l l o t t e d part i n the congeries which formed 
the vdiole was so inconsiderable i n r e l a t i o n to the 
whole that the individual did not need to realize 
t h i s r e l a t i o n or to keep i t i n view. Usefulness 
to the state was the great end which the state set 
before i t s subjects, and the end they set before 
themselves i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l i f e was gain, s e l f -
maintenance, and perhaps vanity. A l l a c t i v i t y 
and every purpose now had a bearing on something 
ind i v i d u a l ; a c t i v i t y was no longer f o r the sake 
of the v/hole or an i d e a l . Either everyone worked 
f o r himself or else he was compelled to work f o r 
some other i n d i v i d u a l . Freedom to obey self-given 
laws, to follow self-chosen leaders i n peacetime 
and self-chosen generals i n war, to carry out plans 
i n whose formulation one had had one's share - a l l 
t h i s vanished. A l l p o l i t i c a l freedom vanished also; 
the citizen's r i g h t gave him only a r i g h t to the 
security of that property which now f i l l e d his entire 
world. Death, the phenomenon vidiich demolished the 
whole structure of his purposes and the a c t i v i t y of 
his entire l i f e , must have become something 
t e r r i f y i n g , since nothing survived him. But the 
republican's whole soul was i n the republic; the 
republic survived him, and there hovered before his 
mind the thought of i t s immortality. (51) 
For Hegel, an important reason f o r the collapse of the ancient 
world was the increasing concern with private property. The 
immediate consequence of t h i s was that the c i t i z e n no longer worked 
f o r the good of his country, but f o r his own personal aggrandizement. 
Since a l l a c t i v i t y was related to the individual, the r i g h t of 
property came to ta£e precedence over p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . And 
i n order to compensate for t h i s loss of i d e n t i t y with the community, 
legal guarantees were established against i t . I t was the introduction 
(5i)H6hi..op.ei$., p.233. 
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of Roman law that severed the relationship between the c i t i z e n and 
the commonwealth which formerly had been the mark of freedom. This 
law reduced each individual to his s o l i t a r y atomistic self unrelated 
(52) 
to his fellows except as a property owner. ^-^  ' Needless to say, 
t h i s law which was formalized and codified had l i t t l e i n common with 
the old law which was based upon custom and habit and was noT/here 
w r i t t e n i n words, but was imminent i n the minds of those subject to 
i t . 
This was the f i r s t appearance i n history of the s p l i t between 
man's private l i f e and public l i f e , a s p l i t which would l a t e r be 
manifested as the unhappy consciousness which Hegel views as the 
source of the contemporary p o l i t i c a l malaise. I t was not Hegel, 
however, but Rousseau who f i r s t drew attention to t h i s s p l i t i n 
modem l i f e . He set out the problem as the difference between 
I'homme prive^ and the citoyen. The f i r s t i s an exclusively private 
individual with a w i l l and conscience uniquely his own, the second 
i s a member of a p o l i t i c a l society which necessarily l i m i t s his w i l l 
and violates his conscience. Man i n modem society i s thus forced 
to lead a dual existence f l o a t i n g , as Rousseau says i n Emile, between 
his penchants and his devoirs. His solution to t h i s dilemma i s 
advanced i n the Social Contract where each individual agrees to 
surrender his r i g h t s and property to the community and through t h i s 
act of association there i s formed "un corps moral et c o l l e c t i f " i n 
which each individual w i l l desire only what i s generally w i l l e d . ^^ ^^  
I t i s not possible to say with absolute certainty that t h i s was 
also Hegel's solution to the problem. I t i s true that, l i k e Rousseau, 
(52) c f . Hegel's analysis of the "abstract legal personality" i n 
Phanomenologie, op.cit., pp.342-465 Phenomenology, op.cit.,pp.501-06. 
(53) Rousseau, op.cit., I I , p.33. 
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Hegel desires a form of p o l i t i c a l association which could recapture 
the spontaneous and i n t u i t i v e harmony of the early Greeks and 
Romans thereby overcoming the d e b i l i t a t i n g dualism i n modem l i f e 
between the private sphere and the public sphere, the bourgeois 
and the citoyen. And l i k e Rousseau's volonte^ generale, the 
Hegelian Volksgeist i s intended to include the individual within a 
wider frame of reference than his isolated existence. S t i l l Hegel 
leaves unresolved whether the social contract has i t s origins i n an 
actual covenant between a l l and a l l or whether i t i s the consequence 
of the subjection of the weak by the strong. ^ ^^ ^ Meanwhile, however, 
we sha l l follow Hegel's account a few steps further. 
The reduction of the c i t i z e n to a private, property owning 
individual created i n him an inordinate fear of death. While the 
republican's whole soul has been bound up with the republic i n which 
he survived even a f t e r death, nothing survived the property owner who 
had eschewed a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Hegel uses t h i s changed 
a t t i t u d e towards death as a means of contrasting the greatness and 
n o b i l i t y of antiquity to the baseness and pettiness of the modem 
(55) 
Christian world. The Greeks faced death as a power of nature 
before which they could do nothing but passively submit. I n t h i s 
way they were able to face i t manfully and undaunted and without a 
bevy of priests and s p i r i t u a l advisers. The Christian fear of death, 
on the other hand, was i n i t i a t e d by Jesus who attempted to i n s t i l a 
fe e l i n g of g u i l t and remorse i n t o humanity i n penance for his 
s a c r i f i c e . 
With t h i s exaggerated fear of death, there arose, not surprisingly, 
a d i s i n c l i n a t i o n f o r m i l i t a r y service which had been one of the p i l l a r s 
(54) l o h l , op.cit., pp.191-93. 
(55) l b i d . , pp.46,59. 
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of the antique c i t y . I n another of his h i s t o r i c a l fragments Hegel 
contrasts m i l i t a r y service under the Greek republic and under a 
modern monarchy.^^^^ Under a monarchy the people are active only 
f o r the duration of aimed c o n f l i c t a f t e r which i t must return to a 
state of servile obedience. Under a republic, however, the matter 
i s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t : "Here the word of command i s l i b e r t y , the 
enemy tyranny, the commander-in-chief the constitution, subordination 
obedience to i t s representatives". Here the people enter combat 
enflamed by an enthusiasm for l i b e r t y , an enthusiasm which cannot 
(56)Quoted from Karl-Rosenkranz, Georg V/ilhelm Fredrick Hegels Leben. 
Be r l i n , 1844» photo reprint Darmstadt, 1963, p.532. The actual 
authorship of t h i s piece i s somewhat i n doubt as, i t has been 
pointed out, i t i s w r i t t e n i n French, a language which Hegel 
neither previously nor subsequently used to express his ideas. 
Of course even i f Hegel was not the author of t h i s extract, the 
question would s t i l l remain as to why he chose to write i t down. 
I n order to give the reader a more accurate picture of v/hat i s at 
issue, I shall here quote the entirety of the or i g i n a l French text: 
Dans l a monarchie l e peuple ne f u t une puissance active, que 
pour l e moment du combat. Comme une arme'e soldee i l devoit garder 
les rangs non seulement dans l e feu du combat meme, mais aussitdt 
apr^s l a v i c t o i r e rentrer dans une parfaite obeissance. Notre 
experience est accoutumee, de vo i r une masse d'hommes arme's 
entrer, au mot d'ordre, dans une f u r i e reglee du carnage et dans 
les l o t e r i e s de mort et de vie^^ et sur un mime mot rentrer dans 
l e calme. On l e demanda l a meme chose d'un peuple, qui s'est 
arme lui-meine. Le mot d'ordre e t o i t l a l i b e r t e , I'ennemi l a 
tyrannie, l e commandement en chef une constitution, l a 
subordination 1'obeissance envers ses represantants. Mais i l y 
a bien de l a difference entre l a passivite de l a subordination 
m i l i t a i r e et l a fogue d'une insurrection; entre I'obe'issance a 
i'ordre d'un general et l a flamme de 1'enthousiasme que l a 
li b e r t e ' fond par toutes les veines d'un etre vivant. C'est 
cette flamme sacree, qui tendoit tous les nerfs, c'est pour 
e l l e , pour j o u r i r d'elle, qu'ils s'etoient tendus. Ces e f f o r t s 
sont les jouissances de l a l i b e r t e ' e t vous voulez, qu'elle 
renonce a e l l e s ; ces occupations, cette a c t i v i t y pour l a 
chose publique, cet Interet est 1'agent, et vous voulez que 
l e peuple s'elance encore a 1'inaction a 1'ennui? 
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simply be extinguished when v i c t o r y has been attained. I t i s t h e i r 
constant readiness to defend freedom which characterizes a free 
people. 
Under these changed conditions, the old c i v i l r e l i g i o n no longer 
made sense. But even while despotism had transformed the classical 
c i t i z e n i n t o a mere private person, i t could not destroy his need f o r 
an absolute which transcends the insignificance of his own i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
I t was only here that Christianity with i t s promise of freedom and 
equality i n the hereafter was able to make any impact. While the 
c i t i z e n had found his absolute through p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
his c i t y , C h r i s t i a n i t y served as a suitable ideology f o r men who had 
despaired of f i n d i n g happiness i n t h e i r earthly existence: 
Thus the despotism of the Roman emperors had chased the 
human s p i r i t from the earth and spread a misery which 
compelled men to seek and expect happiness i n heaven; 
robbed of freedom, t h e i r s p i r i t , t h e i r external and 
absolute element, was forced to take f l i g h t to the diety. 
The o b j e c t i v i t y of God i s a counterpart to the corruption 
and slavery of man, and i t i s s t r i c t l y only a revelation, 
only a manifestation of the s p i r i t of the age....The 
s p i r i t of the age was revealed i n i t s objective conception 
of God when he was no longer regarded as l i k e ourselves, 
though i n f i n i t e l y greater, but was put into another world 
i n whose confines we had no part, to which we contributed 
nothing by our a c t i v i t y , but into which, at best, we could 
beg or conjure our way. I t was revealed again when man 
himself became a non-ego and his God another non-ego.... 
I n a period l i k e t h i s , God must have ceased altogether to 
be something subjective and have e n t i r e l y become an object, 
and the perversion of the maxims of morality i s then 
easily and l o g i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n theory. (57) 
Unlike the pagan c i v i l r e l i g i o n which was based upon man's practical 
reason, the free self-determination of the individual, Christianity 
i s based upon t h i s innate moral corruption of mankind. And t h i s i s 
obviously a convenient doctrine f o r despots who fi n d i t advantageous 
(57)Nohl, op.cit.. pp.227-28. 
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to turn t h e i r subject's attention from t h e i r actual condition i n 
the here and now t o salvation to be found i n heaven alone. 
Hegel's conclusion i s , then, that the major factor contributing 
to the r i s e of C h r i s t i a n i t y was the decline of the old democratic 
freedom and the non-positive, subjective c i v i l r e l i g i o n which 
sustained i t , through the emergence of economic and p o l i t i c a l 
i n e q u a l i t i e s . This was brought about by the Roman Empire's 
expansionist policies which completely levelled other foreign 
nations and t h e i r national r e l i g i o n s . Such a si t u a t i o n i n which 
there was no longer an immediate i d e n t i t y between the individual 
and the community provided f e r t i l e s o i l f o r a purely private r e l i g i o n 
l i k e C h r i s t i a n i t y . Thus Ch r i s t i a n i t y arose to meet certain social 
needs brought about by the b i f u r c a t i o n i n the Roman experience 
between public and private l i f e . 
What now needs to be c l a r i f i e d i s how Christianity which began 
as a purely private r e l i g i o n was able t o insinuate i t s e l f throughout 
the whole of p o l i t i c a l l i f e and thus become "positive" i n the sense 
already described. To some extent, Hegel distinguishes between the 
teachings of Jesus and how these teachings l a t e r became perverted 
i n t o a positive doctrine. Jesus i s seen as a great moral leader 
whose task i t was "to raise r e l i g i o n and v i r t u e to morality and to 
restore to morality the freedom which i s i t s e s s e n c e " . ' This 
humanistic, non-authoritarian r e l i g i o n appeals not so much to dogma 
or some transcendent e n t i t y , but to the reasonableness of man. I t 
i s precisely t h i s sort of natural r e l i g i o n which Hegel sees as central 
to the harmonious moral l i f e of the community. 
(58)lbid., p.154. 
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I n one inrportant respect, however, the p o s i t i v i z i n g of 
Chr i s t i a n i t y was, according to Hegel, the f a u l t of Jesus himself. 
I n order to widen his appeal, Jesus was forced to stress the 
d i v i n i t y of his own person and to speak of himself as the sole 
repository of divine l e g i s l a t i o n . The l e g a l i s t i c f a i t h of his 
Jewish audience which was accustomed to conceiving a l l laws as 
revealed would have no means of grasping a purely rational r e l i g i o n : 
"To propose", he says, "to appeal to reason alone would have meant 
the same thing as preaching to f i s h , because the Jews had no means 
(eg) 
of apprehending a r e l i g i o n of that kind".^-'-'' Hence the origi n a l 
intentions of Christ were subverted by the debased circumstances 
i n which they arose. 
Another feature responsible f o r turning Christianity into a 
positive r e l i g i o n was Jesus' at t i t u d e toward his disciples. I n 
contrasing the narrow sectarianism of Jesus with the universal 
humanism of Socrates, Hegel notes how the former r i g i d l y fixed his 
number of disciples at twelve while f o r the l a t t e r any friend of 
v i r t u e was welcome. I n accordance with the private nature of 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y , Jesus sought to divorce his small band of disciples 
from the ongoing l i f e of society i n order to make them completely 
private individuals. Socrates, on the other hand, taught men how 
to be good citizens by developing t h e i r own unique s k i l l s and 
cap a b i l i t i e s each quite d i f f e r e n t from the others. In t h i s way 
they were enabled to enrich the l i f e of the community: "Each one 
of his students was himself a master: many founded schools of t h e i r 
own; several were great generals, statesmen, heroes of a l l kinds.... 
Besides, whoever was a fisherman, remained a fisherman; nobody was to 
(59)lbid., p.159. 
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leave his home; wit h each he started with his handicraft and thus 
led him from the hand to the s p i r i t " . ^ ^ ^ ^ Of course Hegel's interest 
i n t h i s matter i s not merely antiquarian. I t i s to ezpose the 
malignant effects of Christian doctrine i n contrast to the beautiful 
Greek way of l i f e and to uphold the l a t t e r as a norm f o r the 
p o l i t i c a l reform of modern society. 
The disciples, too, must bear some of the responsibility i n 
p o s i t i v i z i n g C h r i s t i a n i t y . I n order to win converts they emphasized 
the more fantastic and miraculous aspects of Christ's teachings thus 
pandering to ignorance and popular superstition. This was obviously 
easier than propagating Jesus' moral vision of the world. 
Consequently Jesus came to be revered not because of his v i r t u e , but 
his v i r t u e because of him.^^^^ V/hat was once a humane r e l i g i o n 
based upon the individual's p r a c t i c a l reason thus became 
transcendentally sanctioned and commanded i n a positive sense. But 
i t was only when the moral precepts of Jesus, suited only f o r the 
e d i f i c a t i o n of private individuals, were extended to society at large, 
that C h r i s t i a n i t y t r u l y adopted a positive character. While such 
precepts are admissable i n a small sect or community where everyone 
has the r i g h t to be or not to be a member, when extended to a large 
state they become incompatible with freedom and serve only to 
(62) 
enslave man.^ ' 
I n a series of b r i l l i a n t images Hegel shows how the t r a n s i t i o n 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y from a voluntary sect to a state r e l i g i o n v/as 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y bound up with the emergence of inequality of wealth. 
For the early Christians, f o r example, the surrender of a l l private 
(60) l b i d . , p.33; see also pp.163-64. 
(61) l b i d . , pp.164-66. 
(62) l b i d . , p.44. 
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property was a s t r i c t condition f o r admission in t o the group. But 
Hegel notes that i f t h i s p r i n c i p l e of communal property had been 
rigorously applied i t would scarcely have aided the cause of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i n a world where the enjoyment of property had become 
the highest good. Consequently whether from necessity or from 
prudential considerations, t h i s p rinciple was abandoned at an early 
date. I n i t s place voluntary offerings to the common piirse were 
accepted as a means of buying one's way into heaven. Contributions 
to the priesthood were also encouraged with the result that the 
p r i e s t s , careful not to squander t h e i r acquisitions, used them to 
enrich themselves and reduce the l a i t y to penury. Thus the 
priesthood was able to set i t s e l f up as a class apart from the rest 
of humanity. As monopolists of religious t r u t h , a l l moral 
l e g i s l a t i o n was handed over to t h i s p r i e s t l y authority and the 
c r i t e r i o n f o r r i g h t actions became enmeshed i n a "systematic web" 
outside the grasp of the common layman. 
I n a similar fashion the p r i n c i p l e of equality came to be 
p o s i t i v i z e d . For the p r i m i t i v e church, equality was the principle 
whereby the slave i s the brother of his owner. Since t h i s theory 
could not be accommodated by the p o l i t i c a l society into which 
C h r i s t i a n i t y was a product, i t was suitably :;aimended: "This theory, 
to be sure, had been retained i n a l l i t s comprehensiveness, but with 
the clever addition that i t i s i n the eyes of heaven that a l l men are 
equal i n t h i s sense. For t h i s reason, i t receives no further notice 
i n the earthly l i f e " . ^ ^ ^ ^ Even while inequality v/as repudiated i n 
theory i t was retained i n practice. As a r e s u l t , many Christian 
ceremonies such as Holy Communion where the equality and f r a t e r n i t y 
(63)lbid., p.168. 
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of the disciples plays a major role became nothing more than empty 
fo r m a l i t i e s practiced by pious hypocrites. 
Hegel's v i i t r i o l i c attack upon Christianity i s not merely 
confined to the period of Rome i n decline, but i s intended to cover 
the whole of European history, and what he p a r t i c u l a r l y despises i s 
Christianity's a b i l i t y to accommodate i t s e l f t o every form of 
p o l i t i c a l regime: 
I t was the r e l i g i o n of the I t a l i a n states i h the 
fi n e s t period of t h e i r licentious freedom i n the 
Middle Ages; of the grave and free Swiss republics; 
of the more or less moderate monarchies of modem 
Europe; alike of the most heavily oppressed serfs 
and t h e i r overlords: both attended one church. 
Headed by the Cross, the Spaniards murdered whole 
generations i n America; over the conquest of India 
the English sang Christian thanksgivings. 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y was the mother of the f i n e s t blossoms 
of the p l a s t i c a r t s ; i t gave ri s e to the t a l l 
e difice of the sciences. Yet i n i t s honour too a l l 
f i n e a r t was banned, and the development of the 
sciences was reckoned an impiety. I n a l l climates 
the tree of the Cross has grown, taken root, and 
f r u c t i f i e d . Every joy i n l i f e has been linked with 
t h i s f a i t h , while the most miserable gloom has found 
i n i t i t s nourishment and i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . (64) 
I n t h i s manner no aspect of l i f e has escaped the influence of 
positive C h r i s t i a n i t y which has everywhere served as a p i l l a r of 
despotism and oppression. 
I n the f i n a l analysis what Hegel dislike s about the Christian 
r e j i g i o n i s the purely passive atti t u d e i t adopts to any debased 
s i t u a t i o n i n which i t finds i t s e l f . For the ancient Greeks as well 
as f o r the Kantian moralist, what i s of moment i s the free w i l l , 
man's power of pr a c t i c a l reason. Both the pagan c i v i l r e l i g i o n and 
the pagan republic were produced by the voluntaiy v / i l l of the c i t i z e n . 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , however, replaced t h i s active side of human nature with 
(64)lbid., p.140. 
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a purely passive desire,^^^^ For the Christian, neither his god 
nor his community i s i n any way an emanation of his w i l l . Both 
appear implacably given, something which confronts him i n an alien 
and positive manner. Thus Chr i s t i a n i t y breaks man's w i l l to lead 
an active, creative l i f e as a c i t i z e n of a free state. 
Hegel concludes "On the P o s i t i v i t y of the Christian Religion" 
with a p r a c t i c a l solution to the impasse posed by positive 
C h r i s t i a n i t y . His solution i s to develop a new non-positive, 
non-objective c i v i l r e l i g i o n as a means of establishing a f u l l y 
integrated, harmonious p o l i t i c a l culture i n Germany. While such a 
r e l i g i o n would be based upon the p o l i t i c a l r e l i g i o n of classical 
a n t i q u i t y , i t would have to be t a i l o r e d to meet spe c i f i c a l l y German 
needs. Indeed Rosenkranz reports a fragment where Hegel 
contemplates the supersession of both paganism and Christianity by 
a new r e l i g i o n which could bring about the moral regeneration of 
Germany. ^ ^^^ But t h i s moral regeneration which Hegel hopes f o r i s 
s t i l l a future Utopian i d e a l , as yet i t has no concrete existence 
i n the actual world. Only, he believes, through practical p o l i t i c a l 
action w i l l t h i s ideal be realized. 
I n contrast to his Utopian i d e a l , Hegel holds up the present 
wretchedness and misery of Germany where p o s i t i v i t y i s the predominant 
feature of religious and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . He goes on to blame 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y f o r pu t t i n g an end to the old indigenous national .-
rel i g i o u s imagery and populaj: culture: 
(65) l b i d . , p,224. 
(66) Rosenkranz, op.cit., p.l41, 
45 
Chr i s t i a n i t y has emptied Valhalla, f e l l e d the 
sacred groves, extirpated the national imagery 
as a shameful s u p e r s t i t i t i o n , as a de v i l i s h 
poison, and given us instead the imagery of a 
nation whose climate, laws, culture, and interests 
are strange to us and whose history has no 
connection whatever with our own. A David or a 
Solomon l i v e s i n our popular imagination, but our 
country's heroes slumber i n learned history books, 
and, f o r the scholars who write them, Alexander or 
Caesar i s as interesting as the story of Charlemagne 
or Fredrick Barbarossa. Except perhaps f o r Luther 
i n the eyes of the Protestants, what heroes could we 
have had, we who were never a nation? Who could be 
our Theseus, who founded a state and was i t s 
l e gislator? Where are our Haimodius and Aristogiton 
to whom we could sing scolia as the liberators of our 
land? (67) 
The only event, according to Hegel, which a large part of the nation 
took any in t e r e s t , the Lutheran Reformation*,has been allowed to lapse 
i n the popular imagination. I t has become only a dimly perceived 
memory and i s no longer retained i n any l i v i n g fashion i n the 
p r a c t i c a l l i f e of the people. 
This absence of any national religious imagery has i t s 
counterpart i n the absence of any p o l i t i c a l imagery. Returning to 
a theme developed i n his early essay on the ancient poets, Hegel 
remarks that the difference i n the education of the classes prevents 
any popular culture from taking root i n Germany. Hegel i s not blind 
to the c u l t u r a l achievements of the educated upper class, but he 
observes that the d e l i g h t f u l jeux d'esprit of Holty, Burger and Musaus 
are e n t i r e l y l o s t on the masses of people who cannot understand the 
characters and scenes depicted i n t h e i r works.^^^^ The overly 
refined and sophisticated a r t of the modems i s , however, nothing i n 
comparison to the great a r t of the Greeks. The plays of Sophocles 
(67) Nohl, op.cit.. p.215, 
(68) I b i d . , p.216. 
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and Euripides were not wri t t e n f o r the amusement of a cozy e l i t e , 
but were immediately accessible and understood by the entire nation. 
In order to bring about the cohesion and harmony of German 
culture Hegel speaks of the p r i o r necessity f o r a r e l i g i o n similar 
to the subjective c i v i l r e ligions of the Greeks and Romans. The 
absolute unity of p o l i t i c s and r e l i g i o n i n ancient Hellas assured 
the freedom of the community and Hegel sees a future German republic 
b u i l t upon th i s classical foundation. I n t h i s context he c r i t i c i z e s 
the a n t i - c l a s s i c a l doctrines of certain romantic poets, notably 
Klopstock, f o r t h e i r attempts to revive the old Teutonic nyths and 
legends as a basis fo r a re v i v a l of a national culture: 
The project of restoring to a nation an imagery once l o s t 
was always doomed to f a i l u r e ; and on the whole i t was 
bound to be even less fortunate than Julian's attempt to 
inculcate the mythology of his forefathers into his 
contemporaries i n i t s old strength and universality.... 
The old German imagery has nothing i n our day to connect 
or adapt i t s e l f to; i t stands as cut o f f from the whole 
c i r c l e of our ideas, opinions, and be l i e f s , and i s as 
strange to us as the imagery of Ossian or of India. (69) 
I t i s only, then, the creation of a new national r e l i g i o n based upon 
the sovereignty of man's pra c t i c a l reason that can bring about the 
republic of free men who regard one another as "ends i n themselves". 
Such a republic would put an end to the diremptive s p l i t encapsulated 
i n the Christian experience between man's public l i f e and private l i f e , 
the earthly and the heavenly c i t i e s , and return to the classical 
ideal of wholeness, harmony and si m p l i c i t y . 
( 6 9 ) l b i d . . P.2L7. 
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I I I 
During his years i n Tiibingen and Berne Hegel's thought can be 
characterized by i t s strongly p r a c t i c a l bent. His researches, fo r 
example, int o the Greek and Roman religious practices were not 
motivated by a disinterested love of the past, but with an eye to 
the transformation of the present. Yet despite his emphasis upon 
p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l action, Hegel was no revolutionary. I t i s 
nonsense to maintain, as Joachim R i t t e r has done, that Hegel's 
early writings are i n accordance with French Jacobinism. ^ "^ ^^  This 
assertion i s based upon an altogether too f a c i l e comparison between 
Hegel's adulation of the pagan c i v i l r e l i g i o n and Robespierre's 
culte de I'etre supreme. I t seems en t i r e l y to ignore Hegel's 
e x p l i c i t s t r i c t u r e s against Robespierre and the Jacobins. As he 
put i t i n a l e t t e r to Schelling: "You w i l l no doubt have heard that 
Carriere has been g u i l l o t i n e d . Do you s t i l l read French newspapers? 
I f I remember correctly I have heard that they have been proscribed 
i n luSirttemberg* This t r i a l i s very important as i t has uncovered the 
(n) 
ignominy of the Robespierrists".^' ' And i n another l e t t e r to 
Nanette Endel he expresses his disgust at how the revolutionazy wars 
had l a i d waste to the v i l l a g e s and reduced the churches to t h e i r bare 
walle . ( 72 ) 
I t would, however, be unfortunate i f the conservative, i f not 
to say, reactionary tendencies of Hegel's mature p o l i t i c a l thought 
(70) Joachira R i t t e r , Hegel und die franz'o'sische Revolution, Koln and 
Opladen, 1957; see also Jean Hyppolite "The Significance of the 
French Revolution i n Hegel's Phenomenology" i n Studies i n Marx 
and Hegel, trans. John O'Neill, London, I969, pp.35-69• 
(71) Letter from Hegel to Schelling, 24 December 1794> Briefe. op.cit.. 
I , p.12. 
(72) Letter from Hegel to Nanette Endel, 25 May 1798» Briefe. op.cit.. 
I , p.58. 
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(73) are seen as somehow i m p l i c i t i n his early writings.^' ' Like many 
German i n t e l l e c t u a l s , Hegel was a supporter of the moderate 
Girondist phase of the Revolution. The Girondists led by such men 
as Brissot and Condorcet seemed the cultured republicans who 
favoured an aristocracy of merit and the rule of law. ^ contrast 
the xenophobia and fanaticism of a Saint-Just seemed inimical to a 
well ordered republic. Unlike some of his more radical contemporaries, 
Hegel did not f e e l i t would be desirable to import revolution to 
Germany where he hoped that p o l i t i c a l reform could accomplish the 
same end. But even while he did not support a German uprising, the 
reforms he advocated were of a f a i r l y radical variety considering the 
society i n which he l i v e d . This becomes readily apparent i n two 
short p o l i t i c a l t r a c t s w r i t t e n shortly a f t e r his a r r i v a l i n Frankfurt 
am Maim where he had gone to j o i n his friend H*6lderlin. 
The f i r s t of these, Hegel's f i r s t published work, i s an 
annotated translation of some l e t t e r s of a Swiss lawyer Jean-Jacques 
Cart e n t i t l e d Confidential Letters upon the previous constitutional 
r e l a t i o n of Wadtland (Pays de Vaud) to the City of Berne.^"^^^ Cart, 
l i k e Hegel, was a Girondist by temperament and his l e t t e r s are a 
defense of French speaking Vaud against i t s German speaking Bernese 
overlords. I n these l e t t e r s Cart shows how the rights of the Vaudois 
had come to be increasingly violated ever since they had f a l l e n under 
the suzerainty of Berne i n the early XVIth century. An abortive 
uprising had only brought harsher and more repressive measures by the 
Berne oligarchy. While these l e t t e r s were o r i g i n a l l y published i n 
(73)This i s the consistent flaw of Franz Rosenzweig's Hegel und der 
Staat, 2 vols., Berlin and Munich, 1920 who persists i n e n l i s t i n g 
Hegel's support f o r Bismark's l a t e r policies of "blood and i r o n " . 
At no time, not even i n his l a t e r years, did Hegel ever support 
the sort of crude Machtpolitik endorsed by Hosenzweig and the 
Meineke school. 
(74)Dokumente, op.cit., pp.247-57. 
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Paris i n 1793 - the author was subsequently forced to flee to America 
when the Jacobins assumed power - Hegel's translation did not appear 
u n t i l 1798 by which time Vaud had already been liberated by French 
troops; and i t was not f o r over a century that the anonymous 
translator was d e f i n i t i v e l y established as Hegel.^ -^^ 
Hegel's purpose i n undertaking t h i s translation i s to unmask 
the corruption and abuses of the Bernese government which he conceives 
as t y p i c a l of a r i s t o c r a t i c misrule. The essence of his cri t i q u e can 
already be found i n his l e t t e r to Schelling cited e a r l i e r : 
Every ten years the sovereign council replaces about 
ninety of i t s members. Compared to the combinations 
that go on here, the intrigues of cousins and relatives 
at princely courts are nothing. I t i s such that I 
cannot describe i t . The father nominates his son or 
the husband of his daughter who w i l l bring i n the largest 
dowry and so on. I n order to understand an aris t o c r a t i c 
constitution i t i s necessary to spend a winter here before 
the Easter election. (76) 
I n launching t h i s attack Hegel was demanding that a l l existing 
governments rule i n accordance with j u s t i c e . At the head of his 
t r a n s l a t i o n he put the phrase "Discite justiciam moniti - Listen and 
learn j u s t i c e " . Justice i s not viewed here i n terms of abstract 
natural law, but as the h i s t o r i c a l l y established positive laws of a 
people, or the "good old law" (gute alte Recht). Of course, as 
Falkenheim has observed, t h i s defense of ancient rights i n the name 
of j u s t i c e i s f a r from a radical posture. What he forgets to include, 
however, i s that at t h i s time the defense of ancient rights was the 
best defense against absolutism and arbitrary r u l e . 
(75) Hugo Falkenheim, "Eine unbekannte politische Druckschrift Hegels" 
i n Preussische JahrbUcher. CXXXVIil, 1909, pp.193-220. 
(76) Letter from Hegel to Schelling, 16 A p r i l 1795, Briefe. op.cit.. I , 
p. 23. 
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Most of Hegel's statements are merely intended to elucidate 
Cart's views, but occasionally his own p o l i t i c a l position comes 
through. Hegel agrees with Cart that a low level of taxation 
cannot serve as a measure of a people's freedom. I t i s pointed 
out that nowhere are taxes as high as i n England, but England i s 
s t i l l a free nation because taxes are fr e e l y administered by the 
people themselves and not a r b i t r a r i l y imposed by an external authority. 
To substantiate his claim Hegel, i n a marginal note, refers to the 
American experience: "The tax, which the English Parliament imposed 
on tea imported into America, was very small; but the belief of the 
Americans, that by accepting the payment of that sum, however 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n i t s e l f , t h e i r most important r i g h t would be lost to 
(77) 
them, made the American Revolution." Unlike Cart i n th i s respect 
Hegel i s not an unqualified admirer of the B r i t i s h government, and he 
shows that due to the iniquitous system of representation which 
excludes a large sector of the populace from being heard i n Parliament, 
the, prestige enjoyed by the B r i t i s h nation has been diminished even 
amongst i t s greatest admirers.^ ' 
Hegel's other p o l i t i c a l t r a c t , an original piece e n t i t l e d "On 
the Recent Domestic A f f a i r s of .Wtirt'temberg, Especially on the 
Inadequacy of the Municipal Constitution" was occasioned by the 
(79) 
summoning of the Estates Assembly by Duke Fredrick. ^  Originally 
e n t i t l e d "That Town Councillors should be Elected by the Citizens" -
(77) Dokumente, op.cit.. p.249. 
(78) For a b r i e f summary of Hegel's interest i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , 
especially the parliamentary debates over the Poor Laws see 
Rosenkranz, op.cit., p.85. 
(79) G.W:.F. Hegel, Schriften zur P o l i t i k und Rechtsphilosophie. ed. 
G.Lasson, Leipzig, 1923, PP.150-53; henceforth cited as Lasson.' 
Unfortunately only the introduction to t h i s essay i s s t i l l existent 
although Rudolf Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit, Berlin, I857 photo 
re p r i n t Hildesheim, 1962, p.67 provides a synopsis of the remainder 
of the missing t e x t . 
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i t i s not known exactly why Hegel changed the t i t l e - t h i s pamphlet 
was not published on the advice of a friend who claimed that i t would 
be more of a hindrance than a benefit to the cause of popular 
reform. ^ ^^ ^ The reconvening of the Estates which had not met f o r 
over twenty f i v e years bolstered republican sentiments within the 
duchy and led many, although not Hegel, to demand that i t be transformed 
i n t o a representative parliament elected by popular suffrage. The 
pro-French republicanism of the Estates was at odds with the Duke's 
support of the Austrian intervention and as a result they were 
dissolved, but not before a protracted debate was well under way to 
which Hegel's pamphlet was a contribution. 
Here, too, Hegel's basic theme i s that the constitution should 
be amended to accord with j u s t i c e . In t h i s context, however, 
j u s t i c e does not mean rule i n accordance with ancient r i g h t . 
Rather i t has the t r a d i t i o n a l Greek sense of giving each his due. 
Continuing a l i n e of argument f i r s t expressed i n his l e t t e r to Schelling 
Hegel sees the present time as one i n which the v i t a l i z i n g power of 
ideas, such as j u s t i c e and freedom, has taken hold of the people who 
now demand t h e i r r i g h t s . The s p i r i t of the age i s no longer 
characterized by hopelessness and acquiesence. The picture of a 
free r world, one of unrestricted p o s s i b i l i t y , has put men at variance 
with a c t u a l i t y . Thus Hegel c a l l s on his fellow citizens to "give up 
wobbling between fear and hope, and o s c i l l a t i n g between expectancy 
and deception", and to a l t e r those aspects of the constitution which 
no longer conform to the norms of j u s t i c e . Justice must be the sole 
c r i t e r i o n by which these reforms should be carried out: "The courage 
(80)Letter to Hegel from an anonymous fr i e n d , 7 August 1798, 
Rosenkranz, op.cit., p.91. 
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to do j u s t i c e i s the one power which can completely, honourably, 
and peaceably remove the t o t t e r i n g edifice and put something safe 
i n i t s place".^^''•^ I f the needed modifications are not i n s t i t u t e d 
Hegel sees the ever present spectre of revolutionary turmoil, an 
option which he c a l l s "dishonourable" and "contrary to a l l sense". 
Despite the radical rhetoric of the introduction, Hegel's 
conclusions are, as Haym observes, extremely timid and hesitant.^ 
This i s a l l too evident i n his handling of the problem of the 
franchise. While his sympathies are obviously with the Estates 
against the absolute power of the Duke, he i s nevertheless sceptical 
about the people's a b i l i t y to elect i t s own representatives wisely. 
I n a country ruled f o r centuries by an hereditary monarch and where 
the people have been excluded from a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , to 
suddenly grant them the suffrage would be to jeopardize the entire 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . Hegel concludes his pamphlet with an appeal to each 
class of c i v i l society to weigh up i t s rights and privileges 
judiciously and i f i t finds i t s e l f possessed of certain privileges 
contrary t o the demands of jus t i c e to give them up freely and 
graciously. The problem of the siiffrage i s l e f t unresolved. 
Hegel's p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e i n these two pamphlets coincides f o r 
the most part with his e a r l i e r thought. T/hat i s greatly i n evidence 
i s the cautiously optimistic b e l i e f that European society i n genera,l 
and Germany i n p a r t i c u l a r i s gradually evolving toward freedom. 
Freedom would be realized i n the form of a homogeneous and cohesive 
republican state based upon a non-transcendent, non-positive c i v i l 
r e l i g i o n . Following Kant, Hegel exalts the sollen as the s t a r t i n g 
(81) Lasson, op.cit., p.l51. 
(82) Haym, op.cit., p.67. 
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point of philosophy, but as we shall see, Hegel's Kantianism as a 
pendant to his republicanism did not survive the c r i s i s i n his 
thought.^^^^ 
IV 
I t has been alleged by several commentators that during his 
Frankfurt period (1797-1800) Hegel suffered a traumatic i n t e l l e c t u a l 
c r i s i s . - ; The f i r s t evidence of t h i s can be found i n a l e t t e r from 
Holderlin to Hegel i n which the former expresses his sadness at his 
friend's low s p i r i t s and cheerfully remarks: "No doubt you' l l be 
yourself again next spring".^ ' More important perhaps i s his 
l e t t e r to Nanette.Endel i n which he speaks of his i n a b i l i t y to become 
reconciled with man and society. Here he says that i n Berne he 
sought r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with himself and his fellov/s through communion 
with nature, but i n Frankfurt he seeks out nature to avoid t h e i r 
company altogether. The relevant passage reads as follows: 
That which contimxally drives me out of Frankfurt i s 
the memoiy of those days spent i n the country and 
while there I sought rec o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h myself and 
other men i n the arms of nature, here I often seek 
refuge with t h i s f a i t h f u l mother i n order to 
separate myself from the people with whom I l i v e i n 
peace and f i n a l l y to protect myself from t h e i r 
influence under her aegis and to prevent making any 
pact with them. (85) 
The primary evidence f o r a turning point i n Hegel's thought i s 
another l e t t e r , t h i s one wr i t t e n well a f t e r the f a c t , i n which Hegel 
describes a certain "hypochondria" which he suffered f o r a couple of 
years and which he takes to be a common feature i n the development 
(83) Frianz Gabriel Nauen, Revolution, Idealism and Human Freedom; 
Schelling, Holderlin and Hegel and the Crisis of Early German 
Idealism, The Hague, 1971j p.82. 
(84) Letter from Holderlin t o Hegel, 20 November 1796, Briefe, op.cit., 
I , p.45' 
(85) Letter from Hegel to Nanette Ende, 2 July 1797j Briefe, op.cit.,I,p.53. 
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of the human mind: 
I know from my own experience t h i s state of the soul 
or rather the reason where once one has penetrated 
with one's interest and forebodings into the chaos 
of phenomena and where inwardly certain of one's goal, 
but not yet able to achieve a clear view of the whole 
i n i t s d e t a i l . For some years I suffered from t h i s 
hypochondria to the point of t o t a l d e b i l i t y ; every 
man has doubtlessly known such a c r i t i c a l point i n his 
l i f e , the nocturnal point of the contraction of his 
being, a narrow passage through which he forces his 
way, by which he i s f o r t i f i e d and confirmed i n his 
self-assurance, i n the assurance of his ordinary, 
everyday l i f e , or, i f he has rendered himself incapable 
of being f u l f i l l e d i n t h i s manner, with the assurance 
of a more noble inner l i f e . (86) 
This argument i s even f o r t i f i e d by a reference i n Hegel's Berlin 
lectures on the philosophy of mind i n which he speaks of the decade 
between the twenty seventh and t h i r t y s i x t h year - Hegel's Frankfurt 
period f e l l between the ages of twenty seven and t h i r t y - as the 
t r a n s i t i o n from the ideals of youth to manhood. Here again he uses 
the term "hypochondria" to characterize t h i s t r a n s i t i o n a l period i n 
l i f e . ( 8 7 ) 
I f t h i s c r i s i s was of a purely psychological nature, i t would 
be of l i t t l e interest to a study of Hegel's p o l i t i c a l thought. I 
believe, however, that t h i s trauma was at least i n part occasioned 
by his perception of the changing role of p o l i t i c s i n the modem 
world and p a r t i c u l a r l y the i n a b i l i t y of the French Revolution to 
achieve anything remotely resembling classical p o l i s democracy. 
This became increasingly evident af t e r the events of Thermidor i n 
which there was not created a close-knit, cohesive republic, but a 
(86)Letter from Hegel to Windischmann, 27 May 1810, Briefe. op.cit.. 
1} P«314; see also Rosenzweig, op.cit.. I , p.102. 
(87)G.W.F. Hegel, Samtliche Werke. ed. H. Glockner, 20 vols. 
St u t t g a r t , 1927-30, X, addition to paragraph 396. 
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society i n which the stresses of commercial enterprise and the craze 
f o r wealth came to dominate a l l else. I n fact i n one of his many 
h i s t o r i c a l fragments Hegel muses upon the impossibility of 
r e v i t a l i z i n g the ethos of ancient republics i n the large states of 
the contemporary world.^^^^ While the forces of feudalism had been 
dealt a mortal blow, a t r u l y i e t h i c a l state governed by the general 
w i l l had not been substituted i n i t s place. The new government, the 
Directory, merely represented the ultimate triumph of the property 
owning bourgeois over the ideal c i t i z e n . Hence while the Revolution 
had been fought to overcome feudal alienation, i t had not been able 
to establish a harmonious relationship between the individual and the 
state.^^^^ What increasingly came to dominate Hegel's thought from 
t h i s period i s , then, the modern form of alienation. 
While Hegel did not witness the Thermidorian reaction f i r s t hand, 
Ke did experience i t i n d i r e c t l y through the Congress of Rastatt. 
This Congress met from December 1797 to A p r i l 1798 i n order to resolve 
the war with France. Many young progressives such as Hegel and 
Holderlin were hopeful that French v i c t o r i e s would bring about new 
and democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Germany and thus update the antiquated 
constitutions. There was even t a l k of p o l i t i c a l revolution i n Hegel's 
native province of Swabia. These German progressives were shattered 
to discover that the French negotiators cared l i t t l e about modernizing 
German p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , but were concerned only with the 
annexation of conquered t e r r i t o r i e s . I t was t h i s humiliation of the 
p a t r i o t ' s cause coupled with the d u p l i c i t y of the reform party i n the 
(88) Dokumente, op.cit., p.263. 
(89) See Roger Garaudy, Dieu est mort: Etude sur Hegel, Paris, 1970, 
pp.44-9. 
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'WurttembergEstates which may very well have contributed to Hegel's 
c r i s e de conscience. 
This rather abrupt change i n Hegel's attitude i s f i r s t manifested 
i n the major essay of the Frankfurt period e n t i t l e d "The S p i r i t of 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y and i t s Fate".^^^^ Indeed T.M. Knox has maintained 
that between the sober Kantianism of the Berne period and this new 
essay "there i s a gulf so wide, that the l a t e r essay, written as 
i t i s with such assurance, such passion, and such independence of 
mind, may seem at f i r s t as i t could scao'cely have come from the same 
(91) 
pen".^'^ On Knox's account, Hegel's new position i s that of a 
Chri s t i a n mystic seeking speculative expression for his religious 
eiqperience. This i s i n fact a f a i r l y accurate assessment of the 
break i n Hegel's thought for during these years he came to believe 
that only through the personal and d i r e c t l y formative power of 
r e l i g i o n could the basic unity and harmony of l i f e be restored. 
The concept which Hegel uses to depict the essential coherence 
of experience i s Geist, a notoriously elusive word which can be 
(92) 
rendered as either "mind" or " s p i r i t " . ^ ' ^ ' I n one respect Hegel's 
use of the term Geist can be seen as an attempted improvement upon 
what he took to be the deficiency i n the Kantian-Fichtean conception 
of the transcendental ego or the " I think" which accompanies a l l 
(93) 
representations.^"^ ' This i s the formal unifying principle of 
(90) Nohl, op.cit., pp.243-342} t h i s essay i s also included i n the Knox 
tr a n s l a t i o n of the E a r l y Theological Writings, op.cit., pp.182-301, 
but here too I s h a l l continue to c i t e Nohl. 
(91) T.M. Knox, "Hegel's Attitude to Kant's E t h i c s " i n Kant-Studien. 
XLIX, 1957-58, p.72. 
(92) For a brief but i n c i s i v e philosophical account of t h i s subject see 
R.C. Solomon, "Hegel's Concept of 'Geist'" i n Hegel, ed. Alasdair 
Maclntyre, New York, 1972, pp.125-49. 
(93) lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 
London, I95O, pp.152-55• 
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perception which makes a l l consciousness possible. While Hegel 
wsus no doubt sympathetic to Kant's efforts to determine the 
underlying princ i p l e of knowledge and experience, he was extremely 
s c e p t i c a l of Kant's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s transcendentsd ego with 
p a r t i c u l a r individuals thus claiming that there i s one such ego per 
person. For Hegel, Geist i s not simply a principle unifying a l l 
knowledge and experience but re f e r s to a more general or universal 
consciousness. I t i s not the mind of a single individual, but i s 
l i t e r a l l y a p l u r a l i t y of minds thinking together. Geist i s thus a 
departure from the disharmonious conception of a l l men as individuals, 
to the absolute conception of a l l men as one. But there i s 
obviously more to Hegel's Geist than t h i s . Geist cannot simply be 
reduced to the c o l l e c t i v e consciousness of a people, that i s to say, 
the way i n which a people conceives i t s relationship to the world 
around i t . I t i s l i k e the Greek Nous, a demiurge which controls and 
d i r e c t s human a f f a i r s and a c t i v i t i e s . But t h i s absolute mind does 
not stand outside the world, rather i t i s msuiifest within r e a l i t y . 
Indeed i t i s from t h i s period that Hegel began to view history as the 
process whereby the world mind reveals i t s e l f through i t s various 
manifestations i n the s p i r i t s of individual peoples. Thus i t would 
seem that the Volksgeist of which Hegel spoke i n his Tubingen essay 
i s merely a representation of the " I n f i n i t e Mind" which i s , as i t 
were, the motor of h i s t o r i c a l development. 
Geist becomes manifest i n what Hegel c a l l s the fate (Schicksal) 
of a people. Fate i s , for Hegel, an "iron necessity" imminent within 
r e a l i t y before which the individual i s powerless and to which he must 
submit. This conception of an imminent fate marks a si g n i f i c a n t 
departure from Hegel's e a r l i e r speculations. I n Berne he had regarded 
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the entire history of Christian c i v i l i z a t i o n from the f a l l of Rome 
to the present as representing the decline and degeneration of 
mankind. I t would only be through the r e b i r t h of the ancient 
republic that p o s i t i v i t y could be abolished and the regeneration 
of humanity could begin anew. I n Ftankfurt, however, he began to 
see the present as a product not so much of h i s t o r i c a l regress, as 
of an o v e r a l l h i s t o r i c a l fate or destiny which man must hear with 
patience and acquiesencee I t i s because t h i s fate i s i s i n some 
sense necessary that man must learn to reconcile himself with 
r e a l i t y and the type of p o l i t i c a l society i t offers. This desire 
to be reconciled with r e a l i t y becomes evident i n the far more 
conciliatory attitude Hegel adopts to C h r i s t i a n i t y and gentile 
society. While e a r l i e r h i s emphasis had been upon the power of 
man's free p r a c t i c a l reason to shape and transform the world, now 
h i s emphasis i s upon a rapproachment with r e a l i t y . 
. While Hegel speaks at length about t h i s supposed h i s t o r i c a l 
fate he i s not at a l l clear about i t s precise nature which i s perhaps 
why h i s language i s so mystical and obsciire. At one point he 
remarks that fate i s the consciousness of oneself but as an enemy 
and i n a passage of exceeding obscurity he contrasts the omnipotent 
power of fate to the purely human and therefore limited power of 
punishment: 
But fate has a more extended domain than punishment 
has. I t i s aroused even by g u i l t without crime, and 
hence i t i s i m p l i c i t l y s t r i c t e r than punishment. I t s 
s t r i c t n e s s often seems to pass over into the most 
crying i n j u s t i c e when i t makes i t s appearance, more 
t e r r i b l e than ever, over against the most exalted form 
of g u i l t , the g u i l t of innocence. I mean that, since 
laws are purely conceptual unifications of opposites, 
these concepts are far from exhausting the many-
sidedness of life..obut over the relations of l i f e 
which have not been dissolved, over the sides of l i f e . 
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which are given as v i t a l l y unified, over the 
domains of the v i r t u e s , i t exercised no power. 
Fate, on the other hand, i s incorruptible and 
unbounded l i k e l i f e , i t s e l f . I t knows no given 
t i e s , no differences of standpoint or position, 
no precinct of virtue. Where l i f e i s injured 
be i t ever so rightly, i . e . even i f no 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s f e l t , there fate appears, 
and one may therefore say "never has innocence 
suffered; every suffering i s guilty". But the 
honour of a pure soul i s a l l the greater the 
more consciously i t has done injury to l i f e i n 
order to maintain the supreme values, while a 
trespass i s a l l the blacker, the more consciously 
an impure soul has injured l i f e . (9'^) 
What i s of importance for Hegel i s the manner i n which man i s 
reconciled to t h i s fate and he i s most e x p l i c i t that such a 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s only possible through love. Love does not 
e n t a i l a reeisoned, thought-out r e l a t i o n to the world, but i s a 
l i v e d r e l a t i o n and as such remains at the l e v e l of feeling and 
p r a c t i c a l experience. Love i s , for Hegel, commensurate with 
r e l i g i o n which,as he demonstrated e a r l i e r , effects man's imagination 
and s e n s i b i l i t y rather than the understanding and i n t e l l e c t . Thus 
through love fate no longer appears an " a l i e n thing", but the 
manifestation of the s p i r i t of a people to which man can be 
reconciled. Indeed i t i s for h i s insistence upon the redemtive 
power of love that certain c r i t i c s have seen Hegel's Frankfurt 
(95) 
period as characterized by an i r r a t i o n a l i s t mysticism. I t w i l l 
(9^)Nohl, op.cit., pp.283^8'f. 
(95)Thi8 claim was f i r s t made by Wilhelm Dilthey i n his Die Jugendgeschichte 
Hegels, Gesammelte Schriften, Leipzig and Berlin, 1921, iv7 pp.1-10? 
where Hegel i s dubbed a "mystical pantheist". This interpretation 
was given even more elaborate expression by Richard Kroner, 
Von Kant bis Hegel, 2 vols., Tilbingen, 1921-2^1, I I , p.271 who says: 
"Hegel i s undoubtedly the greatest i r r a t i o n a l i s t known to the history 
of philosophy". Also the study of Jean Wahl, Le malheur de l a 
conscience dans l a philosophie de Hegel, P a r i s , 1929 attempts to 
e s t a b l i s h l i n k s between Hegel, Kierkegaard and the i r r a t i o n a l i s t 
philosophy of existentialism. 
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be shown l a t e r , however, that Hegel soon abandons t h i s vague 
language of r e l i g i o n and love for a rigorous and systematic 
philosophiced grasp of r e a l i t y . 
As i n h i s e a r l i e r works Hegel i n "The S p i r i t of Chr i s t i a n i t y 
and i t s Fate" i s concerned to provide an h i s t o r i c a l account of man's 
contemporary p o l i t i c a l malaisso What i s s t i l l at issue i s the 
problem of the unhappy consciousness, that i s , the sense of 
estrangement and alienation the genesis of which Hegel here traces 
back to the time of the flood. Before the deluge, man l i v e d i n a 
peaceful, tranquil relationship with nature. There was at that time 
an immediate, non-alienated identity between man and his environment. 
By unleashing merciless destruction upon mankind, the flood 
irrevocably broke t h i s bond of trust and friendship and replaced i t 
with various forms of society.^^^^ 
As a r e s u l t , two paths were followed by the survivors of the 
catastrophe. Nimrod and h i s followers attempted to arm themselves 
against nature by erecting a tower which could withstemd any future 
devastation. I n t h i s way man set out ^o master nature and subordinate 
i t to h i s w i l l . But t h i s plan was conceived only aft e r men had 
become estranged from nature and from one another and rather than 
reverting to the i r e a r l i e r happy form of l i f e , Nimrod established a 
despotic tyranny maintained through s t r i c t d i s c i p l i n e and force of 
arms. Noah, on the other hand, saved himself and his people by 
subjecting themselves to an all-powerful, omniscent diety. This 
diety appeared not as an idea, that i ^ something which stems from 
man's own freedom, but as an i d e a l , that i ^ something which i s purely 
(96)Nohl, op.cit., ppoZ^J-'*^. 
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fan) 
external t o him.^^'^' This ideal i s similar to the Fichtean non-ego 
which i s t o t a l l y a l i e n to the ego's free s u b j e c t i v i t y . I n return 
for t h e i r absolute obedience, God promised to control nature and 
protect man from i t s ravages. By giving themselves over to this 
i d e a l , estrangement became one of the chief features of the post-
( 9 8 ) 
diluvian epoch. 
I t was t h i s sense o f estrangement which, according to Hegel, 
was to become the fate of the Jewish people. The case of Abraham 
serves as a s t r i k i n g example: 
Abraham, bom i n Chaldaea, had i n youth already 
l e f t a fatherland i n his father's company. Now, 
i n the plains of Mesopotamia, he tore himself 
free altogether from his family as wel l , i n order 
to be a wholly self-subsistent, independent man, 
to be an overlord himself....The f i r s t act which 
made Abraham the progenitor of a nation i s a 
disseverence which snaps the bonds of communal 
l i f e and love. The en t i r e t y of the relationships 
i n which he had hitherto l i v e d with men and nature, 
these beautiful relationships of his youth, he 
spumed. ( 9 9 ) 
By separating himself from society, Abraham was condemned to a l i f e 
of wandering exile amongst foreign peoples for whom he had no feelings 
and to whom he owed no obligations. Living a completely nomadic 
( 9 7 ) l b i d o , p o 2 ^ ; of. po366: " I n a republic one lives for an idea i n a 
monarchy only f o r specific things - even i n a monarchy, men cannot 
dispense with ideas, they f i x on a particular idea, an ideal - i n a 
republic they l i v e according to ideas as they ought to be; i n a 
monarchy, they have an id e a l , i . e . ra r e l y something they have made 
themselves, a diety. I n a republic, a great mind expends i t s entire 
physical and moral energies i n the service of his idea; the sphere 
of his a c t i v i t y has unity. The pious Christian who dedicates himself 
to his idea i s a mystical fanatic. I f his ideal f i l l s him to the 
exclusion of a l l else, i f he cannot divide his energies between t h i s 
and his secular l i f e , i f a l l his strength goes i n t h i s one direction, 
a Guyon w i l l be the r e s u l t . The need to contemplate the ideal w i l l 
s a t i s f y the over stimulated imagination, and even the senses w i l l 
assert t h e i r r i g h t s ; examples are the countless nuns and monks who 
d a l l i e d with Jesus and dreamed of embracing him. The idea of the 
republicem i s of the sort that enables his noblest energies to f i n d 
s a t i s f a c t i o n i n true .labour, while that of the fematic i s a mere 
figment of the imagination". 
( 9 8 ) I b i d . , p p o 2 H - 4 5 . 
( 9 9 ) I b i d . , pp.2'f5-^6. 
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existence with his herds, Abraham never stopped at one place long 
enough to improve or c u l t i v a t e the s o i l for fear of developing 
some sort of physical or emotional attachment to i t . 
This separation from the ongoing l i f e of society has a 
metaphysical dimension i n the separation from God. Unlike the 
pagan gods who were essentially human and as such intimately 
involved i n the a f f a i r s of the coimnunity, Abraham's jealous God 
stands outside the world altogether: "The whole world Abraham 
regarded as simply his opposite; i f he did not take i t to be a 
n u l l i t y , he looked on i t a£ sustained by a God who was a l i e n to 
i t . Nothing i n nature was supposed to have any part i n God; 
everything was simply under God's mastery".^"'"^^ I n fact Abraham's 
i n f i n i t e ideal was the antithesis of everything human to such an 
extent that i t could not even be characterized i n a concrete shape 
or image.^^^^^ This condition whereby man was reduced to the level 
of something "made" brought about a slave-like demeanour incompatible 
with a free people. By depriving themselves of any l i v i n g 
s p i r i t u s i l i t y , the Jews could do nothing but curry favour from a 
despotic diety who ensured t h e i r national survival i n times of c r i s i s . 
I t was only with Jacob and Moses that the Jewish nation as a 
p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y was founded. I t was based, not surprisingly, on 
a s t r i c t l y theocratic form of r u l e , one i n which the politiceJ. sphere 
was completely subordinate to the r e l i g i o u s . This theocracy weis 
predicated upon the absolute equality of i t s members. But Hegel 
does not conceive t h i s equality i n the Greek sense where each c i t i z e n 
( 1 0 0 ) I b i d . , p.a^f?. 
( 1 0 1 ) I b i d o , ppo250-51o 
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gives himself over to the community. Rather t h i s i s an equality of 
unfreedom where there are no c i v i l r i g h t s and the individual i s 
excluded from a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Thus the introduction 
of the monarchical p r i n c i p l e represented a certedn positive advance. 
Even though the monarchy created differences i n wealth and status, 
i t at least raised some persons to a le v e l of p o l i t i c a l importance.^^^^^ 
Here for the f i r s t time Hegel recognizes the existence of cletsses and 
the inequalities between them as symptomatic not of fragmentation and 
decline, but as contributing a beneficial role i n the development of 
society. This i s the f i r s t h i nt of Hegel's l a t e r view that the class 
system as i t exists i n modern society forms the basis of man's 
integration into the community and that i t i s not e n t i r e l y divisive 
and a n t i t h e t i c a l to freedom. 
What Hegel i s seeking i s a means of overcoming t h i s fragmentation 
of l i f e experienced by the Jews. This fragmentation, which he would 
l a t e r describe as madness, consists, as described above, i n meui's 
separation from nature, his separation from society and his separation 
from God. Hence the point i s to annul t h i s fragmentation and 
divisiveness and create, so to speak, a whole man, one who i s i n a l l 
respects at one with the world. The paradigm for wholeness i s here 
not based upon a return t o classical a n t i q u i t y as i t was i n Berne. 
Hegel now sees the p o l l s experience as i r r e t r i e v a b l y l o s t to mankind. 
Neither i s i t based, as Schi l l e r believed, on a lengthy process of 
"aesthetic education" i n which man's play i n s t i n c t i s liberated from 
the d e b i l i t a t i n g effects of modern society with i t s division of labour. 
For Hegel, harmony and cohesion can be created only through a r e l i g i o n 
of love. 
( 1 0 2 ) I b i d . , p p i 2 5 ^ - 6 0 . 
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The form of re l i g i o u s experience which Hegel now embraces i s 
the Christian r e l i g i o n . I n fact he views Chr i s t i a n i t y as the 
r e l i g i o n o f love par excellence. I t might even be said that at no 
other time i n his l i f e did Hegel f e e l so emotionally close to 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y as he did i n his Frankfurt years. ^ ^^ ^^  While i n Beme 
he had castigated the p o s i t i v i t y and dead o b j e c t i v i t y of Christ i a n i t y , 
he now commends i t f o r setting f o r t h the "subjective i n general". 
This message of love emerges most f o r c e f u l l y i n the Christian 
conception of the relationship between man and God. As opposed to 
the Judaic notion that God i s to man as a master to a slave, Jesus, 
who Hegel describes as setting himself against the entire Jewish fate, 
taught that t h i s relationship i s one of a loving father to his 
children. Father and c h i l d are both modifications of the same l i f e 
i n which the father i s of the same essence as the child and the ch i l d 
the father. Hegel expresses t h i s han^onious unity between man and 
God thus: 
The h i l l and the eye which sees i t are object and 
subject, but between man and God, between s p i r i t 
and s p i r i t , there i s no such c l e f t of o b j e c t i v i t y 
and s u b j e c t i v i t y ; one i s to the other only i n that 
one recognizes the other;o.'.b9th are one. ( 1 0 ^ ) 
And eigain i n precisely the same manner: 
How could anything but a s p i r i t know a s p i r i t ? The 
re l a t i o n of s p i r i t to s p i r i t i s a feeling of harmony, 
i s t h e i r u n i f i c a t i o n ; how could heterogeneity be 
unified? Faith i n the divine i s only possible i f i n 
the believer himself there i s a divine element which 
(103)This thesis that C h r i s t i a n i t y , and i n particular the Protestant 
form o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , i s the key to understanding Hegel's 
thought i s central to Theodor Haering's, Hegel, sein Wollen und 
sein Werk, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1929-38. I t i s unfortunate indeed 
that the occasional good insight that Haering provides i s usually 
obscured by his own fascist p r o c l i t i v i t i e s . 
(lO^)Nohl. op.cit., p.312o 
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rediscovers i t s e l f , i t s own nature, i n that on which 
i t believes, even i f i t be unconscious that what i t 
has found i s i t s own nature. ( 1 0 5 ) 
I t only remains to repeat that t h i s unity of man anil God, the f i n i t e 
and the i n f i n i t e , i s not a unity produced by s c i e n t i f i c or 
philosophical knowledge. Such knowledge i s never able to grasp the 
richness and complexity of l i f e . This union i s only possible i n 
love where i t i s not so much understood as l i v e d . 
This idea of a loving r e l a t i o n between man and God could never 
have occurred to the Jews primarily because of t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t 
point of view. The i n t e l l e c t (Verstand) or the power of r e f l e c t i v e 
thinking i s here set i n direct opposition to love. Later i n the 
Phenomenology and the Logic Hegel would describe the principle of 
the i n t e l l e c t as a mode of cognition u t i l i z e d by mathematics and the 
natural sciences. These disciplines assume that the world i s nothing 
more than an a r b i t r a r y conglomeration of discrete elements each of 
which i s s t r i c t l y demarcated from the others. The i n t e l l e c t r e l i e s 
upon the tenets of fonnal logic such as the principle of non-contradiction 
or the mutual exclusion of opposites whereby each thing i s assumed to be 
i d e n t i c a l to i t s e l f alone and to nothing else. While Hegel's 
formulation of i n t e l l e c t u a l r e f l e c t i o n i s i n Frankfurt merely 
ten t a t i v e , he does view i t as a form of cognition which bifurcates 
experience in t o r i g i d and irreconcilable antinomies such as the f i n i t e 
and the i n f i n i t e . Thus when Jesus declared himself both the son of 
man and the son of God, the Jews took t h i s for blasphemy as they could 
not apprehend how the nature of the divine could be part of the same 
personality as hioman nature. ^^^^^ 
( 1 0 5 ) I b i d . , p.313. 
( 1 0 6 ) I b i d . , pp.309-10. 
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Hegel's views on love are obviously designed as a rebuttal to 
the Kantian ethic of pract i c a l reason which he had ea r l i e r adopted. 
Rosehkranz reports that shortly p r i o r to the composition of "The 
S p i r i t of Ch r i s t i a n i t y and i t s Pate" Hegel had undertaken a 
systematic c r i t i q u e of Kant's moral philosophy as well as his 
philosophy of law.^ "''^ ''^  I n these works Kant maintains that the 
fundamental feature of moral experience i s a perpetual struggle 
between i n c l i n a t i o n , man's sensuous desires, and reason, the law of 
duty. I n his view man behaves as an ethical being only when his 
reason has achieved complete mastery over his inclinations Which he 
derisively regards as pathological. Hegel sees t h i s separation of 
i n c l i n a t i o n and reason as containing a deep bifurcation i n which man 
i s set against himself. What Hegel rejects i s the fragmentation of 
man r e s u l t i n g from the highly abstract and metaphysical nature of 
Kant's moral precepts. The basis of Hegel's c r i t i q u e of Kant i s 
very l i k e l y taken over from S c h i l l e r who argues that Kant's 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the f a c u l t i e s resulted i n whole classes of people 
developing only a part of t h e i r dispositions while the res t , l i k e 
crippled plants, are scarcely suggested i n f a i n t traces. The Kantian 
moralist, S c h i l l e r suggests, has a cold heart i n that he c l i n i c a l l y 
dissects the impressions which s t i r the whole soul of man.^^^^^ 
Kantian morality thus seems the antithesis of the well-rounded, 
harmonious personality. 
Hegel's basic argument i s that the Kantian postulate of moral 
reason i s simply the counterpart of Mosaic legalism. For the Mosaic 
code, Hegel maintains, law i s an arb i t r a r y command handed down from 
a master to a slave, while f o r Kantian morality, the moral law 
( 1 0 7 ) Rosenkranz, op.cit., p.87. 
( 1 0 8 ) S c h i l l e r , op.cit.. pp.321-23. 
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emanates from the free w i l l and which man need have no other 
reason for obeying than the love of duty f o r i t s own sake. As 
Hegel sees i t , however, there i s no difference between the man 
who obeys an externally imposed positive command and a man who 
obeys his own self-imposed commands of duty. Both necessitate 
coercion and are therefore both variants of slavery: 
By t h i s l i n e of argument, however, p o s i t i v i t y i s 
only p a r t i a l l y removed; and between the Shaman 
of the Tungus, the European prelate who rules 
church and state, the Voguls, and the Puritans, 
on the one hand, and the man who l i s t e n s to his 
own commands of duty, on the other, the difference 
i s not that the former make themselves slaves, 
while the l a t t e r i s free, but that the former have 
t h e i r l o r d outside themselves, while the l a t t e r 
carries his l o r d i n himself, yet at the same time 
i s his own slave. ( 1 0 9 ) 
The problem with the Kantian doctrine i s that i t disregards the 
whole l i v i n g man by attempting to subjugate a l l the human faculties 
to the tyranny of reason alone. Hegel's desire i s to overcome t h i s 
cleavage i n a new form of moral experience where man's humanity can 
be f u l l y restored. 
Hegel finds t h i s form of moral experience i n the ethic of love 
as embodied i n Christ's Sermon on the Mount. Hegel even describes 
Jesus as a " s p i r i t raised above morality". Christ taught not a 
slavish obedience to the law, but a loving disposition which both 
f u l f i l s the law and at the same time annuls i t . When motivated by 
love, man carries out his duties not because they have been commanded 
but because of a " l i k i n g to perform a l l d u t i e s " . T h e law i s 
stripped of i t s legal form and replaced by a loving disposition which 
( 1 0 9 ) Nohl, op.cit., pp>'265-66. 
( 1 1 0 ) I b i d . . pp.266-67. 
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makes i t superfluous. I n t h i s manner love i s the unity of reason 
and i n c l i n a t i o n and these aspects of l i f e which Kantian morality 
had torn asunder are synthesized i n a superior type of humanity. 
Hegel's conclusion i s , then, that only a social and religious 
ethic based upon love can restore human freedom by providing men 
w i t h the correct perception of the relationship between man and God. 
Love i s a synthetic power which i s able to transcend a l l dead, 
positive barriers which stand i n thei way of an harmonious social 
order: 
True union, or love proper, exists only between 
l i v i n g beings who are a l i k e i n power and thus i n 
one another's eyes l i v i n g beings from every point 
of view; i n no respect i s eiither dead for the 
other. This genuine love excludes a l l oppositions.... 
I n love the separate does s t i l l remain, but as 
something united and no longer as something sepeurate; 
the l i v i n g senses the l i v i n g . ( I l l ) 
And i n another passage which s i g n i f i c a n t l y prefigures his l a t e r 
d i a l e c t i c a l method, Hegel shows how love i s even able to incorporate 
the r e f l e c t i v e power of the i n t e l l e c t thus creating a true union of 
opposites: 
This u n i t y i s therefore perfect l i f e because i n i t 
even r e f l e c t i o n gets i t s due; i n the o r i g i n a l , 
iindeveloped unity the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e f l e c t i o n , of 
cleavage, s t i l l stood over against i t ; i n t h i s unity, 
however, unity and cleavage are united, they are a 
simple l i v i n g thing which had been opposed to i t s e l f 
(and s t i l l feels i t s e l f so opposed), but has not 
rendered t h i s opposition absolute. I n love one l i v i n g 
being senses another l i v i n g being. Thus i n love a l l 
tasks, the self-destructive, one-sidedness of r e f l e c t i o n 
and the i n f i n i t e opposition of an unconscious, undeveloped 
unity, are resolved. ( 1 1 2 ) 
For the young Hegel, as for Feuerbach and Hess f o r t y years l a t e r , only 
when love i s generalized to embody the entire community, does the 
( 1 1 1 ) I b i d . , p.379. 
( 1 1 2 ) I b i d , 
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world cease to appear as something implacably given and become a 
place i n which man can f e e l himself f u l f i l l e d . 
Ultimately, however, Hegel recognizes the f a i l u r e of Jesus to 
create a society based upon love and t h i s recognition led him to 
adopt an extremely pessimistic and resigned tone i n "The S p i r i t of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y and i t s Fate". Hegel accounts f o r the f a i l u r e of 
Jesus i n terras of the h i s t o r i c a l context i n which he was operating. 
On the one hand, Jesus could have attempted the reform of Jewish 
society from w i t h i n , but run the r i s k of compromising his message 
of love. On the other hand, he could have divorced himself 
e n t i r e l y from his society and r e t a i n the p u r i t y of his message 
i n t a c t , but forgo the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a l i z i n g i t . ^ ^ " ' ' ^ ^ Of these 
two alternatives, Jesus chose the l a t t e r . Rather than corrupt the 
o r i g i n a l beauty of his message, he preferred to f l e e from any 
association with his people and concentrate a l l his e f f o r t s upon 
the s p i r i t u a l e d i f i c a t i o n of his immediate friends and disciples. 
His attempt to reconcile man and God and therefore establish the 
basis of a true community proved too radical to make any impact 
upon the Jewish culture of his time. Being at odds with the general 
s p i r i t of the age, his message could not but f a l l upon deaf ears. 
Hegel describes the fate of Jesus as a "beautiful soul" who 
refuses to take any interest i n earthly existence. Jesus exhorted 
his folloT/ers not to succumb to the violence of l i f e . ^ withdrawing 
into himself, he f l e d from l i f e and remained no longer vulnerable to 
i t s i n j u r i e s . Any misfortune which occurred i n the course of l i f e 
was merely tolerated as part of the human condition. Thus while he 
( I 1 3 ) l b i d . , pp.328-29. 
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had come to reconcile man and God, Christ was forced to the 
conclusion that the Kingdom of God i s not of t h i s world. The 
l i f e of Jesus became a separation from the social world and a 
f l i g h t i n t o heaven where human relations can proceed only from the 
most disinterested love. This dualism between the earthly and 
heavenly c i t i e s became the fate of the Christian r e l i g i o n and as 
such i t was never able to completely sublimate the feeling of 
aliena t i o n and estrangement which man has suffered ever since the 
flood rudely separated him from the state of nature: "In a l l the 
forms of the Christian r e l i g i o n " , Hegel remarks, "which have been 
developed i n the advancing fate of the ages, there l i e s t h i s 
fundamental characteristic of opposition....And i t i s the fate 
that church and state, worship and l i f e , piety and v i r t u e , s p i r i t u a l 
and worldly action, can never dissolve into one".^ *'"^ ^^  
Despite his awareness of the duality and inne r - s p l i t of the 
modem Christian world, Hegel believes that withdrawal from r e a l i t y 
i s "dishonourable" and ultimately the source of madness. The 
position of man alienated from the world, the paradigm of which was 
Abraham and the entire Jewish experience, i s one which he desperately 
sought to overcome. Indeed there i s evidence that Hegel viewed the 
extreme isolationism of ancient Judea under Soman imperial domination 
along lines similar to the fragmentation and dissolution of his 
contemporary German culture.^'''^^^ Hence t h i s practical problem of 
pu t t i n g an end to the unhappy consciousness and therefore bringing 
about a rec o n c i l i a t i o n between man and society became of paramount 
importance. 
( 1 1 4 ) l b i d . , pp.341-42. 
( 1 1 5 ) La3son, op.cit., p.136. 
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As we have just seen, during his f i r s t years i n Frankfurt, 
Hegel believed that the harmony and unity of human experience could 
only be restored through the power of r e l i g i o n and t h i s i s an 
assumption given i t s most e x p l i c i t statement i n the so-called 
"Fragment of a System".^^"'"^^ Vfliat underlies Hegel's attitude 
here i s a polemic against philosophy. I n his view philosophical 
reasoning which he here equates with the diremptive force of the 
i n t e l l e c t i s incapable of grasping the richness and complexity of 
experience, but bifurcalfes experience into so many p e t r i f i e d 
antitheses. Each thought which i s a product of r e f l e c t i o n may 
take i n t o account one aspect of l i f e and experience but cannot 
conceive the underlying unifying principle of l i f e and experience. 
For each thought which i s propounded, another i s necessarily excluded 
and i n t h i s manner thought i s driven ever onward i n an " i n f i n i t e 
progress" never reaching any stable hold on r e a l i t y . Also the 
thought process gives r i s e to an epistemological dichotomy between 
the thinking ego and the object of thought which i t i s unable to 
overcome. ^ ^^ ''^  
This unifying p r i n c i p l e of a l l experience i s , Hegel believes at 
t h i s time, not a product of r e f l e c t i o n , but a " r e a l i t y beyond a l l 
r e f l e c t i o n " . This, of course, refers to r e l i g i o n which expresses 
a p r a c t i c a l , l i v e d r e l a t i o n to the world and i s f o r t h i s reason, he 
maintains, superior to the merely contemplative philosophical 
a t t i t u d e . As opposed to philosophy, r e l i g i o n does not proceed 
"from the f i n i t e to the i n f i n i t e ( f o r these terms are only products 
of mere r e f l e c t i o n , and as such t h e i r separation i s absolute), but 
(116) Nohl, op.cit.. pp.345-51. 
(117) l b i d . , p .348. 
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from f i n i t e l i f e t o i n f i n i t e l i f e " . ^ ' ' " • ^ ^ ^ And l a t e r Hegel remarks 
that " r e l i g i o n i s any elevation of the f i n i t e to the i n f i n i t e , when 
the i n f i n i t e i s conceived as a d e f i n i t e form of l i f e " . ^ ^ " ' " ^ ^ The 
general point which Hegel i s t r y i n g to make i s that ultimate r e a l i t y 
i s not amenable to conceptual analysis, but must simply be l i v e d i n 
i t s fullness and immediacy. Philosophy can only play at best a 
preparatory role f o r the coming of r e l i g i o n ; i t i s , as i t were, the 
handmaiden to r e l i g i o n . 
I t i s only at the end of the Frankfurt period, forreasons not 
altogether clear, that Hegel abandons his erstwhile religious 
mysticism i n favour of a r a t i o n a l , philosophical comprehension of 
r e a l i t y . Indeed i t i s t h i s endorsement of philosophy which marks 
the real turning point i n Hegel's development. Of course i t would 
only be over a period of many years that his complete system of 
philosophy would be worked out i n d e t a i l . Here he only hints at the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of such a philosophy. This i s f i r s t expressed i n the 
Preface to a proposed essay on the German Constitution which i t s e l f 
was occasioned by Germany's defeat i n the revolutionary wars with 
France. This essay w i l l be treated i n some d e t a i l i n the following 
chapter, but what i s of importance here is that f o r the f i r s t time 
Hegel c a l l s on a new metaphysic to come to terms with the period of 
revolutionary turmoil. Such a metaphysic would have the task of 
"se t t i n g l i m i t s to the r e s t r i c t i o n s of existence and giving them 
t h e i r necessity i n the context of the whole".^^^^^ I t should be 
mentioned, however, that what Hegel calls metaphysics bears nothing 
( 1 1 8 ) l b i d . , p.347. 
( 1 1 9 ) l b i d . , p.350. 
( 1 2 0 ) Lasson, op.cit., p . l 4 0 . 
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i n common to the philosophies of r e f l e c t i o n which he would i d e n t i f y 
p r i m a r i l y with Kant and Fichte. While these philosophies admirably 
express the intractable disintegration of an age i n c r i s i s , they 
prove, upon examination, unable to f i n d the path vrtiich leads beyond 
t h i s disintegration to the humanistic idea of wholeness and unity. 
Hegel's f i n a l remark on his philosophical predecessors i s that they 
are "sublime and awful, but not beautiful and humane".^^^^^ The new 
philosophy which Hegel envisages bears f a r more resemblance to what 
he had e a r l i e r called r e l i g i o n i n that they are both concerned to 
provide a coherent, harmonious account of experience. There i s , 
though, one c r u c i a l methodological d i s t i n c t i o n between them. V/hile 
r e l i g i o n operates at the immediate level of feeling and imagination, 
philosophy r e l i e s upon reason and logic. 
Hegel's decision to adopt philosophy as his me'tier was very 
l i k e l y influenced by his collaboration with Holderlin during t h i s 
formative stage i n his career. Hblderlin, too, was interested i n 
the problem of man alienated from society and f o r him the only answer 
to t h i s problem lay i n the renaissance of the ancient p o l l s . Living 
i n a time of grave social unrest, Efolderlin could f i n d no way of 
coming to grips with r e a l i t y except through ineffectual wishful 
thinking. Unable to compromise the republican ideals of his youth 
he slowly gave way to insanity. ^''"^ ^^  No doubt f e a r f u l of Holderlin's 
dilemma, Hegel v;as determined to make his peace with the world. He 
now believed that only through the philosophical comprehension of 
( 1 2 1 ) Nohl, op.cit.. p.351. 
(122) For an excellent study of ffdlderlin's thought during these years 
see Jacques Taminiaux, La Nostalgie de l a Grece a I'aube de 
1'idealisms allemande. The Hague, I967, pp.l28-g05. 
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p o l i t i c a l society could humanity be regenerated. This new insight 
that philosophy i s the form of thinking best attuned to ultimate 
r e a l i t y and as such most suited to bring about a rapport between man 
and ordinary experience i s expressed i n a l e t t e r to Schelling 
w r i t t e n at the very end of his Frankfurt period. The pertinent 
passage i s here quoted i n f u l l : 
I have considered your great public progress with 
great admiration and joy: you w i l l overlook i t 
i f I do not speak about i t or do not present 
myself to you with false humility. I prefer a 
middle course and I hope that we shall meet anew 
as friends. I n my own development which began 
with the most elementary needs of man, I was 
necessarily pushed toward science and the ideals 
of my youth necessarily became a form of r e f l e c t i o n , 
transformed into a system. I ask myself now, while 
s t i l l engaged i n t h i s , how to f i n d a way back to the 
li v e s of men. From a l l the men I see around me, 
you are the only one i n whom I would l i k e to f i n d a 
f r i e n d , from the view point of the expression of 
ideas and of action on the world. For I see that 
you have grasped man wholly, that i s to say, with a l l 
your soul and without vanity. I t i s f o r t h i s reason 
that I approach you with confidence, that you w i l l 
recognize i n my disinterested e f f o r t s , even i f they 
be i n an i n f e r i o r sphere, something of value. As 
f o r the desire and hope of our reunion, I am obliged 
to honour fate and hope that i t w i l l favour the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of our reunion. (123) 
I t i s from t h i s desire to return to the l i v e s of men that Hegel's 
philosophical thought takes i t s point of departure. We shall now 
see how he intends to carry t h i s out. 
Cl23)Letter from Hegel to Schelling, 2 November IBOO, Briefe. op.cit., 
I> pp.59-60. 
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CHAPTER I I 
HEGEL AT JENA; 
A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICS 
Hegel's decision to provide a philosophical explanation of 
human experience i n general and man's p o l i t i c a l experience i n 
pa r t i c u l a r i s i n a sense the turning point i n his development. 
I t signalizes the passage from the writings of his youth to those 
of maturity. Having given up his revolutionary aspirations f o r 
the p r a c t i c a l transformation of r e a l i t y , he came to maintain that 
only the philosophical interpretation of the world as a t o t a l i t y 
can overcome fragmentation and disharmony. As he sees i t , only 
by understanding the world as i t i s can man become reconciled to 
i t . 
Hegel's philosophy of e^erience did not, however, arise f u l l 
blown. Rather i t emerged slowly by degrees over a number of years 
and was, at least i n - i t s i n i t i a l stages, t i e d very closely to the 
philosophy of Schelling. Of course i t i s well known that i n his 
Berlinllectures on the h i s t o i y of philosophy, Hegel contemptuously 
dismissed Schelling as a man who "completed his philosophical 
education i n public"^"''^ but t h i s rather harsh jvidgement only came 
af t e r the almost t o t a l eclipse of Schelling's influence. Vfhen Hegel 
arrived at Jena i n I8OI to assume the position as Privatdozent at the 
university, Schelling was the leading i n t e l l e c t u a l l i g h t of his 
generation, having already issued several books. Like Hegel, 
Schelling was concerned with the t o t a l comprehension of r e a l i t y and 
(l)G.W.F. Hegel, Samtliche Werke. ed. H. Glockner, 20 vols., 
Stu t t g a r t , 1927-30, XIX, p.647. 
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at t h i s time he was p a r t i c u l a r l y preoccupied with the philosophy of 
nature. Schelling was never a systematic philosopher, however, and 
he l e f t large areas of inquiry completely untouched. The 
comprehension of social and p o l i t i c a l experience appeared to Hegel 
as j u s t such a blind spot i n Schelling's work which he might 
elaborate. But before going into Hegel's own system of philosophical 
p o l i t i c s , i t w i l l be necessary to examine, a l b e i t i n a very schematic 
fashion, Schelling's r e l a t i o n to Fichte. 
During the early years of t h e i r collaboration, Fichte and 
Schelling believed themselves equal partners embarked upon a common 
philosophical venture. This venture had been i n i t i a t e d by Fichte's 
t r e a t i s e the Wissenschaftslehre which f i r s t appeared i n 1794 and which 
was intended to r e c t i f y what he understood as the epistemological 
deficiency of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, namely the unknowability 
of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f (Ping-an-sich). I n t h i s work Kant argues 
against Hume and the philosophy of empiricism, that the mind plays an 
active part i n structuring r e a l i t y and i s not merely a passive 
recipient of external sensations. From the outset he merely assumes 
that there are such things as synthetic a p r i o r i judgements and his 
( 2 ) 
task i s to demonstrate how such judgements are possible. His 
answer i s that there are certain innate categories of the mind which 
he designates as the fundamental forms of i n t u i t i o n (space and time) 
and the forms of the understanding (quantity, q u a l i t y , cause, e f f e c t , 
etc.) which are not given i n experience, but which are necessary 
prerequisites f o r any possible experience. This solution gives r i s e . 
(2)lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 
London, I 9 5 O , pp.41-3. 
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however, to the notorious discrepancy between things as they appear, 
that i s as structured by the mind, and things i n themselves which 
stand outside the l i m i t s of a l l human cognition. Knowledge i n 
Kant's view only extends to the appearances of things and not to 
the essential r e a l i t y vdiich underlies them. 
Fichte, as the foremost representative of the Kantian school, 
had published his tre a t i s e not as a rebuttal of Kant's epistemology, 
but as an extension and an improvement of i t . Indeed, Kant had at 
f i r s t embraced Fichte as a b r i l l i a n t young disciple, but shortly 
before his death i n I804 he had become aware of certain irreconcilable 
differences between them, differences which could not simply be 
ignored or papered over, but had to be made e x p l i c i t . The breach 
between them was inevitable. 
Fichte's theory of knowledge i s based upon a radical and 
systematic subjective idealism f a r beyond anything envisaged by Kant. 
Fichte holds that Kant had been unable to solve the problem of the 
t h i n g ^ i n - i t s e l f , or the unknowable substrate of a l l objects of 
experience, because of his dualism between the ego and the external 
world. Fichte attempts to overcome t h i s dualism by arguing that 
the external world i s merely something "posited" by the ego and i n -
•sofax.' as the ego has created the world i t can have certain knowledge 
of i t . Hence Fichte's epistemology begins from the rudimentary 
thesis that the facts encountered i n experience are merely the facts 
of self-consciousness. They exist only f o r the thinking ego and i t 
only remains for philosophy to show that t h i s objective world of facts 
i s not other to man, but a result of his own subjective a c t i v i t y . 
The t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f i s therefore eliminated as nothing i n the world 
i s opaque to the omnipotent power of thought. 
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I t i s i n terms of a counterpart to the Wissenschaftslehre that 
Schelling conceived his System of Transcendental Idealism (l800). 
Like Pichte, Schelling also takes his point of departure from the 
concept of the t h i n g - i n ^ i t s e l f . His argument i s basically that we 
can have knowledge of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f through an act of what he 
c a l l s " i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n " . This notion of a purely i n t u i t i v e 
understanding by which ultimate r e a l i t y may be known i s not completely 
Schelling's own, but was suggested by Kant himself i n the Critique of 
Judgement. I n fact i t i s not at a l l surprising that Schelling who 
had a highly developed aesthetic s e n s i b i l i t y should be influenced by 
t h i s work of Kant's where aesthetics and teleology are the crowning 
points of the entire system. I n the section dealing with the 
teleological Judgement Kant argues that i n ordinary thought there i s 
always a residue of contingency located i n the particular which the 
judgement attempts to bring under the universal categories of the 
understanding. I t i s t h i s contingency which makes i t d i f f i c u l t to 
reduce the manifold of nature to the unity of knowledge. But there 
i s , Kant maintains, a form of Judgement based upon the "complete 
spontaneity of i n t u i t i o n " which i s able to bring about a harmony 
between the p a r t i c u l a r and the universal: 
But now i t i s at least possible to consider the 
material world as mere phenomenon, and to think 
as i t s substrate something l i k e a t h i r g r i n - i t s e l f 
(which i s not phenomenon), and even to attach to 
t h i s a corresponding i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n (even 
though i t i s not ours). Thus there would be, 
although incognisable by us, a supersensible real 
ground f o r nature, t o which we ourselves belong. (3) 
This mode of cognition which he refers to as "intellectus archetypus" 
(3)lmmanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J.H. Bernard, London, 
1914, p.325. 
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i s here not proved or demonstrated, but only proposed. This proof 
can only be worked out i n d e t a i l i n transcendental philosophy. 
I t was Schelling who f i r s t took t h i s suggestion seriously and 
elaborated an entire philosophy based upon t h i s complete spontaneity 
of i n t u i t i o n . I n a central passage from his System of Transcendental 
Idealism he defines t h i s form of i n t u i t i o n as follows: 
This knowledge must be ( l ) an absolutely free 
knowledge because a l l other knowledge i s unfree; 
i t must, therefore, be a knowledge to which we 
cannot be led by means of demonstrations, 
syllogisms or the mediation of concepts; i t must 
be an i n t u i t i o n . (2) This knowledge must be such 
that i t s object i s not independent of i t ; i t must, 
therefore, be a knowledge which at the same time 
produces i t s object - an i n t u i t i o n which produces 
f r e e l y and i n which the productive act i s at one 
with i t s product. I n opposition to sensible 
i n t u i t i o n which does not produce i t s object, where 
the act of i n t u i t i o n i s d i s t i n c t from i t s object, 
t h i s act of i n t u i t i o n must be called an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
i n t u i t i o n . (5) 
Even while Schelling here obviously takes his point of departure from 
Kant, any supposed s i m i l a r i t y between them must be more apparent 
than r e a l . Since Schelling maintains that i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n 
i s an absolutely free and unconditioned knowledge, i t is,therefore, 
not amenable, as Kant would have l i k e d , to rigorous philosophical 
proof or deduction. Rather i t i s only revealed through a higher 
form of aesthetic experience. I n t h i s manner Schelling, following 
the romantics Jacobi, Novalis and Schliermacher, succumbs to a dubious 
mystical aestheticism which i s incapable of being r a t i o n a l l y accounted 
(4) l b i d . , pp.313-14. 
(5) F.W.J. Schelling, Werke, ed. Manfred Schroter, I4 vols., Munich, 
1927, I I , p.369. 
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f o r . ^ ^ ^ As a result Schelling makes the cognition of r e a l i t y the 
exclusive province of a privileged s p i r i t u a l e l i t e ; and, as we 
shall see l a t e r , i t i s on precisely t h i s point that Hegel takes him 
to task. 
Even while Pichte and Schelling i n i t i a l l y saw themselves engaged 
i n a common enterprise, that i s , the philosophical comprehension of 
the whole of r e a l i t y , i t soon became apparent that there were 
substantial differences between them. Just as e a r l i e r differences had 
emerged between Kant and Fichte. The major source of contention was 
that Schelling was not s a t i s f i e d with Pichte's claim that nature i s 
merely "posited" by the ego, a passive object upon which the ego 
r e f l e c t s . Per Schelling, who had come to embrace a form of 
Spinozism, nature i s governed by a creative dynamic of i t s own, the 
laws of force, which are not simply the product of the pre-conscious 
(7) 
i n t e l l e c t . ^ " Indeed, both mind and nature are conceived as two 
separate branches of the same t o t a l i t y or absolute which Schelling 
c a l l s the "indifference point". I t was Schelling's refusal to 
a t t r i b u t e primacy to the thinking ego which ultimately drove a wedge 
between him and Pichte. Ijy assigning a s p i r i t u a l telos to nature, 
which implies that things other than man may have a purpose, Schelling 
hoped to overcome the epistemological opposition between subject and 
object which i n his view Pichte had f a i l e d to supply. Such a 
re c o n c i l i a t i o n i s brought about through the above mentioned i n t e l l e c t u a l 
(6) The best study on t h i s subject by f a r i s Hinrich Knittermeyer, 
Schelling und die romantische Schule, Munich, 1929; f o r an excellent 
account of Hegel's c r i t i q u e of Schelling's romantic nature philosophy 
see Otto Poggeler, Kegels K r i t i k der Romantik, Bonn, 1956, pp.138-85. 
(7) This i s put forward i n Schelling, op.cit., I , pp.653-706. 
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i n t u i t i o n i n which a perfect harmony between man and nature, subject 
and object, i s achieved. 
V/hat i s at issue here i s not merely an obscure debate between 
two German philosophers, but a much larger question which was to 
have v i t a l implications f o r the entire history of philosphy. I t i s 
a debate concerning two quite d i f f e r e n t forms of idealism. I t i s 
the absolute supremacy of the ego over natuire and the extreme 
s o l i p s i s t i c conclusions which can be drawn from such a position 
which places Fichte squarely i n the camp of subjective idealism. 
I t i s Schelling's attempt to give a certain degree of independence 
to nature which gives his thought a recognizably objective i d e a l i s t 
perspective. I n fact i n many respects t h i s objective idealism 
c l e a r l y borders upon;philosphical materialism with i t s proposition 
that being i s , at least i n i t i a l l y , independent of consciousness. I t 
i s no accident, f o r example, that the young Ularx i n a celebrated 
l e t t e r speaks of Schelling's "genuine youthful insight" and refers 
to him as a "distorted r e f l e c t i o n " on Peuerbach's materialism.^ ' 
Even Engels i n l a t e r years remarks how Schelling's and other 
philosophies of nature, containing as they do a great deal of nonsense 
and fantasy, nevertheless played a positive role i n the development 
of the natural s c i e n c e s . O f course i t was Schelling's great 
misfortune, Marx maintains, never to have developed his genuine 
(8) Letter from Marx to Ludwig Feuerbach, 20 October I843 i n Marx-Engels 
Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and V.Adoratskij, Frankfurt and 
Berl i n , 1927-32, I , p.3l6; c f . the comment of Feuerbach i n his Zur 
K r i t i k der Hegelschen Philosophie (I839) i n Santliche VYerke, ed. 
P.Jodl and W. Bolin, 10 vols., Stuttgart, I903, I I , p.l93; "(With 
Schelling) philosophy becomes beautiful, poetic, comfortable, 
romantic, but at the same time transcendental, superstitious, and 
absolutely u n c r i t i c a l " . 
(9) Fredrick Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, I969, p.16: " I t i s much 
easier, along with the unthinking mob a l a Karl Vogt, to assail the 
old natural philosophy than to appreciate i t s h i s t o r i c a l significance. 
I t contains a great deal of nonsense and fantasy, but not more than 
the unphiloaophioal theories of the empirical natural scientists 
contemporary with that philosophy^ and that there was also i n i t 
much that was sensible and r a t i o n a l . . . . " 
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youthful insight i n t o a f u l l fledged materialism and i t was t h i s 
f a i l u r e which ultimately brought his system into disrepute. 
I t was i n terms of t h i s dispute between Fichte and Schelling 
that Hegel, soon a f t e r a r r i v i n g at Jena, published his f i r s t 
philosophical manifesto e n t i t l e d The Difference between the Fichtean 
and Schellingian Systems-gf Philosophy (18OI). I n t h i s b r i e f and 
h a s t i l y composed essay Hegel, f o r the f i r s t time, gives systematic . 
philosophical expression to what he had e a r l i e r characterized as a 
realm beyond thought accessible only to religious experience. 
Throughout t h i s essay Hegel sides with Schelling against Pichte, or, 
to put i t another way, he adopts the position of objective idealism 
against subjective idealism. Indeed i t might be f a i r to say, and 
there i s considerable evidence fo r saying i t , that i n his early years 
i n Jena Hegel considered himself a Schellingian. Not u n t i l the 
publication of the Phenomenology of Mind were his differences with 
Schelling made public. 
Continuing the basic theme developed i n his early writings, 
Hegel begins by examining the need f o r philosophy and he traces t h i s 
back to the appearance of bifurcation and disharmony: 
When v/e consider more closely the particular form 
which a philosophy has, we see how at once i t 
develops from the l i v i n g o r i g i n a l i t y of a mind 
which has actively structured a fragmented harmony 
and which also develops from the particular form 
of disunity from which the system springs. 
Bifurcation i s the source f o r the need for philosophy» 
and as the culture of i t s age, i t i s i t s unfree, 
pre-deterrained aspect. In culture manifestations 
of the absolute have become isolated and fixed as 
autonomous things. (lO) 
(lO)G.W.F. Hegel, Erste Druckschriften, ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig, 1928, 
p.l>2. 
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And Hegel expresses precisely t h i s idea again shortly afterward: 
The need f o r philosophy arises when the power of 
u n i f i c a t i o n disappears from the l i f e of men, when 
the contradictions have lost t h e i r l i v i n g r e l a t i o n 
and reciprocal interaction and become independent 
from one another, ( l l ) 
This unifying power to which Hegel refers i s the harmony of the 
individual and the general w i l l which t y p i f i e d the antique republics 
and which guaranteed the freedom of the whole. But the harmony of 
the Greek world was an immediate harmony which was merely f e l t and 
l i v e d spontaneously. I t was not a closely reasoned, in t e l l e c t u a l i z e d 
r e l a t i o n to the world. With the development of the powers of the 
human mind, man could no longer l i v e i n t u i t i v e l y with his environment, 
but had to conceptualize i t . As a result the orig i n a l close-knit 
unity was broken apart and Hegel interprets the rise of philosophy 
as motivated by a need to restore the sense of t o t a l i t y to man's 
p o l i t i c a l experience. 
Hegel's argument i s that the culture of his own time represents 
the highpoint i n fragmentation and disunity, even though he i s not 
e x p l i c i t about what t h i s fragmentation and disunity consists of. I n 
any case i t i s the task of philosophy to comprehend the sources of 
these antagonisms and i n doing so, eliminate them: 
To do away with such fixed antagonisms i s the specific 
task of philosophy. This does not mean that i t i s 
against opposition and l i m i t a t i o n i n general; indeed 
disunity i s a necessary factor i n l i f e which develops 
from a perpetual process of oppositions, and i t i s 
only from the condition of the greatest possible 
disunion, that the t o t a l i t y can be recreated i n a l l 
i t s v i t a l i t y . But reason i s against the absolute 
f i x i n g of disunity by the understanding, and even more 
so when absolute oppositions have arisen from reason 
i t s e l f . (12) 
(11) l b i d . , p.14. 
(12) l b i d . , pp.13-14. 
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This passage, while extremely murky, says a great deal. F i r s t , i t 
says that while the task of philosophy i s to do away with antagonisms, 
a return to the unmediated i d e n t i t y of Greek culture i s a pract i c a l 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Indeed the existence of modern culture i s predicated 
upon the development of certain oppositions which are a necessary 
factor i n l i f e . Second, i t says that philosophy i s not wrong to 
give expression to these antagonisms, but only to portray them as 
fixed and s t a t i c . I n fact they are i n an eternal process of 
development i n which f l u i d i t y and movement are the outstanding 
characteristics. Third, i t says that t h i s r i g i d f i x a t i o n of 
antagonisms i s the result of a particular form of theorizing which 
he i d e n t i f i e s with the i n t e l l e c t or the understanding (Verstand). 
This as demonstrated i n "The S p i r i t of Chri s t i a n i t y and i t s Pate" i s 
a type of thought that bifurcates experience in t o antinomies which 
are incapable of being resolved. As Hegel sees i t , i t i s the task 
of reason (Vernunft), of philosophy, to locate the source of these 
antagonisms and f i n d a means of creating unity out of them. I n t h i s 
manner does Hegel fo r the f i r s t time give expression to the nature 
of the philosophical enterprise. 
I n the Difference Hegel does not even attempt to provide a 
sketch f o r a philosophy of culture. What he does provide, however, 
i s a sustained attack upon Fichte's theory of knowledge showing i t 
to be an unsatisfactory foundation f o r any possible philosophy of 
culture. He focuses p a r t i c u l a r attention upon two problems of 
Fichte's, the f i r s t being his i n a b i l i t y to reconcile adequately.the 
subject-object opposition and, as a corollary of t h i s , his i n a b i l i t y 
to free himself from the grip of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . For Hegel, 
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the source of a l l disunity now appears under the aegis of an 
epistemological c o n f l i c t between the knowing subject and the 
object of knov/ledge and i t i s only a f t e r t h i s c o n f l i c t i s 
resolved that philosophy can f i n d the path back to harmony and 
coherence. 
Like his mentor, Schelling, Hegel claims that Fichte's f a i l u r e 
to resolve t h i s c o n f l i c t between subject and object ultimately 
stems from the basic p r i n c i p l e of his system. Hegel correctly 
points out that the Fichtean system of philosophy depends upon a 
primary act called the Grundsatz by which the ego posits i t s e l f as 
i t s e l f before i t i s posited i n nature. This f i r s t p rinciple i s 
expressed i n the simple form of Ego = Ego which, so f a r as Hegel i s 
concerned, constitutes a denial of o b j e c t i v i t y as the objective 
world merely becomes a predicate of the ego. Bather than postulating 
an absolute which i s the common ground of both subject and object, 
Fichte merely raises the subject to the level of an absolute thus 
making any genuine r e c o n c i l i a t i o n completely untenable. Hegel 
himself e x p l i c i t l y recognizes the l o g i c a l incoherency of Fichte's 
i d e n t i c a l subject-object when he says: "The absolute i d e n t i t y i s 
c e r t a i n l y the p r i n c i p l e of speculation, but i t remains l i k e his 
expression Ego = Ego nothing more than a rule whose i n f i n i t e f u l f i l m e n t 
i s postulated but never achieved i n the system".^^^^ As a result the 
opposition between ego and nature f o r which Pichte had c r i t i c i z e d 
Kant i s never reconciled i n his own system as the l a t t e r simply 
remains a backdrop f o r the development of the fomer. 
As a consequence of Fichte's f a i l u r e to reconcile s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
( I 3 ) l b i d . , p.46. 
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subject and object, he remains the victim of a perpetually coercive 
ought, the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . Here too Hegel traces t h i s back to the 
Grundsatz. Following the Kantian thinker Reinhold, Pichte argues 
that while the mind could have certain knowledge only of things 
exi s t i n g i n time and space i t could have a p a r t i a l , r e l a t i v e 
knowledge of the transcendental forces of which the Grundsatz i s 
i t s e l f an expression. Although he does not venture as f a r as 
Schelling who claims that the ultimate object of knowledge can be 
known through a tnystical act of i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n , he does 
f e e l that the mind could a t t a i n a limited though inconclusive view 
of i t . As a r e s u l t , Hegel says, Fichte's philosophy remains stuck 
on the ought: 
This impossibility of the ego reconstructing i t s e l f 
from the opposition of subj e c t i v i t y and of the X which 
emerges i n the act of unconscious production and of 
uni t i n g with i t s manifestation i s expressed thus: the 
supreme synthesis of which the system i s capable i s 
expressed as an ought (Sollen). Ego equals Ego i s 
transformed into Ego ought to equal Ego; the end of 
the system does not return to the beginning. (I4) 
Put i n simple terms t h i s means that the ego i s never able to assimilate 
i t s object and that a part of the object always remains outside of 
consciousness. Thus Fichteanism, l i k e Kantianism before i t , i s 
forced i n t o an " i n f i n i t e progress" vrtiich can never reach any conclusion 
w i t h i n philosophy. 
I n due course the social and p o l i t i c a l implications of Fichte's 
theoretical philosophy w i l l be examined. Suffice i t to say f o r now 
that since he commences with the single, isolated ego, the community 
of other egos simply appears as something which must be assimilated 
(l4)IbidM pp.52-3. 
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to consciousness as would any other object. The community i s 
merely a part of the objective world and as such a l i m i t a t i o n 
to the free s u b j e c t i v i t y of the individual. This i s the direct 
opposite of Hegel's view which holds that the community i s i n fact 
the basic precondition of human freedom. Referring to Pichte's 
view that the community i s a l i m i t a t i o n on freedom, Hegel .says that 
(I'S) 
as such i t would amount to the highest form of tyranny.^ 
At t h i s time Hegel accepted, with only certain reservations, 
Schelling's solution to the problems of Fichte's philosophy. 
Schelling believed that subject and object can only be adequately 
harmonized i n an indifference point which i s knowable through 
philosophical i n t u i t i o n . This indifference point i s neither pure 
o b j e c t i v i t y nor pure s u b j e c t i v i t y , but an absolute which stands over 
and above both. But even while Hegel i s here the avowed disciple of 
Schelling and frequently coquettes with some of his more esoteric 
terminology, there i s already imminent the germ of th e i r l a t e r 
d i v i s i o n . For Schelling, the point of indifference, l i k e the 
Spinozist absolute, tends to eliminate a l l struggle between subject 
and object i n favour of a peaceful and q u i e t i s t i c equilibrium. But 
unlike Spinoza's famous "order and connection" Schelling's absolute 
negates a l l the a r t i c u l a t i o n s of that vAiioh i s ordered and connected.^^^^ 
Here a l l differences are merely absorbed in t o a perfect i d e n t i t y or 
(17) 
what Hegel would l a t e r c a l l "a night i n which a l l cows are black".^ " 
(15) l b i d . , p.65. 
(16) See Benedict de Spinoza, The Chief Works, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, 
2 Vols., New York, I95I, I I , p.86: "The order and connection of 
ideas i s the same as the order and connection of things". 
(17) G.W,F. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister, 
Hamburg, 1952, p.19* The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. B a i l i e , 
London, I 9 7 I , p.79-
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While Hegel's own position i s not yet clearly delineated, he 
makes i t evident that the struggle between subject and object 
cannot simply be eliminated at the philosopher's convenience, but 
i s a necessary feature of the development of the human mind. I t i s 
impossible to delete a l l bi f u r c a t i o n and discord and return to a 
condition of complete equipoise. Rather bifurcation and discord 
are a part of r e a l i t y and therefore must be incorporated within a 
philosophical understanding of i t . I n a passage reminiscent of 
Schelling but already some distance from him, Hegel remarks that to 
provide an accurate grasp of r e a l i t y , philosophy must depict i t as 
an i d e n t i t y of i d e n t i t y and non-identity: 
Just as i d e n t i t y must be validated, so too must 
di v i s i o n . I n so f a r as i d e n t i t y and division 
are opposed to one another, each i s absolute, 
and i f i d e n t i t y i s to be upheld through the 
annihilation of duality then they remain opposed 
to one another. Philosophy must give division 
i n subject and object i t s due; but i n assuming 
i t be as absolute as the i d e n t i t y opposed to 
duality - since i t i s based upon the annihilation 
of duali t y - i t assumes i t as r e l a t i v e . Thus 
the absolute i s the i d e n t i t y of i d e n t i t y and 
non-identity; both opposition and unity are equal 
w i t h i n i t . (l8) 
This passage bears a certain s i m i l a r i t y to Hegel's e a r l i e r "Fragment 
of a System" where he speaks of r e a l i t y as a union of union and 
h o ) 
non-union.^ The great difference, of course, is that i n Frankfurt 
Hegel believed that t h i s insight was the exclusive product of religious 
experience, vrtiile i n Jena he hopes to give i t systematic philosophical 
expression. 
I n order to comprehend the complexity of r e a l i t y and experience, 
(18) Hegel, Erste Druckschriften, op.cit., pp.76-7. 
(19) G,W,F. Hegel, Kegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. H. Nohl, 
Tubingen, 1907, p.348. 
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Hegel i s led to view i t w i t h i n the context of an overall philosophy 
of mind. Since we have already seen i n some d e t a i l exactly v/hat 
i s entailed i n Hegel's use of the term Geist, further elucidation 
w i l l not here be necessary. What i s c r u c i a l , however, i s the 
manner i n which he sees t h i s new philosophy i n r e l a t i o n to his 
predecessors. As Richgird Kroner correctly observes, i t i s from 
t h i s period that Hegel adopts a genuinely h i s t o r i c a l approach to 
the understanding of philosophy.^^^^ Neither Kant, nor Pichte, 
nor Schelling had any real h i s t o r i c a l sense (although at one time 
or another each of them dabbled with the philosophy of h i s t o r y ) , 
but merely viewed ideas i n abstraction from the social s i t u a t i o n i n 
which they were expounded. For Hegel, however, philosophy i s viewed 
i n terms of a progressive h i s t o r i c a l development over time. Each 
philosophy represents i t s age comprehended i n thought. Philosophy 
i s thus the i n t e l l e c t u a l apotheosis of i t s time. And Just as no man 
can overstep the general s p i r i t of his age, so too does t h i s hold true 
f o r philosophy which i s always intimately related to the dominant 
p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l problems of the era. Starting from t h i s 
methodological premise, Hegel interprets the philosophy of subjective 
idealism as representative of p o l i t i c a l society i n c r i s i s as i t 
v i v i d l y depicts the imminent disintegration of true community relations. 
I n a similar fashion Hegel c r i t i c i z e s the materialist philosophy of 
Helvetius and d'Holbach r e f e r r i n g to the l a t t e r ' s System de l a nature 
as characteristic of "mind estranged from i t s e l f " as i t views the 
universe as governed by certain blind natural lav/s which operate 
(21) 
e n t i r e l y independently of human consciousness.^ ' I n t h i s manner 
(20) Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel. 2 vols., Tubingen, 1921- 4, 
I I , p.146. 
(21) Hegel, Erste Druckschriften, op.cit., pp.96-7. 
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both subjective idealism and materialism are complementary as they 
merely provide a p a r t i a l , one-sided grasp of r e a l i t y and therefore ' 
perpetuate man's sense of estrangement and alienation. I n Hegel's 
view, however, only a new philosophy which understands experience 
as the t o t a l development of mind or consciousness can overcome t h i s 
malaise. I t w i l l be shown l a t e r exactly how on Hegel's account 
such a philosophy i s possible. 
I I 
Hegel's Difference was intended as a cr i t i q u e of the theoretical 
philosophy of subjective idealism. I n t h i s work he came down 
largely on the side of Schelling's objective idealism with i t s 
attempt to discover the transcendental conditions of knowledge which 
both Kant and Fichte had declared t o be unknowable. Here Hegel had 
merely to follow the lead of Schelling i n exposing the obvious 
inadequacies of Kantian and Fichtean philosophy. Shortly thereafter, 
however, Hegel was to turn his attention t o the practical philosophy 
of subjective idealism, that i s , i t s moral and p o l i t i c a l doctrine. 
Since the p r a c t i c a l philosophy was not something with which Schelling 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned - his own interests being more i n the 
domain of nature philosophy and aesthetics - Hegel was here forced to 
generate his own o r i g i n a l insights rather than to f a l l back on those 
of his f r i e n d . I t i s perhaps thus that the extreme density and 
obscurity of Hegel's thought during t h i s period can be explained. 
Hegel's f i r s t philosophical attempt to understand the character of 
man's pr a c t i c a l experience i s put forward i n an essay "On the 
S c i e n t i f i c Treatment of Natural Right" which was published i n l802 
i n the C r i t i c a l Journal of Philosophy which Hegel was then co-editing 
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(22) with Schelling. ^  ' As Rosenkranz observes, i t was with t h i s work 
that Hegel hoped to make his impact upon the i n t e l l e c t u a l milieu at 
(23) 
Jena which was then the c u l t u r a l capital of a l l Germany.^ ' I n 
t h i s essay Hegel i s not simply content to c r i t i c i z e his predecessors, 
but he attempts to stake out the boundaries of a new ethical and 
p o l i t i c a l philosophy both with respect to the ancient and the modem 
tr a d i t i o n s of thought. This new practical philosophy, he believed, 
would provide the perfect counterpart to Schelling's speculative 
physics and together would express t h e i r Joint philosophical ideal. 
Hegel begins his essay v/ith an incisive c r i t i q u e of the 
empiricist approach to p o l i t i c s and society. Empiricism, he argues, 
represents an advance over the philosophies of Descartes and Spinoza 
primar i l y i n i t s r ejection of innate ideas and i t s assertion that a l l 
t r u t h and knowledge stems from experience. He sees the t r u t h of 
empiricism i n i t s claim that a l l thought i s a r e f l e c t i o n upon a 
given mode of experience. This claim i s , however, not without 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . I f empiricism i s to remain true to i t s e l f i n 
maintaining that a l l thought derives either d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y 
from experience, i t cannot account f o r how t h i s experience i s 
;orgariiae"d and arranged by the mind. The mind, as Hume had 
demonstrated, becomes nothing more than a flow of sense impressions 
and t h e i r f a i n t traces i n memory. Reality i s thus perceived as a 
(22) G.W.F. Hegel, Schriften zur P o l i t i k und Rechtsphilosophie, 
ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig, 1923> pp.327-411; henceforth cit e d as 
Lasson. For a good account of Hegel's views on the subject of 
natural r i g h t see Manfred Riedel, "Hegels K r i t i k des Naturrechts" 
i n Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, Frankfurt a/M, 1969> 
pp.42-74. 
(23) Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Wilhelm Fredrick Hegels Leben, Berlin, l844> 
photo r e p r i n t Darmstadt, 1963> p.l49. 
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vast catalogue of things and events none of which can claim any 
precedence over the others: "For empiricism each thing has the 
same equal r i g h t as the others and no one determination i s superior 
to any other, a l l are equally r e a l " . ^ ^ ^ ^ Thus f o r the true 
empiricist r e a l i t y i s a hodge-podge of p a r t i c u l a r details with no 
inherent r a t i o n a l i t y . 
I t should be said that Hegel always remained f a i t h f u l to a 
certain type of empiricism i n that he f e l t philosophy should be 
purely descriptive and should contain nothing that i s not included 
w i t h i n experience. What he condemns here, however, i s a bogus 
empiricism which claims to describe, but i n fact d i s t o r t s and 
mystifies experience. I n describing experience t h i s vulgar 
empiricism frequently selects one particular aspect of r e a l i t y and 
transforms i t i n t o the fundamental determination or essence of the 
whole: "For an account", he says, "which must incorporate a multitude 
of concepts t ^ remain coherent, i t i s necessary to give primacy to 
one of the determinations which expresses i t s e l f as the end or law 
of the whole so that a l l the other determinations appear as unreal 
or n u l l " . ^ •'' I n i t s search f o r absolute certainty, empiricism 
frequently has recourse to these rather surreptitious techniques. 
When speaking about the i n s t i t u t i o n of marriage, for instance, i t 
i s often alleged that the procreation of children i s the essence of 
the r e l a t i o n . Or i t i s also alleged that the reformation of the 
criminal i s the essence of penal law.^ ' ^ thus abstracting one 
(24) l'asson, op.cit., p.335' 
(25) I b i d . , p.340. 
(26) I b i d . , pp.332-33. 
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element of experience and elevating i t to the status of a f i r s t 
cause, empiricism i s enabled to a t t r i b u t e a certain r a t i o n a l i t y 
to experience but at the cost of negating i t s own premises. 
Hegel next c r i t i c i z e s the direct opposite of empiricism, 
formalism, which i s simply the practical philosophy of subjective 
idealism. I n t h e i r haste to avoid the p i t f a l l s of empiricism, 
the formalists were led to abandon actual concrete experience i n 
favour of a purely a p r i o r i type of thinking which can account f o r 
the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of r e a l i t y . To do t h i s formalism attempts to 
construct a philosophically coherent concept of reason, but without 
any reference to the facts encountered i n experience. As an 
instance of t h i s type of theorizing Hegel focuses on the moral 
idealism of Kant whose entire ethical doctrine i s based upon t h i s 
highly abstract and metaphysical principle of reason. Hegel's 
c r i t i q u e here i s much along the same lines as i n Frankfurt, but he 
elaborates i t i n f a r more d e t a i l and with d i r e c t reference t o 
Kantian texts. Hegel correctly poihts out that f o r Kant the 
p r i n c i p l e of pure p r a c t i c a l reason i s the basis of a l l moral 
l e g i s l a t i o n . But having propounded t h i s principle of reason i n 
complete abstraction from a l l experience, Hegel says that i t cannot 
le g i t i m a t e l y pass judgement on the morality or immorality of any 
course of action as t h i s would drag i t down from i t s ethereal a p r i o r i 
status to the world ofsensuous human a c t i v i t y . So.long, Hegel 
maintains, as the pr i n c i p l e of reason i s independent of experience, 
so long w i l l i t s commands be u t t e r l y vacuous. 
Hegel substantiates t h i s claim by reference to one of the central 
arguments i n Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. In t h i s work Kant 
says that the categorical imperative, the highest law of morality. 
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consists i n self-consistency or the absence of contradiction i n 
human actions. As an instance of t h i s law he discusses the case 
of a man who has decided to embezzle a deposit, the orig i n a l owner 
of which had died and the whereabouts of which was unknown to 
anyone except the man to whom i t was entrusted. Even under these 
circumstances Kant says that such an action cannot be considered 
moral on the grounds that i t becomes involved i n contradictions 
when universalized i n t o a law: " I at once become aware that such 
a p r i n c i p l e , viewed as a law, would annihilate i t s e l f , because the 
(27) 
resu l t would be that there would be no more deposits". Kant 
wants to show then that the morality of an action can be established 
simply by a deduction from the internal coherence of the moral law. 
Hegel's argument i s that by attempting to assess the moral 
rightness or wrongness of a pa r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s manner, 
Kant himself f a l l s prey to certain contradictions. For example, 
to say that the embezzlement of a deposit i s morally contradictozy 
because i t would result i n the negation of a l l future deposits 
presupposes a society which puts great store i n such things as 
deposits. While Kant claims that the law of moral reason i s 
independent of empirical a c t u a l i t y , the presupposition of contingent 
human i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e deposits and property i s smuggled i n through 
the back door. Taken on -^ ivts;-- own, Hegel says, the existence or 
non-existence of property i s perfectly consistent with i t s e l f and 
there i s no means by which the principle of reason can decide between 
them. Hegel puts i t thuss 
(27)lnimanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. T.K. Abbot, 
London, 1967> p.115. 
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I f the detemination of property i n general i s posited, 
the following tautology can be deduced from i t : 
property i s property and nothing other. And t h i s 
tautological production i s the l e g i s l a t i o n of practical 
reason: property, i f there i s property, must 
necessarily be property. But i f the opposite 
determination, the negation of property, i s posited, 
then the l e g i s l a t i o n of t h i s same practical reason 
produces t h i s tautology: non-property i s non-property 
and i f there i s no property that which pretends to be 
property i s annulled. (28) 
While Hegel's reasoning i s no doubt d i f f i c u l t , his point i s a f a i r l y 
simple one. Moral l e g i s l a t i o n , he maintains, i s not something which 
can be propounded i n abstraction from man's concrete social existence. 
Rather morality i s i t s e l f a part of a wider social and p o l i t i c a l 
whole. Thus the maxims of moral l e g i s l a t i o n are not timeless and 
a h i s t o r i c a l , but vary according to time and place and may on occasion, 
although Kant had strenuously denied t h i s , c o n f l i c t with one another. 
The f u l l ramifications of t h i s position w i l l come out more clearly 
l a t e r when we examine Hegel's social ethics. 
What Hegel d i s l i k e s i s the s t r i c t l y a p r i o r i manner i n which Kant 
establishes the precepts of morality. But this he feels i s not only 
peculiar to Kant alone, but to Fichte as well who i n The Foundations 
of Natural Right (1796) attempts to deduce legal and p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s from the requirements of philosophy alone. As an 
instance of t h i s highly abstract and unrealistic approach to p o l i t i c s , 
Hegel singles out f o r c r i t i c i s m Fichte's notion of an Ephorate or a 
board of governors whose task i t i s to supervise the actions of the 
government. On the one hand he points out that i f t h i s Ephorate had 
any real power i t would merely be setting i t s e l f up as an alternate 
government and i n any state a dual authority i s i n the long run 
(28)Lasson, op.cit., p.352. 
96 
unworkable. I f both were equal i n power the result would be a perfect 
(29) 
equilibrium, a perpetuum quietum, leading to p o l i t i c a l paralysis.^ 
On the other hand, i f the Ephorate was to have no real power of i t s own, 
i t would only exist as an appendage to the government and i n times of 
c r i s i s would be impotent. Hegel supports t h i s second contention by 
reference to actual events thus showing how Pichte's theories run 
contrary to h i s t o r i c a l f a c t . I n a rather oblique reference to 
Napoleon's coup d'e^tat of 1799 he demonstrates how l i t t l e influence 
such a board of control would actually have: 
We r e c a l l the recent dissolution by a government of 
a l e g i s l a t i v e body which was i n competition with i t 
and paralysing i t . The idea that the establishment 
of a commission of control analogous to the Fichtean 
Ephorate would have prevented such a COUP d'e'tat has 
been correctly judged by a man closely involved i n 
t h i s matter. According to him, such a supervisory 
council which attempted to r e s i s t the government 
would have been treated v/ith equal violence. (30) 
I t w i l l be shown l a t e r to what an extent Hegel's p o l i t i c a l thought 
during the Jena period was influenced by the Napoleonic experience. 
Hegel's own view of natural r i g h t i s based largely upon the 
concept of S i t t l i c h k e i t v/hich i s roughly equivalent to his e a r l i e r 
use of the term Volksgeist and which s i g n i f i e s a comprehensive f i e l d 
of social ethics which transcends the purely subjective morality of 
the i n d i v i d u a l . I n fact the German word S i t t e l i k e the Greek ethos 
l i t e r a l l y means customs, manners and morals of a people as embodied 
i n a l i v i n g and organized community. At one point he even says that 
"the absolute ethical t o t a l i t y i s nothing other than a people".^^^^ 
:E!y thus viewing the community as a continuation of ethics Hegel i s 
(29) l b i d . , pp.361-62. 
(30) I b i d . , p.363. 
(31) l b i d . , p.368. 
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returning to the wisdom of the ancients, most notably A r i s t o t l e . 
Indeed he cites A r i s t o t l e ' s P o l i t i c s to the effect that the 
community as a whole i s always anterior to the individual. The 
isolated, autonomous individual i s an abstraction of recent o r i g i n , 
a phenomenon of the times, and such a man who i s t o t a l l y s e l f - r e l i a n t 
and without need of p o l i t i c a l association must either be a beast or 
(32) 
a god.^ ' Since i t i s only as a participant i n the ethical l i f e 
of the community that man becomes t r u l y human, i t follows that 
p o l i t i c s i s the moral science par excellence. Hegel also cites the 
words of Diogenes to a man who asked him what would be the best 
education f o r his son: "Make him the c i t i z e n of a people with good 
i n s t i t u t i o n s " . ^^ -^ ^ 
By r e f e r r i n g to the ethical l i f e of the community, i t should not 
be f e l t that Hegel i s moving any closer to the practical philosophy 
of Kant and Fichte. For Hegel, ethical maxims cannot be deduced 
p r i o r to a l l experience but are an i n t r i n s i c part of a people's 
social existence. The ethical l i f e of a people i s absolutely unique 
i n h i s t o i y and cannot be subordinated to any f i c t i t i o u s transcendental 
laws as previous natural r i g h t theorists were wont to do. A l l the 
ethi c a l relations which comprise the community are part of an 
irreducible unity. The only modem theorist who had i n Hegel's 
opinion succeeded i n grasping t h i s fact i s Montesquieu: 
(32)A r i s t o t l e , The P o l i t i c s , trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford, 1957j p.6: 
"From these considerations i t i s evident that the polis exists to 
the class of things that exist by nature, and that man i s by nature 
an animal intended to l i v e i n a p o l i s . He who i s without a p o l i s . 
by reason of his own nature and not of some accident, i s either a 
poor sort of being, or a being higher than mans he i s l i k e the man 
of whom Homer wrote i n denunciation: 'Clanless and lawless and 
hearthless i s he'". 
(33)liasson, op.cit., p.392. 
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Montesquieu had founded his immortal work on the 
i n t u i t i o n of the individual character of peoples. 
I f he did not elevate t h i s to the most l i v i n g idea, 
he at least knew not to either deduce the particular 
dispositions and laws from reason or to abstract them 
from experience only to raise t h i s abstraction to the 
universal. (34) 
The point which Hegel i s t r y i n g to develop from Montesquieu's 
i n i t i a l i n t u i t i o n i s that men are what they are because of the 
social and p o l i t i c a l context i n which they f i n d themselves. The 
mind of man i s not something which inhabits a realm outside of a l l 
other c u l t u r a l considerations, but i s bound to that culture, as i t 
were, by bands of st e e l . This idea that there i s an interaction 
between the human mind and the environment i n which i t i s formed may 
now seem a commonplace, but at the time i t was a radical departure 
from the philosophical orthodoxy which attributed to the mind certain 
q u a l i t i e s , such as a "social i n s t i n c t " , etc., from which i t v/ould be 
possible to explain the growth of culture. This seemed to Hegel 
f a r too f a c i l e an explanation and i n his Jena lectures on the 
philosophy of mind as well as i n the Phenomenolofiy he attempted to 
develop a new methodology f o r the philosophical explanation of culture. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to know whether the commonwealth or ethical 
absolute which Hegel describes i s meant to be an ideal construct 
which exists only i n the mind of the philosopher or whether i t i s 
an approximation of an actually existing state. I t i s more l i k e l y 
that the l a t t e r i s the case primarily because of Hegel's antipathy 
to Utopian speculations. But even i f he i s r e f e r r i n g to an actual 
h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y , i t i s not always easy to discern which. Jean 
Hyppolite has remarked tha t , under Schelling's influence, Hegel.tends 
( 3 4 ) l b i d . , p.406. 
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to poeticize the state c a l l i n g i t a "great work of a r t " and indeed 
i t i s true that both t h i s essay and his JlSystem of Ethics" carry 
certain mystical Schellingian overtones especially i n the terminology 
employed.^^^^ Nevertheless, i t i s possible to discover, albeit i n a 
very rudimentary fashion, a f a i r l y r e a l i s t i c philosophical description 
of the development of modem European society. 
Hegel's method of understanding society i s here genetic, h i s t o r i c a l . 
As i n his e a r l i e r writings he traces the origins of the modem world 
back t o the collapse of the Greco-Roman c i v i l i z a t i o n . But even though 
there i s a certain s i m i l a r i t y between t h i s essay and his early ones, 
more importantly there i s a crucial difference. V/hile i n Tubingen 
and Beme Hegel had viewed the ancient republic as a classless society 
with no social or economic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , he now sees i t as divided 
i n t o two d i s t i n c t classes. The f i r s t i s the class of citizens or 
freemen who the ancients i d e n t i f i e d with the warriors who daily risked 
t h e i r l i v e s f o r the preservation of the p o l i s . The work of t h i s class 
i s thus not directed toward any one particular object, but toward the 
conservation of the ethical organization as a whole. To be a c i t i z e n , 
says Hegel, i s to lead a universal l i f e v/hich appears wholly i n the 
public domain.^^^^ The second i s the class of bondsmen or slaves 
who are the material and economic foundation of society. While t h i s 
class does not face the danger of death i n i t s work, i t s function i s 
to labour f o r the citizens v/ho are engaged i n p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y 
matters. Hence while the young Hegel had seen the antique c i t y 
exclusively from the standpoint of the c i t i z e n , he now sees i t from 
(35) Jean Hyppolite, Introduction a l a philosophie de I ' h i s t o i r e de 
Hegel, Paris, I 9 4 8 , p.69. 
(36) Lasson, op.cit., p.375. 
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the standpoint of the slave as well. 
Hegel i s reluctant to go into any d e t a i l concerning the 
relationship between the citizens and the slaves except to say 
that the former were free v/hile the l a t t e r were not. I t was 
only w i t h the dissolution of the Roman world that the two classes 
were equalized: 
With the loss of the ethical v/orld and with the 
debasement of the noble class, the two hitherto 
d i s t i n c t classes became equal. The end of l i b e r t y 
necessarily swept away the end of slavery. The 
pr i n c i p l e of unity and formal equality began to 
prevail thus doing away with the true imminent 
dist i n c t i o n s between classes....This principle of 
universality and equality had to possess the whole 
i n such a way as to replace the destruction of the 
classes by a mixture of the tv/o. Under the law of 
formal unity t h i s mixture i s i n fact the annullment 
of the f i r s t class and the extension of the second 
to the t o t a l i t y of the people. (37) 
As a response to t h i s changed situ a t i o n , a new system of law 
evolved v/hich recognized the individual not as a member of a state, 
but as a private, property owning person. What was recognized was 
not the concrete, l i v i n g man, but the mere mask or personna, the 
abstract legal personality. I t v/as t h i s triumph of the private 
l i f e over the public l i f e which, according to Hegel, has resulted 
i n the transformation of the classical citoyen into the modern 
bourgeois. Here i s the way i n which Hegel defines t h i s bourgeois; 
The power of t h i s class i s defined i n the following 
manner: i t s domain i s possession and the system of 
law which corresponds to t h i s possession; at the 
same time i t constitutes a coherent system i n v/hich 
the relations of possession have been transcribed 
into a formal unity. Each individual, i n so f a r 
as he i s capable of possession, relates to a l l as 
a universal, that i s to say a Burger i n the sense 
( 3 7 ) l b i d . , p.377. 
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of bonrgeois. The p o l i t i c a l n u l l i t y of t h i s 
class of private persons i s compensated by the 
f r u i t s of peace and industry and the f u l l 
security i n v/hich these things can be enjoyed.(38) 
Even though Hegel sees the possession and enjoyment of property 
as the central feature of bourgeois society, he i s careful to avoid 
the claim that the preservation of property i s the sole rationale of 
c i v i l association. He i s c l e a r l y concerned to raise the state above 
the l e v e l of competing economic interests which he calls, the "system. 
of needs". I t i s , however, only through war that the state i s able 
to maintain i t s independence from these private interests. I t does 
not follow from t h i s as Heller and Popper have argued that Hegel i s 
thus prescribing war as a good thing thereby providing some sort of 
i n t e l l e c t u a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the exploits of future fascist 
(39) 
states.^ '^^ Neither does i t follow as Avineri and other l i b e r a l 
sympathizers have t r i e d to demonstrate that Hegel's views on war are 
inconclusive and i n s u f f i c i e n t to support the thesis that he advocates 
war as a means of s e t t l i n g international disputes.^^^^ Both of these 
interpretations f a i l to note that from the period of the French 
Revolution the idea of pacificism was often associated with conservatism, 
while revolutionary propaganda was often incarnated i n b e l l i c o s t i c 
(38) l b i d . , p .379» c f . p . 4 0 1 : " I n modern times the internal arrangement 
of the natural law has been characterized by the fact that exterior 
j u s t i c e , a r e f l e c t i o n of the i n f i n i t e i n t o f i n i t e existence, which 
i s the p r i n c i p l e of bourgeois law, has acquired a certain domination 
over public and international law. The form of an i n f e r i o r 
relationship such as contract has insinuated i t s e l f into the 
absolute majesty of the ethical t o t a l i t y " . 
(39) Herman Heller, Hegel und der nationale Machtstaatsgedanke i n 
Deutschland. Leipzig and B e r l i n , 1921, p . l l S j Karl Popper, The 
Open Society and i t s Enemies, London, 1973> II» pp.68-70. 
(40) Shlomo Avineri, "The Problem of War i n Hegel's Thought" i n Journal 
of the History of Ideas, XXII, I 9 6 I , pp.463-74; see also John 
Plamenatz, Man and Society, London, 1963> II» p.261. 
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ideologies. I t need only be recalled that i n the 1790s Hegel had 
endorsed the po l i c i e s of the Girondins who were i n fact the war 
party, but who were also the cultured republicans who t r u l y believed 
i n t h e i r Athenian id e a l . Thus Hegel does not f a l l prey to the 
romantic theories of war of Bonald and de Maistre which flourished 
i n the f i n de siecle nor does he subscribe to the enlightenment 
cosmopolitanism of Herder who denounced a l l wars as c i v i l wars i n 
l i g h t of the essential brotherhood of mankind. For Hegel, war i s 
the means by which the sense of classical v i r t u s can be revived i n 
the modem world. 
While there has been great controversy over Hegel's views on war, 
his general position i s a f a i r l y simple one. He seems to suggest that 
i t i s only i n periods of war and great national upheaval that the 
public s p i r i t of a people becomes genuinely manifest. War prevents a 
people from becoming too rooted i n one particular way of l i f e and 
attaching too much importance to ephemeral things such as property. 
An extended peace generally favours a predominantly commercial 
mentality which can only debase the s p i r i t of a people by giving rise 
to the mistaken view that the state i s an alien power which the 
individual may u t i l i z e to further his private interests.^^^^ One of 
the p r i n c i p a l characteristics of a state must be i t s a b i l i t y to 
adequately defend i t s e l f i n time of war and c i t i n g Gibbon Hegel notes 
that the collapse of Rome was brought about by the decline i n the 
martial s p i r i t . While private courage remained, public courage which 
i s nurtured on the love of independence and sense of national pride 
(4l)l'asson, op.cit., p.369; "Just as the movement of the winds protects 
the lakes from the stagnation of a durable t r a n q u i l i t y , so do wars 
protect peoples from corruption by a prolonged or even eternal 
peace". 
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disappeared.^^^^ Hence Hegel's statement that war preserves the 
"ethical health" of a people must be seen within the context of a 
general philosophy of history which holds that prolonged peace must 
give r i s e to the moral degeneration and decay of society. 
I t w i l l not be necessary to go in t o any further d e t a i l concerning 
Hegel's account of the state or the relations between states as t h i s 
w i l l be taken up l a t e r i n our analysis of the Philosophy of Right. 
What i s of moment i s Hegel's view of the community as an ethical 
body. He does not confine ethics to the private actions of the 
individual as the p r a c t i c a l philosophy of subjective idealism had 
done, but shows how a l l actions are part of a l i v i n g social t o t a l i t y 
the nature of which i s essentially e t h i c a l . What needs to be shown 
i s the way i n which t h i s ethical body has developed i n history and 
t h i s Hegel undertakes i n his "System of Ethics" and,his two sets of 
lectures the Realphilosophie I and Realphilosophie I I . 
I l l 
I n 1803-04 and I805-O6 Hegel lectured on logic, the philosophy 
of nature and of mind at Jena. The l a t t e r i s closely t i e d to his 
unpublished "System of Ethics" which consists of lecture notes f o r 
an e a r l i e r course given i n 1802. Prom these manuscripts emerge 
Hegel's f i r s t attempt to work out a coinprehensive system of philosophy 
which can explain the various modes of experience and show how they 
are related to one another. Hegel focuses particular attention upon 
the development of (a) language, (b) labour and (c) ethical or 
community relations as primary media of human experience. What i s 
( 4 2 ) l b i d . , pp.377-78, 
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outstanding here i s the way i n which these manuscripts prefigure 
Hegel's mature social and p o l i t i c a l thought as expounded i n the 
Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopedia. This would seem to 
disprove the commonly held assumption that these l a t e r works are 
merely an apologia f o r the existing Prussian state as i n i t s broad 
outlines Hegel's arguments were formulated long before he moved to 
Prussia to take up the chair as Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Berlin. I t should perhaps also be mentioned that 
while there are certain differences between the "System of Ethics" 
and the sections on the philosophy of mind (Geistesphilosophie) i n 
the Realphilosophie I and I I they w i l l f o r the sake of convenience, 
here be treated as a unit.^^"^^ 
Hegel begins with man i n a p r i s t i n e natural state i n which he 
i s not yet d i s t i n c t from his immediate environment. At t h i s stage 
consciousness i s universal, submerged within t h i s primitive community 
so as to produce an e n t i r e l y undifferentiated fonn of experience.^^^^ 
I t i s only with the development of language that consciousness becomes 
individuated. Language i s the f i r s t means by which man attains a 
degree of mastery over nature. To give something a name i s i n a 
sense to possess i t : "The f i r s t act,"Hegel says,"by which Adam 
constituted his domination over the animals was to give them a name".^^^^ 
(43)"System der S i t t l i c h k e i t " i n Lasson. op.cit., pp.415-99? G.W.P.Hegel, 
Jensener Realphilosophie I ; Die Vorlesungen von l 803 /04» ed. 
J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig, 1932 and Jensener Realphilosophie I I ; Die 
Vorlesungen von I805/06, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig, 1931? 
henceforth cited as Realphilosophie I and I I respectively. For an 
int e r e s t i n g Marxist view of these writings see Jiirgen Habermas, 
"Arbeit und Interaction: Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jensener Philosophie 
des Geistes" i n Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie, Frankfurt a/^, 
1968, pp.9-47. 
(44) Lasson, op.cit., p.417. 
(45) Realphilosophie I . op.cit., p.211. 
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And elsewhere he says: "To give a name i s the r i g h t of majesty".^^^^ 
Only with the appearance of language does man become aware that 
consciousness and being are d i s t i n c t . V/hat was previously a shadowy 
realm of images and sense impressions i s now translated into an 
ideal realm of names and symbolic representations. In t h i s way 
language i s the f i r s t form of bifurcation and discord as i t distances 
man from his natural state. I n another respect, however, language 
brings about the f i r s t s p e c i f i c a l l y human community, a l i n g u i s t i c 
community. Following certain suggestions of Herder, Hegel shows how 
language can never be a private a f f a i r , but i s a product of social 
i n t e r a c t i o n : 
Language only exists as the language of a people.... 
I t i s something universal, something granted recognition 
i n i t s e l f and i n t h i s manner resounds i n the consciousness 
of a l l . Each speaking consciousness immediately becomes 
another consciousness. I t i s only, however, within a 
people that a language, as to i t s content, becomes a true 
language and permits each to express exactly what he 
means. (47) 
As t h i s passage indicates language i s a decisive force i n the evolution 
of man from barbarism to culture. 
Even while language i s the f i r s t means by which man asserts his 
dominance over nature, i t s t i l l leaves the world unchanged. I n 
Hegel's terms, i t i s an expression of man's theoretical, not his 
p r a c t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e . I t i s only with the advent of labour (Arbeit) 
that man gains conscious control over his environment. Labour i s not 
an i n s t i n c t u a l , but a purposive a c t i v i t y , a "mode of s p i r i t " by which 
man i s able to transcend purely physical objective matter by making i t 
(46) Realphilosophie I I , op.cit., p . l 8 3 . 
(47) Realphilosophie I , op.cit., p.235; see also Daniel Cook, "Language 
and Consciousness i n Hegel's Jena Writings" i n Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, X, 1972, pp.197-211. 
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an extension of the human personality and as such human h i s t o i y . An 
animal, f o r example, does not work, but merely s a t i s f i e s i t s desires 
through the immediate destruction of i t s object, such as a piece of 
meat. This simple g r a t i f i c a t i o n never creates anything of enduring 
value, but must always "begin again from the beginning" every time 
the need reappears.^^^^ Labour d i f f e r s from t h i s immediate 
g r a t i f i c a t i o n i n that i t does not destroy i t s object, but aims at 
po s i t i v e l y transforming i t i n t o something else. Hegel defines t h i s 
process thus: 
The destruction of the object or of i n t u i t i o n , but 
only as a moment, that i s not f i n a l l y or absolutely, 
so that t h i s destruction i s replaced by another 
object or i n t u i t i o n . . . i t does not destroy the object 
as an object as such, but i n such a way that another 
i s put i n i t s place...and t h i s destruction i s called 
labour. (49) 
What Hegel wants to do i s to reverse the t r a d i t i o n a l A r i s t o t e l i a n 
disdain f o r the work of the body as an i n f e r i o r occupation of only 
instrumental value. For him, labour i s an "ennobling c i v i l i z i n g 
a c t i v i t y through v/hich man becomes f u l l y human. 
Hegel's views on labour did not arise i n a vacuum, but are based 
upon a thorough study of classical p o l i t i c a l econonqy. While he never 
developed his own independent system of economics, Hegel always 
remained a connoisseur of the English economists, notably Smith and 
Steuart. I t i s known that as early as 1799 Hegel had read Steuart's 
An Inquiry into the Principles of P o l i t i c a l Economy i n German 
(48) Realphilosophie I I , op.cit., p.197. 
(49) LasBon, op.cit., p.420. 
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t r a n s l a t i o n , ^ ^ ^ ^ According to Rosenkranz, so impressed was Hegel 
with t h i s work that he composed a lengthy commentary on i t as well. 
As t h i s commentary has unhappily been l o s t , a l l that remains i s 
Rosenkranz's b r i e f and inconclusive precis: 
A l l of Hegel's thoughts upon the nature of c i v i l 
society, upon need and labour, upon the division 
of labour and the resources among the classes, 
poor r e l i e f and the police, taxes, etc, were 
f i n a l l y concentrated i n an annotated commentary 
on the German translation of Steuart's P o l i t i c a l 
Economy,,,.Within t h i s there are many impressive 
views upon p o l i t i c s and history, many fin e 
observations. Steuart was s t i l l an adherent of 
the mercantile system. With great pathos, with 
many interesting examples, Hegel fought against 
what was dead i n i t as he strove to save the 
heart (Gemiit) of man withi n the competition and 
mechanical int e r a c t i o n of labour and commerce.(51) 
While these remarks are indeed rather p a l t r y , i t does not necessarily 
follow as Lukacs has argued, that through his use of the term Gem'ut 
Rosenkranz views Hegel along the li n e s of the reactionary romantics 
who sought to escape the complexity of modern society by returning 
(52) 
to the more organic Middle Ages.^ ' Such a construction would be 
quite remarkable as from t h i s period Hegel i s most e x p l i c i t about the 
essentially progressive nature of modem c i v i l society and f a r from 
advocating an escapist a t t i t u d e , he urges man to reconcile himself 
with the r e a l i t i e s of the contemporary world. 
(50) Joachim R i t t e r i n Hegel und die franzosische Revolution, Koln and 
Opladen, 1957> p .62 observes that there existed i n the XVIIIth 
century two d i f f e r e n t German translations of Steuart's work from 
which Hegel could have chosen. The f i r s t v/as published i n Hamburg 
i n two volumes dated I769 and 1770 respectively under the t i t l e 
Untersuchung der GrundsStze der Staats-Wissenschaft. The second 
tra n s l a t i o n appeared i n Tubingen again i n two volumes between I769 
and 1772. The available evidence, which i s admittedly slim, seems 
to indicate that Hegel used the second s l i g h t l y l a t e r translation 
of Steuart's Inquiry. 
(51) Rosenkranz, op.cit., p.86. 
(52) Georg Lukacs, . Der Junge Hegel; uber die Beziehungen von Dialektik 
und Okonomie, 2 vols., Frarikfurt a/M, 1973, I , pp.278-79. 
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What i s important i n Hegel's treatment of p o l i t i c a l economy i s 
his account of man as an active, productive being whose labour shapes 
and transforms the world. I t was Marx who f i r s t focused on t h i s 
aspect of Hegel's outlook. I n the f i r s t of his famous "Theses on 
Feuerbach", Marx observes that the chief defect i n a l l previously 
existing materialist philosophies i s that they conceive man primarily 
as a passive contemplative being f o r v/hom r e a l i t y i s only an object 
of thought (Marx's term i s actually Anschauung: l i t e r a l l y i n t u i t i o n ) . 
I n contrast to t h i s , idealism v/as l e f t to develop the "active side" 
(53) 
of man.^ -^^ ' This active side was f i r s t given expression by Kant and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Fichte who treated practice merely "abstractly" as 
morality. I t w i l l be recalled that Hegel himself c r i t i c i z e d the 
abstract ethics of subjective idealism f o r t r e a t i n g man not as a 
member of an ethical community f o r whom morality i s only one, albeit 
an important, aspect of his t o t a l social a c t i v i t y , but f o r abstracting 
man from a l l the concrete conditions of existence and carnal 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n within society. Such an abstract and r e s t r i c t e d notion 
of human a c t i v i t y was epistemologically legitimized by Kant through 
his perpetual dualism between the thing and the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f and 
by Fichte through his perpetual dualism between the ego and the non-ego. 
While Hegel never understood labour i n Marx's sense of "sensuous human 
a c t i v i t y " (menschliche sinnliche T a t i g k e i t ) , he came f a r closer to t h i s 
p o s i t i o n than either Kant or Fichte. For Hegel, human a c t i v i t y i s 
(53)Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Werke, 39 vols., Berlin, I956, I I I , 
p.5, henceforth cited as fflW; "The chief defect of a l l hitherto 
e x i s t i n g materialism - that of Feuerbach included - i s that the 
thing, r e a l i t y , sensuousness i s conceived only i n the form of the 
object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous a c t i v i t y , 
practice, not subjectively. Hence i t happened that the active 
side, i n contradistinction to materialism, was developed by 
idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does 
not know r e a l , sensuous a c t i v i t y as such". 
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economic before moral. This comes out very clearly i n the "System 
of Ethics" i n which his analysis begins with need, labour and 
enjoyment and progresses to appropriation, the product of labour and 
the possession of t h i s product.^^^^ Thus what f o r his contemporaries 
was a peripheral aspect of human nature, Hegel now places at i t s 
centre - productive labour. Hence the appropriateness of Marx's 
observation: "Hegel's standpoint i s that of modern p o l i t i c a l 
economy. He grasps labour as the essence of man".^^^^ We shall 
see shortly, however, that what Hegel c a l l s labour Marx qualifies by 
c a l l i n g alienated labour. 
According to Hegel, labour i s the source of the various forms of 
social integration which have appeared i n histoyy. The f i r s t and 
most rudimentary of the s o c i a l . i n s t i t u t i o n s which Hegel discusses i s 
the family. Labour unites previously disparate individuals into a 
family or t r i b e which then appropriates as i t s property the objects 
which provide f o r i t s sustenanG^* So long, however, as the family 
remains an isolated u n i t among other such un i t s , i t s property and 
possessions w i l l lead a precarious existence. I n such a state each 
individual or group of individuals needs to have the r i g h t to i t s 
property recognized by others. The problem i s that at t h i s stage of 
social development, t h i s mutual recognition i s not immediately 
forthcoming. Rather each party demands to be recognized, but without 
giving equal recognition i n return. Each wants to be recognized alone 
with the res u l t that a l i f e and death struggle f o r recognition (Kampf 
des Annerkennens) occurs which i n certain respects resembles Hobbes' 
bellum omnium conta omnes. In the course of t h i s struggle f o r 
(54) Lasson, op.cit., pp.418-21. 
(55) Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of l844t 
trans. Martin M i l l i g a n , ed. Dirk Struik, New York, I969, p.177. 
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recognition a decisive contradiction appears: 
In seeking the death of the other, I expose myself to 
death, I involve my own l i f e . I perpetuate the 
contradiction of wanting to maintain the i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
of my being and possessions, but t h i s maintenance 
i s transformed i n t o i t s Opposite since I sacrifice a l l 
my possessions, the p o s s i b i l i t y of possession and even 
the enjoyment of l i f e i t s e l f . (56) 
I t i s t h i s fear of mutual destruction that forces men to recognize 
one another as equals and signalizes the t r a n s i t i o n from the family 
to the nation. 
I n his further remarks on labour, Hegel goes on to describe the 
mode of production characteristic of modern society where men u t i l i z e 
tools and instruments to f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r work. At one point Hegel 
remarks that man makes tools because he i s a ra t i o n a l being and that 
(57) 
t h i s i s the f i r s t expression of his w i l l . ^ - " ' The tool serves as a 
mediator between man and nature as i t puts a distance between him and 
the object of destruction. What's more, the tool raises the level 
of work from an isolated individual a c t i v i t y to a universal social 
one. For the f i r s t time Hegel uses the term "cunning" ( L i s t ) to 
s i g n i f y the mediating function of the t o o l : 
The tool i n i t s e l f does not yet have a c t i v i t y . I t i s 
an i n e r t thing, i t does not turn back i n i t s e l f . I 
must s t i l l work with i t . I have interposed cunning 
between inyself and the external world so as to spare 
myself...I remain the soul of the syllogism i n 
r e l a t i o n to the t o o l , to activity....Making myself 
int o a thing i s s t i l l unavoidable; the a c t i v i t y of 
the impulse i s not yet i n the thing? i t remains to 
make t h i s t o o l spontaneously generate i t s own a c t i v i t y . . . . 
Nature's own a c t i v i t y , the e l a s t i c i t y of a watch spring, 
water, wind, and so on are employed to do t o t a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t things than i f they were l e f t to themselves so 
that t h e i r b l i n d action becomes purposive, the opposite 
(56) Realphilosophie I . op.cit., pp.228-29. 
(57) Realphilo30phie I I , op.cit., p.l97. 
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of i t s e l f , that i s to say, the rational behaviour 
of nature, laws, i n i t s external existence. 
Nothing happens to nature i t s e l f ; the individual 
ends of natural existence become universal. Here 
impulse e n t i r e l y departs from.labour. I t allows 
nature to act on i t s e l f while simply looking on 
and c o n t r o l l i n g i t with the l i g h t touch of cunning. 
In t h i s way the broadside of force i s attacked by 
the f i n e point of cunning. (58) 
Hegel f i r s t r e a l l y discerns the importance of tools and machines 
i n a discussion of the teleology of means and ends. For him, labour 
i s an essentially teleological project as i t aims at translating an 
idea or image of a thing into objective r e a l i t y by setting to work 
certain causal relations inherent with i n nature. Generally the tool 
i s used simply as a means of satisfying some other end, but i t i s i n 
f a c t f a r more exalted than any f i n i t e , l i m ited end, since the invention 
of each new instrument of labour i s handed down from generation to 
generation f o r the benefit of a l l mankind. Each such acquisition 
contributes to the cumulative progress of technology and society 
leading to man's a b i l i t y e f f e c t i v e l y to control nature. As he would 
put i t . l a t e r on: 
Further , since the end i s f i n i t e i t has a f i n i t e 
content; accordingly i t i s not absolute or u t t e r l y 
i n and f o r i t s e l f reasonable. The means, however, 
i s the external middle of the syllogism which i s the 
r e a l i z a t i o n of the end; i n i t , therefore, 
reasonableness manifests i t s e l f as such - as 
preserving i t s e l f i n t h i s external other and precisely 
through t h i s externality. To what extent the means 
i s higher than the f i n i t e ends of external usefulness; 
the plough i s more honourable than those immediate 
enjoyments that are procured by i t , and serve as ends. 
The instrument i s preserved while the immediate 
enjoyments pass av/ay and are forgotten. In his tools 
man possesses power over external nature, even though, 
as regards his ends, nature dominates him. (39) 
(58) l b i d . , pp.198-99. 
(59) G.W.P. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, ed. G. Lasson, 2 vols., 
Leipzig, 1923, I I , p.398; Science of Logic, trans. A.V. M i l l e r , 
London, I969, p.747. 
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I t i s perhaps of interest to note that Lenin i n his famous "Conspectus 
on Hegel's Logic" singled out t h i s passage as containing the germ of 
Marx's h i s t o r i c a l materialism.^^^^ 
As a consequence of the development of labour and tools, there 
i s created a vast system of mutual interdependence which Hegel c a l l s 
the "system of needs". Originally man worked to satisfy some 
immediate concrete need, but as work becomes universalized, he 
produces not f o r himself alone but on a reciprocal basis with others. 
Thus he works to sa t i s f y the "abstraction" of a general need. I n 
short man produces commodities which are not objects of direct u t i l i t y , 
but objects of exchange which allow him to sa t i s f y his heeds 
i n d i r e c t l y . Here are a couple of characteristic passages describing 
t h i s patterns 
Man thus s a t i s f i e s his needs, but not by the object 
manufactured by him since by satisfying his needs t h i s 
object becomes something other than i t i s . Man no 
longer produces that which he needs or put another way 
he no longer needs that which he produces. In ef f e c t , 
t h i s object i s not the r e a l i t y of the satisfaction of 
his needs, but becomes merely the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
sati s f a c t i o n . His work becomes formal, abstract, 
universal, singular. He l i m i t s himself to only one 
of his needs which he then exchanges f o r the other 
necessities. (61) 
And again: 
Things that serve the satisfaction of needs are 
produced...this production i s manifold; i t i s 
consciousness transforming i t s e l f into things. 
But since i t i s universal, t h i s act becomes abstract 
labour. Needs are multiplied....Each individual 
because he i s an individual works f o r one need. The 
content of his work transcends his own need; he works 
f o r the satis f a c t i o n of many and so does everyone. 
Each person thus s a t i s f i e s the needs of many and the 
satisf a c t i o n of his many particular needs i s the labour 
of many others. (62) 
(60) V.I. Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks, London, I96I, pp.l89-90. 
(61) Realphilosophie.I, op.cit., pp.237-38. 
(62) Realphilo3ophie I I , op.cit., pp.214-15* 
113 
While t h i s system of needs assists i n r a i s i n g men above t h e i r 
isolated natural condition and uniting them i n an ethical community, 
Hegel i s also aware of i t s baneful consequences. I n the "System of 
Ethics" he c a l l s i t an "alien power" over which the individual has 
not control yet upon which he i s e n t i r e l y dependent. And i n the 
same work he refers to "an unconscious, blind t o t a l i t y of needs and 
the means of t h e i r satisfaction".^^^^ In the Jena lectures he even 
goes so f a r as to compare t h i s system to a wild animal which c a l l s 
f o r permanent control and curbing, which seems a f a i r l y obvious 
metaphor f o r government intervention i n the economic domain.^^^^ 
Indeed only through the di r e c t i o n of a strong state apparatus can 
this'jblind and elemental economic a c t i v i t y be put under conscious and 
rati o n a l control. 
As a student of English p o l i t i c a l economy Hegel was not unaware 
that an advanced technological competency goes hand i n hand with a 
highly developed d i v i s i o n of labour, the paradigm of which can be 
found i n Adam Smith's description of a pin factory i n his_ An Inquiry 
i n t o the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Under t h i s 
d i v i s i o n of labour not only does work become narrow and specialized, 
but the worker himself becomes enervated and dehumanized: 
The d i v i s i o n of labour increases the abundance of 
manufactured objects. I n an English manufacture 
18 men work i n the production of pins. Each has 
a par t i c u l a r task and only t h i s task. A single 
worker could perhaps not produce 120 pins nor even 
one. These l8 workers...produce 4000 pins per 
day....But the decrease i n the value of work i s i n 
direct proportion with the increase i n productivity. 
Work becomes more and more absolutely dead; i t 
becomes the work of a machine. The individual's 
(63) Lasson, op.cit., p.489* 
(64) R e a l p h i l o 3 o p h i e I , op.cit., pp.239-40. 
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s k i l l becomes i n f i n i t e l y l i m ited and the consciousness 
of the worker i s reduced to the lowest degree of 
degradation. And the connection between one particular 
species of work and the i n f i n i t e mass of needs becomes 
impossible to see, thus turning into a blind dependence. 
I t often happens that a f a r away operation renders 
superfluous and redundant the v/ork of a whole class of 
men who had formerly s a t i s f i e d t h e i r needs through it.(65) 
Prom t h i s passage i t should be evident that i n no respect did Hegel 
endorse a reactionary economic romanticism which proclaimed that only 
a return to a simpler and more primitive culture could counteract the 
i l l e ffects of modem industry. Like Smith and even Marx, Hegel sees 
the positive a t t r i b u t e s of industry's increased productive capacity as 
fa r outweighing i t s "bad side". Unlike Marx, however, he does not 
see the periodic crises of capitalism as i n any way posing an 
insurmountable problem and with minor modifications and adjustments he 
believes i t to be a self-regulating self-perpetuating system. 
Under t h i s modem di v i s i o n of labour man not only uses tools i n 
the production process, but f o r the f i r s t time heavy machinery comes 
into play. The introduction of the machine marks a new plateau i n 
human development. The t o o l , i t villi be recalled, i s something 
i n e r t ; man i s s t i l l forced to make himself into a "thing". Only 
the machine i s a perfect mediator between man and nature. The irony 
of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , however, i s that while man has invented machines 
to ease his burdens, to deceive nature, nature has i t s revenge upon 
him. Man achieves greater material comfort, but at the expense of 
losing a l l joy and satis f a c t i o n i n his work: 
I n the machine man even abolishes his own formal a c t i v i t y 
and makes i t v/oik completely f o r hSm. But t h i s t r i c k e r y 
(Betrug) which man exercises upon nature...has i t s revenge 
on him. liVhat man wins from nature by subjugating i t 
merely serves to render him more feeble. In exploiting 
nature by a l l sorts of machines man does not abolish the 
(65)lbid., p.239-
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necessity f o r his own work, but only pushes i t away, 
moves i t further from nature so that he does not 
relate to nature as one l i v i n g thing to another. 
Instead labour loses i t s negative v i t a l i t y and 
becomes more mechanical. Man only diminishes the 
amount of labour f o r the whole, but not f o r the 
in d i v i d u a l . Rather he increases i t f o r the more 
mechanical labour becomes the less value i t has and 
the more he must work i n t h i s manner. (66) 
The amazing l u c i d i t y with which Hegel analyses t h i s aspect of the 
production process shows not only how he d i f f e r s from the economic 
romanticists, but how f a r he was from embracing the f a c i l e optimism 
of Benthamite u t i l i t a r i a n i s m or Bastiat's economic theodicy. Even 
though he was convinced of the superiority of i n d u s t r i a l production, 
Hegel never allowed t h i s admiration to degenerate to the level of 
stale apologetics. 
Despite the fact that Hegel cites Smith approvingly, he s t i l l 
had an insight i n t o the dialectics of modern econonQr of which Smith 
was incapable. For the classical economists, poverty and the 
pauperization of the working class was merely a peripheral feature 
of the economy. For Hegel, however, i t i s central and i s d i r e c t l y 
correlated to the existence of great wealth. I t i s t h i s dichotomy 
between wealth and poverty which cuts down the very centre of modem 
society d i v i d i n g i t in t o two h o s t i l e camps. I n a passage which could 
almost be mistaken f o r Marx, Hegel says: 
A mass of the population i s condemned to the 
stupefying, unhealthy and insecure labour of the 
factories, manufactures, mines and so on. Whole 
branches of industry which supported a large class 
of people suddenly f o l d up because of a change i n 
the mode or because the value of t h e i r products f a l l s 
or f o r other reasons. Thus whole masses are abandoned 
to poverty. There appears the c o n f l i c t between vast 
(66)Ibid., p.237. 
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wealth and vast poverty, a poverty unable to do 
anything f o r i t s e l f . . . . T h i s inequality of wealth' 
and poverty, t h i s need and necessity, turn into 
the utmost tearing up of the w i l l , inner rebellion 
and hatred. (67) 
Despite any s i m i l a r i t i e s , Hegel's account of modern c i v i l society 
d i f f e r s from Marx's i n one crucial respect, which must now be b r i e f l y 
examined i n order to avoid any confusion. 
The differences between Hegel and Marx i s an enormous question 
and goes f a r beyond the scope of t h i s study. Here i t w i l l only be 
possible to hint at one of t h e i r major differences. According to 
Marx, a basic flaw i n Hegel's philosophy as a whole i s his confusion 
between alienation and o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . On the one hand, Hegel sees 
labour as a process whereby man externalizes or obj e c t i f i e s himself i n 
the outer world thus making i t an extension of his ovm humanity. I t 
i s the transformation of nature from dead, l i f e l e s s matter to a higher 
and more refined mode of being. This i s labour's positive side. The 
negative side i s that every act of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n necessarily entails 
alienation: "(a) I n labour I make myself into a thing, a form which 
exists, (b) At the same time I extemalize my existence, make i t 
int o something al i e n and maintain myself i n i t " . ^ Alienation 
consists, then, i n the fact that the product of human labour confronts 
man as something "other than himself" or put another way, he f a i l s to 
recognize himself i n his product. Alienation thus becomes a b u i l t i n 
feature of a l l labour and even a constitutive aspect of man himself. 
Marx's ov/n viev^point i s quite d i f f e r e n t . For him, too, labour 
comprises an act of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . This o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s a 
(67) Realphilosophie I I , op.cit., pp.232-33. 
(68) l b i d . , p.217. 
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characteristic of work i n general. But on Marx's account, 
o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s not s t r i c t l y commensurate with alienation. 
I t merely happens that under capitalism, an h i s t o r i c a l contingency, 
the two v/hich are ontologically d i s t i n c t , phenomenologically 
coincide.^^^^ Alienation i s not inherent i n a l l labour, but i s 
the consequence of a specific h i s t o r i c a l mode of production -
capitalism or the regime of private property.^^^^ Only under t h i s 
system does "the object which labour produces - labour's product -
confront i t as something a l i e n , as a power independent of the 
(71) 
producer".^ ' Hence the g i s t of Marx's c r i t i q u e i s that by viewing 
a l l labour as en t a i l i n g alienation, Hegel overlooks what i s specific 
(72) 
to c a p i t a l i s t society.^ ' 
Of course the differences between Hegel and Iiilarx do not end here. 
They also d i f f e r substantially over th e i r respective prescriptions to 
(69) For an interesting commentary on t h i s problem see Jean Hyppolite, 
"Alienation and Objectification: Commentary on G. Lukacs 'The 
Young Hegel'" i n Studies on Marx and Hegel, trans. John O'Neill, 
London, 1969, pp.70-90. 
(70) Marx, op.cit., pp.106-19. 
(71) l b i d . , p.108. 
(72) l t i s Hegel's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of alienation, man's loss of self and 
sense of estrangement, with o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , the very existence of 
things, which has, i r o n i c a l l y , contributed to a great revival of 
interest i n his philosophy i n recent years. See, for example, 
Jean Hyppolite, op.cit., pp.86-7: "The author of the Phenomenology, 
the Encyclopedia, and the Philosophy of History cannot have confused 
the h i s t o r i c a l alienation of the human s p i r i t with o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n 
without some v a l i d reasons, other than those one might f i n d i n the 
economic structure of the period and the stage reached by the 
c a p i t a l i s t system. :E|y objectifying himself i n culture, the State, 
and human labour i n general, man at the same time alienates himself, 
becomes other than himself, and discovers i n t h i s o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n an 
insurmountable degeneration which he must nevertheless t r y to overcome. 
This i s a tension inseparable from existence, and i t i s Hegel's merit 
to have drawn attention to i t and to have preserved i t i n the very 
centre pf human self-consciousness. On the other hand, one of the 
great d i f f i c u l t i e s of Marxism i s i t s claim t o overcome t h i s tension 
i n the more or less near future and h a s t i l y to at t r i b u t e i t to a 
pa r t i c u l a r phase of history". 
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the problem of alienated labour. As we have seen i n the analysis of 
the Differenzschrift Hegel's solution to alienation and bifurcation 
i s philosophy. Only philosophy can restore a sense of the t o t a l i t y 
and unity of human l i f e . I n t h i s manner alienation i s overcome not 
i n deed, but i n thought. Since i t i s i t s e l f a product of the 
thinking mind, i t can be overcome through the a c t i v i t y of mind 
r e f l e c t i n g upon i t s e l f . Thus the h i s t o r i c a l function of philosophy 
i s to reconcile man to the world thereby making him feel at home i n i t . 
For Marx, philosophy i s an inadequate means of overcoming the 
h i s t o r i c a l problem of alienation. \'/hile Hegel argues that philosophy 
constitutes the annulment of alienation, Marx t r i e s to show how 
philosophy i s i t s e l f merely a mode of alienation: "The philosophic 
mind i s nothing but the alienated mind of the world thinking within 
(73) 
i t s self-estrangement - i . e . comprehending i t s e l f abstractly".^ ' 
This alienated philosophic mind, as even Feuerbach had pronounced, i s 
the r e s u l t of certain conditions i n the material l i f e of man. Rather 
than overcoming alienation, philosophy can only r e f l e c t i t . I n the 
place of philosophy Marx substitutes revolutionary practice or as he 
would put i t : "Social l i f e i s essentially p r a c t i c a l . A l l mysteries 
which mislead theory to mysticism f i n d t h e i r rational solution i n 
human practice and i n the comprehension of t h i s practice".^''^^ Only 
thus does Marx fe e l man can overcome his unhappy consciousness and 
pave the way to a t r u l y just and humane society. 
While there are cert a i n l y great differences i n t h e i r world 
outlooks, Marx always maintained that there i s a fundamental kemel 
of t r u t h contained i n Hegel's assessment of r e a l i t y . But while Blarx 
(73) Marx, op.cit., p.l74« 
(74) l^ ffiW, op.cit.. I l l , p.7. 
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feels that c a p i t a l i s t society i s ultimately doomed because of the 
great contradiction between the social mode of production and the 
individual mode of appropriating surplus-value, Hegel believes that 
through occasional state intervention, the econoiqy can be made to 
function r a t i o n a l l y and harmoniously for the good of a l l . The state 
must be above the competing interests of the system of needs i n order 
to mitigate the worst aspects of economic inequality: 
The government should do a l l i n i t s power to f i g h t 
against t h i s inequality and the general destruction 
which follows. This may be done immediately by 
making i t harder to achieve great p r o f i t s ; and i f 
the government abandons a part of t h i s class to 
mechanical and factory labour leaving i t i n a state 
of b r u t a l i t y , i t must nevertheless preserve t h i s 
w^hole class i n a condition of r e l a t i v e health. The 
necessary or rather immediate way to a t t a i n t h i s i s 
through a proper constitution of the class i n 
question. (75) 
This c a l l f o r state intervention i n the economic domain as a means 
of r e c t i f y i n g some of the abuses of l a i s s e r - f a i r e economic individualism, 
departs s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the l i b e r a l model of c i v i l society and 
ca l l s f o r a word of explanation. 
Hegel's ideas on government regulation of economic a c t i v i t i e s 
could very easily have come from Steuart's notion of the Staatsmann. 
As Rosenkranz remarked, Steuart was an adherent of the mercantile 
system, a system s t i l l operative i n early XlXth century Germany, and 
t h i s could have provided some common ground f o r these two thinkers. 
Steuart believed that a certain degree of extemal control was necessaxy 
i n order to ensure maximum economic efficiency. As one recent 
commentator has put i t : "Steuart's ideal state i s technocratic, his 
(76) 
p r i n c i p l e i s economism".^' ' This statesaah does not, however, 
(75) Las8on, op.cit., p.492. 
(76) Paul Chamley, "Les origines economique de l a pense'e de Hegel" i n 
Segel-Studien, I I I , 1965, p.248. 
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exercise an a r b i t r a r y authority, but operates with i n a rule of law, 
even i f t h i s law has largely been l a i d down by himself. I n a sense 
he i s Diderot's or Voltaire's image of an enlightened despot or what 
Hegel l a t e r would describe as a Theseus able to bring the interests 
of the individual i n t o harmony with the interests of the whole. 
Just as easily Hegel could have received his ideas from Fichte's 
The Closed Commercial State which Xavier Leon has described as a 
(77) 
panegyric to the social and p o l i t i c a l ideals of Robespierre.^'" I n 
t h i s work Fichte warns his fellow Germans against minimizing the role 
of the state i n economic a f f a i r s . He argues that the government must 
be responsible f o r overseeing the production and consumption of 
commodities and f i x i n g prices to accord with a commodity's i n t r i n s i c 
value. He also rejects the use of money as i t creates glaring class 
differences within the community and i n international trade always 
confers advantages upon the wealthier nations to the disadvantage of 
the poorer. S t i l l Hegel remains sceptical of what he takes to be 
the more authoritarian elements of the Fichtean state and ridicules 
Fichte's deduction of a police state from a system intended to liberate 
mankind from i t s bondage and oppression. I n his essaj-- on "The German 
Constitution" he makes his point as follows: 
The pedantic craving to determine every d e t a i l , the 
i l l i b e r a l jealousy of (any arrangement whereby) an 
estate, a corporation, &c., adjusts and manages i t s 
own a f f a i r s , t h i s mean carping at any independent 
action by the citizens which would only have some 
general bearing and not a bearing on the public 
authority, i s clothed i n the garb of rational 
( 7 7)lt i s perhaps the only flaw i n his other wise b r i l l i a n t Fichte et 
son temps, 3 vols., Paris, 1922-27 that Xavier Leon continues to 
trea t Fichte as a l i b e r a l apologist f o r the French Revolution even 
a f t e r I8OO when his disillusionment with the entire revolutionary 
experience i s very much i n evidence; f o r an excellent account of 
the relationship between Fichte's philosophy and his mature p o l i t i c a l 
p osition see Heinrich Rickert, "Die philosophische Grundlagen von 
Pichtes Sozialismus" i n Logos, XI, pp.l49-80. 
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p r i n c i p l e s . On these principles not a s h i l l i n g of 
the public expenditure on poor r e l i e f i n a country 
of 20 or 30 m i l l i o n inhabitants may be incurred 
unless i t has f i r s t been not merely allov/ed but 
actually ordered, controlled, and audited by the 
supreme government. (78) 
Hegel goes on to argue that while the government must take the 
i n i t i a t i v e i n some matters, i t should not encroach upon the freedom 
of i t s citizens which i s "inherently sacrosanct". Although he 
rejects the more extreme elements i n Fichte's prognosis, Hegel 
nevertheless adopts the view that the state should steer a middle 
path between the absolutist notion that everything should come under 
i t s auspices and the l i b e r a l notion that there should be no external 
intervention as eveiyone w i l l naturally direct his conduct i n 
accordance to the needs of others. 
Unfortunately i n his Jena lectures Hegel does not precisely 
spell out the r e l a t i o n between the state and the economic domain. 
This i s largely due to his uncertainty as to the form and structure 
of the modern p o l i t i c a l community. S t i l l he provides some penetrating 
insights i n t o the h i s t o r i c a l development of t h i s community which i n 
many ways prefigure his l a t e r philosophy of history. Throughout t h i s 
period Hegel i s concerned to elucidate the various types of communities 
which have developed i n history. The f i r s t type he designates as 
tyranny v/here the force of a single individual welds a people into a 
uni f i e d whole: 
A l l states have been founded by the power of great men. 
This does not si g n i f y physical strength since the many 
are stronger than a single individual. But the great 
man has something i n his t r a i t s that make others c a l l 
him t h e i r master; they obey him against t h e i r w i l l . 
I t i s against t h e i r w i l l that his w i l l i s t h e i r w i l l . 
(78)Lasson, op.cit., p.28. 
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A l l gather round his banner; he i s t h e i r god. 
I n t h i s way Theseus founded the Athenian state; 
also i n t h i s way during the French Revolution a 
t e r r i b l e power held the state generally. This 
power i s not despotism, but tyranny, pure 
t e r r i f y i n g power. But i t i s necessary and just 
i n so f a r as i t constitutes and preserves the 
state as a real i n d i v i d u a l . (79) 
Hegel j u s t i f i e s tyranny on the grounds that i t establishes the state 
and nojimatter how horrible t h i s experience may be i t i s preferable to 
anarchy. Tyranny as a means to national u n i f i c a t i o n i s j u s t i f i a b l e , 
but a f t e r t h i s has been accomplished i t s raison d'ttre vanishes. 
While the stage of tyranny represents the lowest level of 
p o l i t i c a l development where human w i l l and consciousness are barely 
distinguishable from nature, i t unconsciously paves the way f o r a 
higher and more complex form of p o l i t i c a l integration. I n educating 
the people to obey a superior force, namely himself, the tyrant makes 
possible the obedience to law and therefore brings about his own 
demise: "Tyranny i s overthrown by a people not because i t i s 
abominable, beastly, etc., but because i t has become superfluous".^^^^ 
I f the tyrant i s wise he w i l l step down v o l u n t a r i l y but t h i s i s rar e l y 
the case and he must usually be deposed by force. Such was the case 
with Robespierre whose "power abandoned him, because necessity abandoned 
him and so he was v i o l e n t l y overthrown". Hegel concludes that while 
tjrranny i s under certain circumstances a necessaiy stage i n history, 
i t i s only t r a n s i t i o n a l and must consequently give way to more 
advanced forms of community. 
The second type of community which Hegel considers i s democracy 
as embodied i n the Greek p o l i s . As we have seen, Hegel's earliest 
(79) Realphilosophie I I , op.oit., p.246. 
(80) I b i d . , pp.247-48. 
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writings display a profound nostalgia f o r the days of classical 
a n t i q u i t y and i n i t i a l l y he saw the French Revolution as effecting 
a retum to t h i s c i v i l i z e d Utopia. Even at Jena Hegel describes 
antique democracy i n glowing terms as the*unity of private l i f e and 
public l i f e where the part i c u l a r and universal are merged into one. 
I t appears as a beautiful work of ar t i n which justice and harmony 
pr e v a i l : 
This i s the beautiful happy freedom of the Greeks 
which has been and i s so envied. The people i s 
broken up into citizens who at the same time 
constitute the ind i v i d u a l , the government. I t i s 
i n reciprocal r e l a t i o n with i t s e l f . The same w i l l 
i s both individual and universal. The alienation 
of the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of the w i l l i s i t s immediate 
preservation....It i s the realm of ethical l i f e ; 
each individual i s himself e t h i c a l , immediately one 
with the universal. There i s no protest here; 
each individual knows himself immediately as universal, 
i . e . he renounces his p a r t i c u l a r i t y without knowing i t 
as such, as a s e l f , as essence...,In the ancient v/orld 
beautiful public l i f e was the customs of a l l . Beauty 
v/as the immediate unity of the universal and the 
pa r t i c u l a r , a work of art i n which no part i s separate 
from the whole, a union of self-knov/ing self and i t s 
representation. But t h i s absolute self-knowledge of 
the individual did not yet exist, t h i s being-in-oneself 
was not present. The Platonic republic, l i k e that of 
Sparta, i s the disappearance of self-knowing 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y . (81) 
Hegel's attit u d e here i s far from u n c r i t i c a l adulation of the 
Greek world. He i s indeed aware of the r e s t r i c t i o n s of polis democracy 
which presuppose an extremely li m i t e d range of social and p o l i t i c a l 
experience. What the Greeks lacked was the sense of i n d i v i d u a l i t y or 
subjective freedom by which man differ e n t i a t e s himself from his 
environment. At Tubingen and Beme Hegel, following Schiller, had 
provided an extremely trenchant moral c r i t i q u e of the corrosive effects 
of modem individualism. He had seen i t as a mark of p o l i t i c a l 
( 8 l ) l b i d . , pp.249-51-
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decadence and c u l t u r a l backsliding. The Frankfurt c r i s i s brought 
about a new perception of t h i s problem and he began to see i t as an 
aspect of man's fate which must be borne with resigned f o r t i t u d e . 
Only at Jena does he come to see t h i s principle of i n d i v i d u a l i t y , 
"the higher principle of the modern age that the ancients and Plato 
did not know", as h i s t o r i c a l l y progressive and as such something to 
be commended. No longer does Hegel wish to resurrect polis democracy, 
as did Rousseau, but now he views i t as something which belongs 
e n t i r e l y and exclusively to t^e past. 
While .the emergence of the principle of subjectivity represents 
an advance i n terms of the overall development of human consciousness 
i t has not been without i t s i l l effects. This principle which i n fact 
divides the ancient and modern worlds has brought about a fundamental 
r i f t i n human experience between private l i f e and public l i f e . While 
Greek democracy admirably expressed the indissoluble unity between man 
and the state, t h i s i s a condition which no longer prevails i n the 
contemporary world. Indeed the modern property owning bourgeois who 
Hegel had e a r l i e r described as a " p o l i t i c a l n u l l i t y " has gained a 
certain degree of precedence over the classical citoyen. This r i f t 
represents a primary form of alienation which must be overcome i n a 
new p o l i t i c a l union. I t i s only i n a modern constitutional monarchy, 
Hegel believes, that a happy balance can be reached between these two 
aspects of experience. 
What Hegel desires i s then a p o l i t i c a l situation i n which the 
personal freedom of the individual i s given i t s due, but at the same 
time i s integrated wit h i n the universal structure of the state. This 
would be quite d i f f e r e n t from the Platonic and Lacaedemonian republics 
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whose existence depended upon the complete abnegation of a l l 
(Qo) 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y . ' The modern state must be the substance responsible 
for c o n c i l i a t i n g the various private interests of i t s members. Hence 
hi s statement: "The cunning of the government i s that i t allows free 
reign to the s e l f - i n t e r e s t of others".^ ' And again: "The 
e c c e n t r i c i t y , ruin, licentiousness and vice of others must be borne -
the state i s cunning".^ This state must, therefore, combine the 
p r i n c i p l e s of substantiality and subjectivity and such Hegel claims 
i s not the case i n Germany where uncontrolled individualism has led 
to a general condition of anarchy. 
This might very well be the place to embark on a brief digression 
into Hegel's analysis of Germany's p o l i t i c a l malaise or what the poet 
Heinrich Heine called the German misere. Germany's problem, 
according to Hegel, i s that i t i s not a state of any description, but 
a mere c o l l e c t i o n of disparate p r i n c i p a l i t i e s held i n the grip of a 
protracted feudalism. At no time has a common authority arisen to 
unite these various parts into a single cohesive national entity: 
"The Gennan p o l i t i c a l e d i f i c e i s nothing but the sum of rights which 
the individual parts have vn:ested from the whole, and this j u s t i c e , 
which c a r e f u l l y watches to see that no power i s l e f t over to the state, 
/Q|-\ 
i s the essence of the constitution".^ I t i s t h i s attenjpt to turn 
the public power of the state into private property v/hich accounts 
for the impotence of German p o l i t i c a l l i f e . This impotence was i t s e l f 
(82) l b i d . , p«251: "Plato did not set up an i d e a l , but he interiorized 
the state of h i s own time i n himself. But t h i s state has 
perished - the Platonic republic i s not realizable - because i t 
lacked the p r i n c i p l e of absolute individuality". 
(83) l b i d . , p.262. 
(84) l b i d . , p.251. 
(85) Lasson, op.cit., pp.l3-14o 
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f o r c e f u l l y manifes-fced i n Germany's military defeat at the hands of 
republican France. Hence following Voltaire, Hegel refers to 
Germany as a constitutional anarchy. 
Germany's i n a b i l i t y to r i s e above the quagmire of feudalism 
presents a sorry spectacle i n comparison with modern nation states 
such as France and England. Hegel shows the highest esteem for 
Richelieu v/ho he regards as the architect of modern France. I t was 
he v/ho established the unity of the French state by breaking the 
power of the nobility and the Huguenots both of which had been 
operating as a sort of state within a state.^ Germany which had 
not yet produced such a statesman had found i t s e l f powerless to 
overcome the divisiveness and fragmentation of feudal particularism. 
This condition, Hegel says, was ensured by the Peace of V/estphalia 
which guaranteed that Germar^r would remain a conglomeration of warring 
states each independent of the others. 
Due to i t s f a i l u r e to become a state, Germany, l i k e I t a l y , has 
remained a theatre for constant warfare. With t h i s analogy i n mind, 
Hegel invokes the authority of Machiavelli who he sees as the great 
prophet of I t a l i a n u n i f i c a t i o n : "Profoundly moved by t h i s situation 
of general d i s t r e s s , hatred, disorder, and blindness, an I t a l i a n 
statesman grasped with cool circumspection the necessaiy idea of the 
(Qn) 
salvation of I t a l y through i t s unification i n one state".^ Hegel 
argues that Machiavelli was misunderstood by those who took his book 
The Prince as a prescription for the way p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s should be 
carried out i n a l l times and places. He sees i t as b a s i c a l l y a period 
piece which cannot be understood outside the p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l 
(86) I b i d . , p.108. 
(87) l b i d . , p . m . 
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context i n which i t was written. Nievertheless Hegel obviously f e e l s 
there i s something of enduring importance i n Machiavelli for he 
favourably contrasts his actions as an advocate of the national 
r e v i v a l of h i s country to those of Fredrick the Great "a modern 
monarch v*iose whole l i f e and actions have expressed most c l e a r l y the 
(88) 
dissolution of the German state into independent states". 
Like Machiavelli, Hegel r e a l i z e s that national unification 
cannot be achieved through deliberation, but only through force and 
violence. Since the German people have never kncwn anything but 
d i v i s i o n Hegel here as i n his l a t e r lectures c a l l s on a tyrant, a 
modern Theseus, to compel them to act as though they belonged to one 
state: 
This Theseus would have to..have the magnanimity to 
grant to tlie people he would have had to fashion 
out of dispersed units a share in^mattersthat affected 
everyone. Since a democratic constitution l i k e the 
one Theseus gave to his ov/n people i s self-contradictory 
i n modern times and i n large states, t h i s share would 
have to be some form of organization. Moreover, even 
i f the direction of the state's power v/hich he had i n 
hi s hands could insure him against being repaid, as 
Theseus was, with ingratitude, s t i l l he would have to 
have the character enough to be ready to endure the 
hatred with which Richelieu and other great men who 
wrecked men's private and psirticular interests were 
saddled. (89) 
Hegel then goes on to observe that i f the Germans per s i s t i n th e i r 
love of particularism and find themselves unable to bring about any 
viable form of community, they w i l l , l i k e the Jewish people, be 
pushed to the edge of madness.and w i l l eventually be destroyed. 
I t would be well to note that Hegel i s here f a i r l y evidently 
involved i n some sort of paradox. Time and again he makes the claim 
( 8 S)lbid., p.115. 
(89 )Ibid., pp.135-36. 
128 
that qua philosopher a l l he can do i s describe or better yet the 
task of philosophy i s to explain that vihich has occurred showing 
t h i s to be both rational and necessary to the development of Llind. 
Philosophical esplanations involve the analysis of p a r t i c u l a r modes 
of experience and can contain nothing that i s not already a part of 
that experience. Hence his c r i t i c i s m s of Kant and Pichte who, he 
f e l t , were siniply building sand c a s t l e s i n the a i r with no reference 
to concrete r e a l i t y . Yet i n h i s image of a Theseus come to restore 
German national unity, Hegel i s himself c l e a r l y making av.rather 
peculiar p o l i t i c a l and moral prescription concerning some desired 
state of a f f a i r s . No longer i s he making a broad generalization 
about the foundation of a l l states, but he i s saying that Germany 
must and should follm t h i s path too. As a p r a c t i c a l argument i n 
favour of German unity Hegel's logic, as future statesmen well 
understood, i s forceful and convincing, but a p r a c t i c a l argument i s , 
of course, not a philosophical argument and i t . i s for f a i l i n g i n t h i s 
instance to distinguish between these two types of discourse that 
Hegel i s to be c r i t i c i z e d . I t would be abortive to attempt to 
eccplain away th i s confusion between prescription and description 
because that i s p r e c i s e l y what i t i s , a confusion. Yet i t would be 
equally abortive to see i n Hegel's prescription nothing more than 
i d l e wishful thinking. His Theseus i s certainly, not, as Professor 
Avineri has said, simply a longed for deus-ex-machina.^^^^ Rather 
t h i s Theseus represents a r e a l and p r a c t i c a l means of bringing about 
a genuine European p o l i t i c a l r e v i v a l i n the person of Napoleon. 
For Hegel, Napoleon was the restorer of the P'rench state after 
(90)Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theoiy of the Modern State, Cambridge, 
1972, p.61. 
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i t s d issolution during the period of revolutionary turmoil. Whereas 
e a r l i e r Hegel had envisioned the French Revolution as a great act of 
l i b e r a t i o n freeing men from the bonds of despotism and revealed 
r e l i g i o n , i n the Phenomenology he depicts only the negative aspects of 
t h i s great event r e f e r r i n g to the period immediately prior to the 
revolution as absolute Zerrissenheit, l i t e r a l l y "being completely torn 
(qi) 
apart".^-^ ' The revolutiorv,^s Hegel understands i t , resulted from 
the philosophical struggle of the Enlightenment which he characterizes 
as an e s s e n t i a l l y r e l i g i o u s c r i s i s i n which reason attempts to repudiate 
f a i t h and remake the world i n accordance with i t s own secularized v i s i o n 
of absolute freedom of the vail. Such an attempt v/as, Hegel believes, 
bound to f a i l for the reason that f a i t h and reason are not a n t i t h e t i c a l 
(92) 
but i d e n t i c a l to one another. ^  The revolution merely attempted to 
implement t h i s v i s i o n of freedom arrived at by the philosophes and 
e s p e c i a l l y Rousseau, but the r e s u l t v/as a purely "self-destructive" 
freedom, destructive because i t was carried out by individuals against 
(91) Hegel, Phanomenologie, op.bit., pp.367-70; Phenomenology, op.cit., 
pp.536-40. 
(92) The basic unity of f a i t h and knowledge which Hegel believes v/as torn 
apart by the Enlightenment i s the major thesis of his essay "Glauben 
und Wissen"; see Hegel, Srste Jruckschriften, og.cit., p.223: "Our 
culture has elevated our age so f a r above the old opposition between 
reason and f a i t h , of philosophy and positive r e l i g i o n , that t h i s 
opposition between f a i t h and knov/ledge has acquired a t o t a l l y 
different meaning: i t has today been transferred to a position 
within philosophy i t s e l f . I n the past reason v/as claimed as the 
servant of f a i t h and against t h i s philosophy has i r r e s i s t a b l y 
affirmed i t s absolute autonoiny. Nov/ these conceptions or modes of 
expression have disappeared and reason, i f i n fact there i s reason 
i n that which gives i t s e l f that name, has become so i n f l u e n t i a l 
within positive r e l i g i o n that even an attack by philosophy on the 
positive aspects of r e l i g i o n such as miracles and the l i k e i s 
considered something outmoded and obscure". 
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(93) the state rather than by the state i t s e l f . This t o t a l l y 
unconditioned negative freedom was achieved from 1789-94 and was 
bolstered by the terror which was intended to prevent any r e s t r i c t i o n 
or l i m i t a t i o n upon freedom. The terror brought about the complete 
dissolution of the state and society which were only restored by 
Napoleon. 
V/hile Napoleon i s not e x p l i c i t l y mentioned i n the Phenomenology 
Hegel does express great enthusiasm for him on a number of different 
occasions, mostly i n h i s private correspondence. I n a l e t t e r to 
Nifethammer he says: " I saw the Emperor - t h i s world soul - come to 
the c i t y for a reconnaissance. I t i s indeed a marvellous sensation 
to see, concentrated i n one point, an individual who, s i t t i n g on a 
horse, overruns the world and conquers i t " . ^ ^ ^ ^ And i n another 
l e t t e r he makes the follov/ing observation: 
Vife speak a great deal about the unification of the 
various states of the Empire. The principle decision 
w i l l doubtlessly come from Paris....The German 
professors of constitutional law are s t i l l writing a 
great number of works on the idea of sovereignty and 
the meaning of the Confederation, The great teacher 
of constitutional law (der grosse Staatsrechtslehrer), 
however, s i t s i n Paris....After the Wurttemburg Estates 
had been dissolved, Napoleon said to one Vfiirttemburg 
Minister: ' I made your master a sovereign, not a despot'. 
The German princes have not yet grasped the idea of a free 
monarchy, nor have they even attempted to put i t into 
practice - i t w i l l be necessary for Napoleon to organize 
these a f f a i r s . (95) 
(93) See the analysis of absolute freedom and the terror i n Hegel, 
Phanomenologie, op.cit., pp.414-22; Phenomenology, op.cit., pp.599-610. 
(94) L e t t e r from Hegel to Niethammer, 13 October 1806 i n G.IV.F. Hegel, 
Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. J . Hoffmeister, 3 vols., Hanburg, 
1952-54, I , p.120; henceforth cited as Briefe. 
(95) Letter from Hegel to Niethammer, 29 August I8O7, Briefe, op.cit., 
I , p.185. 
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And l a t e r Hegel made t h i s comment upon learning of the introduction 
of the Napoleonic Code into Germany: "The importance of the Code 
cannot be compared with the importance of the hope that other parts 
of the French and V/estphalian constitutions w i l l be introduced into 
Germany".^^^^ 
What i s s i g n i f i c a n t , hov/ever, i s not Hegel's response to t h i s 
or that aspect of the Napoleonic experience, but the fact that he 
interprets t h i s experience as an entirely new epoch i n world history 
representing a qualitative rupture from the ancien regime. This new 
epoch which Hegel designates as a new form or configuration of 
consciousness has as yet not had time to develop, but only ex i s t s i n 
abstract form. For t h i s reason modern philosophy which i s nothing 
more than a r e f l e c t i o n upon the times must also remain incomplete and 
abstract. The novel and revolutionary character of the modern age 
v/as given i t s f i r s t succinct expression by Hegel i n the conclusion to 
hi s lecture course of I806: 
This Gentlemen, i s speculative philosophy as f a r as I 
have been able to present i t . Look upon i t as the 
commencement of the philosophy which you v / i l l carry 
foiward. We stand at the gates of an important epoch 
of world history, when s p i r i t leaps forward, transcends 
i t s previous form and takes on a new one. The whole 
mass of exi s t i n g representations, concepts and bonds 
holding our world together have collapsed and dissolved 
as i n a dream. A new phase of s p i r i t i s i n preparation. 
Philosophy i n particulaS must v/elcome i t and grant i t 
recognition, while others, who impotently oppose i t , hold 
to the past and the majority unconsciously constitute the 
masses i n v/hich i t i s manifest. (97) 
(96) L e t t e r from Hegel to Niethammer, 11 February I808, Briefe, op.cit., 
I , p.218. 
(97) Lecture of I 8 September I8O6 i n G.V/.F. Hegel, Sokumente zu Hegels 
Entwicklung, ed. J . Hoffmeister, Stuttgart, 1936, p.352. 
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I t i s t h i s idea that the present constitutes a turning point i n 
contemporary history which i s at the centre of the Phenomenology as 
we l l . I t would be impossible to provide even a schematic account of 
what Hegel attempts to accomplish i n t h i s work, but what comes out 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Preface i s h i s conviction that his i s an age of 
t r a n s i t i o n . Both the French and the Kantian revolutions, he argues, 
have put an end to the old order of things and given birth to a nev/ 
age even though, he admits, i t i s as yet impossible to know what form 
t h i s age w i l l take. Here i s how he describes t h i s process: 
For the r e s t i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to see that our epoch 
i s a birth-time, and a period of t r a n s i t i o n . The 
s p i r i t 6f toaii has broken with the old order to things 
hitherto prevailing, and v/ith the old ways of thinking, 
and i s i n the mind to l e t them a l l sink into the depths 
of the past and to set about i t s own transformation. 
I t i s indeed never at r e s t , but carried along the stream 
of progress ever onward. But i t i s here as i n the case 
of the b i r t h of a c h i l d ; a f t e r a long period of 
n u t r i t i o n i n silenc e , the continuity of the gradual 
growth i n s i z e , of quantitative change, i s suddenly cut 
short by the f i r s t breath drawn - there i s a break i n 
the process, a qualitative change - and the child i s 
born. I n l i k e manner the s p i r i t of the time, growing 
sloivly and quietly ripe for the new form i t i s to assume, 
disintegrates one fragment after another of the structure 
of i t s previous world. That i t i s tottering to i t s f a l l 
i s indicated only by symptoms here and there. F r i v o l i t y 
and again ennui, which are spreading i n the established 
order of things, the undefined foreboding of something 
unknown - a l l these betoken that there i s something else 
approaching. This gradual crumbling to pieces, which 
did not a l t e r the general look and aspect of the whole, 
i s interrupted by the sunrise, which, i n a f l a s h and at a 
single stroke, brings to viev/ the form and structure of 
the new world. (98) 
S t i l l Hegel i s aware that the Phenomenology i s merely a v/ork i n outline 
since only the foundation of the new era has been l a i d . V/e s h a l l see 
(98)Hegel, Phanomenologie, op.cit., pp . l 5 - l 6 ; Phenomenology, op.cit., 
p.75. Cf. also l e t t e r from Hegel to Niethammer, 5 July I 8 I 6 , 
Briefe, op.cit., I I , pp.85-6. 
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l a t e r that while i n l807 Hegel ref e r s to the dawn of an age i n the 
Preface to the Philosophy of Right written i n 1820 he speaks of the 
close of the epoch. I n t h i s respect by the end of his l i f e both 
Hegel and the culture he came to represent had gone f u l l c i r c l e . 
Despite his admiration for Napoleon and the new h i s t o r i c a l era 
he inaugurated, Hegel sees i n him merely an agent for a higher purpose 
v/hich transcends him and of which he i s unconscious. Napoleon thus 
becomes the bearer of a v/orld h i s t o r i c a l p r inciple, constitutional 
monarchy, which i s realized through h i s actions and of which he i s 
himself not f u l l y cognizant. This general outlook i s f a i r l y typical 
of Hegel's idealism whereby men are conceived simply as instruments or 
agents v/ho unwittingly bring about the ultimate ends of history. Of 
course t h i s idea of an h i s t o r i c a l teleology i s as old as Bossuet and 
before him Augustine and the Church Fathers. But while for e a r l i e r 
C h r i s t i a n thinkers the goal of history v/as attuned to securing the 
happiness of a small portion of humanity i n another world, for Hegel, 
t h i s goal i s the p o l i t i c a l state, a constitutional monarchy which he 
would l a t e r c a l l the "constitution of developed reason". V/hen the 
•basis of t h i s state has been l a i d , hov/ever, the work of i t s architect 
i s made redundant. Thus Hegel says, Napoleon, th i s modem tyrant, 
l i k e the original Theseus i s fated to disappear from the scene which 
he helped to prepare. I n fac t much l a t e r on during the period of 
Napoleon's decline, Hegel i n a l e t t e r to Niethammer claims that t h i s 
(99) 
had been foreseen i n the Phenomenology. ^  ' 
I n the Realphilosophie I I Hegel goes into some detai l concerning 
the structure of the modern state v/hich i n many ways prefigures his 
( 9 9)Letter from Hegel to Niethammer, 29 April I814, Briefe, op.cit., 
I I , pp.28-29. 
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l a t e r more systematic treatment of the subject i n the Philosophy of 
Right. I n i t s broad outline t h i s state i s modelled along the l i n e s 
of the constitution which Napoleon had given to the I t a l i a n s with i t s 
di v i s i o n s into colleges of possidenti, merchanti and dotti.^"'•^^^ As 
opposed to the undifferentiated unity of the antique republic, the 
constitution of the modern state i s e s s e n t i a l l y complex and p l u r a l i s t i c , 
a phenomenon which Hegel attributes to the increase i n s i z e and 
population. ^''•^•'•^  This complexity and pluralism i s primarily reflected 
i n the system of estates into which society i s divided. 
A detailed discussion of the concept of estate (Stand) w i l l be 
put off u n t i l the next chapter. What i s signif i c a n t here i s the way 
i n which Hegel defines each estate according to the type of labour i t 
performs. The f i r s t estate, the peasantry, i s characterized by i t s 
immediate relationship with the object of i t s labour, the land. I n 
Hegel's opinion t h i s estate exhibits a very low le v e l of consciousness 
and int e l l i g e n c e b e f i t t i n g the simple, concrete nature of i t s labour. 
Unlike the urban bourgeoisie whose work i s extremely technical and 
abstract and only accidentally connected with h i s personal needs, the 
peasant i s able to look a f t e r a l l h is needs himself: "The peasantry," 
Hegel says, " i s thus unindividuated t r u s t , having i t s individuality i n 
the unconscious individual, the earth. As for h i s labour, the peasant's 
labour does not have an abstract form, but he takes care of just about 
a l l h i s needs".^"^^^^ He goes on to say that the peasantry serves as 
the "raw mass" i n times of v/ar which i s as i t should be for the estate 
of unreflective t r u s t . This rather dim view of the peasantry i s 
(100) Lasson, op.cit., p.305. 
(101) Ibid'., pp.24-5. 
(102) Realphilosophie I I , op.cit., p .254« 
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obviously a r e f l e c t i o n upon the feudal backwardness of t h i s estate 
i n early XlXth century Germany. While i n other parts of Europe the 
peasantry was being r a d i c a l l y transformed due to the introduction of 
modern i n d u s t r i a l technology into ag r i c u l t u r a l production, Hegel, 
despite h i s knowledge of the c l a s s i c a l economists, chooses to ignore 
t h i s f a c t . For him, the peasantry produces only for immediate need 
and not for exchange at the market place. 
The second estate i s designated as the Biirgerstand, a rather 
archaic German word which i s roughly, although not l i t e r a l l y , 
commensurate with boiu;geoisie or middle c l a s s . ^•'"'^^^  While the peasant 
puts h i s f a i t h and fate i n the hands of nature, the Burger puts h i s 
confidence i n the leg a l and j u r i d i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of society. Hegel's 
thoughts on such subjects as property, contract and law are 
extraordinarily oblique, but what i s evident i s that he sees .these 
i n s t i t u t i o n s as i n some sense necessary for the smooth functioning of 
a f u l l y developed society. Never did he harbor the c h i l i a s t i c 
i l l u s i o n s of a Fichte for whom the rule of law was merely propaedutic 
to the coming of a society governed by the principles of pure morality. 
The purpose of the law. i s to put the interests of the individual into 
harmony with the common interest and i t i s t h i s identity of 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y and uni v e r s a l i t y which assures the freedom of the whole.^^^^^ 
I t i s of course another question altogether whether the lav/ actually 
functions i n t h i s manner or whether Hegel too f a l l s prey to the 
tendency of id e a l i z i n g e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y by attributing to i t the 
perfection of some future i d e a l . 
(103 )An excellent h i s t o r i c a l aiccount of the r i s e of the German middle 
c l a s s can be found i n W.H. Binoford, Germany i n the Eighteenth 
Century, Cambridge, 1935} pp.214-34. 
(l04)RealphiloBophie I I , op.cit., p.248. 
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The Burgerstand i s divided into two branches. The f i r s t consists 
of craftsmen or the p e t i t bourgeoisie whose work i s devoted to 
transforming the raw materials of nature into suitable objects for 
human consumption. The second consists of the commercial and 
in d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t s who deal only with the exchange of finished 
commodities. Here there i s a very highly developed degree of 
abstractness as work i s completely disassociated from any connection 
with immediate use or need. The commodity, Hegel says i n a passage 
s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r to the opening pages of Marx's Capital,has two 
aspects, that which i t i s i n i t s e l f as an a r t i c l e of commerce and that 
which i t i s i n i t s universal equivalent, money, "a great invention". 
Indeed the phenomenon of money must have presented Hegel with great 
d i f f i c u l t i e s as the following passage demonstrates: 
A person i s r e a l t o the extent that he possesses money. 
Imagination i s squandered; the meaning has immediate 
existence; the essence of the thing i s the thing 
i t s e l f ; value i s hard cash. The formal principle of 
reason i s present here (but this money which bears the 
meaning of a l l needs i s i t s e l f an immediate thing) -
i t i s the abstraction from a l l p a r t i c u l a r i t y , character, 
h i s t o r i c i t y , etc. of the individual. The disposition 
of the merchant i s t h i s hardness of s p i r i t whereby 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y i s completely alienated and no longer 
counts; only the s t r i c t law pr e v a i l s . The b i l l must 
be honoured come what may even i f he himself, his family, 
wealth, l i f e , etc. are destroyed. (IO5) 
This account very c l e a r l y bears out how f a r Hegel v/as from glorifying 
the l i f e of the contemporary bourgeois. In fact i n a completely 
r e a l i s t i c fashion he observes that the accumulation of money i s made 
possible only through the ruthless and brutal exploitation of a c l a s s , 
l e f t unnamed, i n the mines and m i l l s . 
(105)Ibid., pp.256-57. 
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The t h i r d estate Hegel designates as "universal" as i t s function 
i s to oversee the entire p o l i t i c a l e d i f i c e . ITI the essay on "Natural 
Right" Hegel had i d e n t i f i e d t h i s estate v/ith the c l a s s of c i t i z e n 
warriors v/hose position was l e v e l l e d with the collapse of the Roman 
Empire. I n the "System of E t h i c s " as well Hegel continues to operate 
with the concept of a m i l i t a r y aristocracy which he models not along 
the l i n e s of the old n o b i l i t y , but along the Napoleonic scheme. There 
i s , however, something of an ambivalence within t h i s work as Hegel 
tends to viev/ t h i s estate as the personification of the government 
rather than an intemnediate body subordinate to the state. This 
g l o r i f i c a t i o n of the m i l i t a r y should come as no surprise when considered 
i n the l i g h t of his b e l i e f that the constant preparedness for wax and 
willingness to s a c r i f i c e one's l i f e f or the fatherland i s an essential 
ingredient of the state without which the whole so c i a l fabric becomes 
enervated and dissolute. This i s how he expresses i t i n the 
Phenomenology: 
I n order not to l e t them get rooted and settled i n 
t h i s i s o l a t i o n and thus break up the v/hole into 
fragments and l e t the common s p i r i t evaporate, 
government has from time to time to shake them to 
the very centre by war. By t h i s means i t confounds 
the order that has been established and arranged, 
and viola t e s t h e i r right to independence, v/hile the 
individuals (who, being absorbed therein, get a d r i f t 
from the whole, s t r i v i n g a f t e r inviolable s e l f -
existence and personal s e c u r i t y ) , are made, by the 
task thus imposed on them by government, to f e e l the 
power of th e i r lord and master, death. By thus 
breaking up the form of fixed s t a b i l i t y , s p i r i t guards 
the e t h i c a l order from sinking into merely natural 
existence, preserves the s e l f of which i t i s conscious, 
and r a i s e s that s e l f to the l e v e l of freedom and i t s 
ovm powers. (l06) 
(l06)Hegel, Phanomenologie, op.cit., p.324; Phenomenology, op.cit., 
p.474-
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Hegel also mentions i n passing the public s p i r i t e d c i v i l servants, 
the administrative bureaucracy, but he i s not at a l l s p e c i f i c about 
t h e i r function. Nor for that matter does he go into the function of 
the monarch whose p o l i c i e s they administer. The only point worth 
noting i s h i s remark that the true public servant must also be a 
scholar, for as we s h a l l see later,education i s an essential prerequisite 
for membership i n t h i s estate. ^ ^^ "^ ^ 
Philosophically understood, the system of estates i s not a d i v i s i v e 
power v/hich alienates man from h i s fellows, but a means of bringing about 
s o c i a l integration and harmony. Since each estate i s based upon what i s 
common to i t s members, t h e i r labour, i t r a i s e s the individual above his 
natural state of isolated p a r t i c u l a r i t y and provides him with a more 
general s o c i a l consciousness. Indeed a person, according to Hegel, i s 
what he i s by virtue of the estate to which he belongs. I t i s the 
estate which fosters an identity between the interests of the individual 
and the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s of the community. Thus the estate mediates 
betweeh man's private role as bourgeois and hi s public role as citoyen.^^^^^ 
Hegel's point i s that t h i s dual role i s not something to be eschev/ed, but 
represents legitimate spheres of differentiation which must be respected. 
I n t h i s regard Hegel's views are the direct opposite of Lilarx's for whom 
the d i v i s i o n of society into s o c i a l classes i s never r e a l l y legitimate, 
but always e n t a i l s the e:q)loitation of one cl a s s by another. While for 
Marx only a c l a s s l e s s society could bring about the rule of reason on 
earth for Hegel, without the estates system society would become 
fragmented and atomized. Thus while the former views soci a l classes 
as a measure of human alienation, for the l a t t e r they alv/ays remain a 
buttress against fragmentation and dissonance. 
(107) Realphilosophie I I , op.cit., pp.259-60i 
(108) l b i d . , p.249. 
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Hegel's Realphilosophie does not conclude, as i s sometimes thought, 
with the supremacy of the s t a t e . Rather there i s a realm of mind which 
surpasses the material limitations of the p o l i t i c a l community which 
consists of a r t , r e l i g i o n and philosophy. While each of these modes of 
expression have the same content, the cognition of ultimate r e a l i t y , 
they d i f f e r as to t h e i r form. Art attempts to depict the absolute or 
r e a l i t y i n an i n t u i t i v e mariner through material given by the senses. 
Religion attempts to apprehend i t through picturesque representations 
(Vorstellungen) and images. And philosophy depicts r e a l i t y through a 
systematically inter-related set of concepts (Begriffe). I t might be 
f i t t i n g to conclude t h i s analysis of Hegel's Jena philosophy with a 
br i e f examination of the relationship between the realm of what Hegel 
would l a t e r c a l l mind absolute and the realm of man's so c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
experience described above. 
My argument so f a r , i t w i l l be recalled, i s that Hegel's purpose i n 
providing a philosophical account of experience grew out of a p r a c t i c a l 
need to bring about a harmonious, non-alienated relationship betv/een man 
and the world. Following the e a r l i e r leads of Kant, Fichte and 
Schelling, Hegel came to the conclusion that only when the whole of 
r e a l i t y i s grasped by the human mind w i l l man learn to view i t as his 
"second nature". Like h i s fellow German i d e a l i s t s , Hegel confers 
p a r t i c u l a r importance upon r e l i g i o n and s p e c i f i c a l l y upon Ch r i s t i a n i t y 
as a fundamental mode of explaining man's position i n the cosmos. As 
opposed to the neo-Kantians of Tubingen, Hegel r e j e c t s the contention 
that the Chr i s t i a n God i s a remote and a l i e n intelligence completely 
cut off from human a f f a i r s . No longer does God appear as the " i n f i n i t e 
Lord of the universe", but h i s existence i s made manifest through man 
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and h i s a c t i v i t y i n the world. This might well seem a rather 
pantheistic conception of r e l i g i o n and i t does r e l y heavily upon the 
pantheistic element i n Spinoza's religious philosophy, the influence 
of which v i a Jacobi and Goethe was undergoing a revi v a l i n the early 
part of the XlXth century. ^ ^^^^ I n t h i s manner the world of God and 
the world of man are brought together i n a harmonious union so that 
r e l i g i o n rather than being a measure of man's separation from the 
community becomes central for h i s integration into i t or as Hegel puts 
i t somewhat c r y p t i c a l l y : "The state is...the r e a l i t y of the kingdom 
of heaven".(110) 
I t should be mentioned, however, that t h i s reconciliation between 
the earthly and heavenly c i t i e s does not take place within religion, 
but within philosophy or more precisely within the philosophy of 
r e l i g i o n . The f i n a l pages of the essay "Faith and Knowledge" provide 
the culmination of t h i s elevation of re l i g i o n to philosophy where the 
death of Christ i s transformed into a "speculative Good Friday". 
This point i s made even more fo r c e f u l l y l a t e r when Hegel remarks that 
i f r e l i g i o n i s unable to obtain a rational knowledge of God and the 
universe, refuge must be taken i n philosophy which can.^^l^^ So long 
as God remains an unknowable t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f which stands outside of 
human cognition, there w i l l never be a complete reconciliation between 
man and the world. I n t h i s manner Hegel accomplishes the conceptual 
(109) This r e v i v a l of interest i n Spinoza among the German i d e a l i s t s was 
large l y due to the publication i n I785 of Jacobi's Uber die Lehre des 
Spinoza. 
(110) Realphilosophie I I , op.cit., p.270. 
(111) Hegel, Er s t e Druckschriften, op.cit., p.346. 
(112) G.W.F. Hegel, Die Vernunft i n der Geschichte, ed. J . Hoffmeister, 
Hamburg, I955, pp.37-49. 
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transposition of theology i n t o speculative philosophy. This 
transposition was i n fact f i r s t noted by Peuerbach who i n his 
Provisional Theses f o r the Reform of Philosophy made the observation 
that: "The secret of speculative philosophy i s theology - speculative 
theology i s distinguished from common theology i n t h i s , that i t 
transposes in t o the here and now that i s actualizes, determines and 
realizes the divine essence which otherv/ise would exist i n the beyond. "^ '^^ •^ ^ 
Equally s i g n i f i c a n t i s the relationship between ar t and philosophy 
f o r t h i s brings up once again the matter of Hegel's r e l a t i o n to 
Schelling. During the early years at Jena, Hegel's philosophical 
positi o n was not yet e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t from Schelling's and, as we 
have seen, he adopted a largely Schellingian l i n e i n his cr i t i q u e of 
Kant, Fichte and the philosophy of subjective idealism. Hegel seemed 
to have accommodated himself to the role of junior partner (although he 
was f i v e years Schelling's senior) i n t h e i r Joint e f f o r t to provide a 
comprehensive philosbphical account of experience. Nevertheless 
differences between Schelling and Hegel were there from the st a r t and 
gradually these became increasingly manifest. 
The point of contention was that Schelling believed that r e a l i t y 
was only cognizable through an act of aesthetic i n t u i t i o n . • Art was 
fo r him the only medium through which the absolute can be known. As 
both Lukacs and Garaudy have pointed out, Schelling's notion of an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n as revealed through aesthetic experience goes 
hand i n hand with an a r i s t o c r a t i c theory of knov/ledge as i t implies 
that the veritable cognition of r e a l i t y i s only open to an a r t i s t i c 
(ll3)Feuerbach, op.cit., I I , pp.222-23; cf. also p.246: "The essence 
of speculative philosophy i s nothing other than the essence of God, 
ration a l i z e d , realized and actualized. Speculative philosophy i s 
the true, coherent and ra t i o n a l theology". 
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e l i t e , a few geniuses who have been especially chosen to look upon the 
god-head.^ •'••'•^ ^ Hegel's claim i s that Schelling's use of i n t u i t i o n as 
the foundation of speculative philosophy, f a r from providing an adequate 
knowledge of r e a l i t y , can only open the floodgates of mysticism and 
obscurantism. V/hile he was certainly sympathetic to Schelling's attempt 
to overcome the unknowability of Kant's t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f and thus restore 
a harmonious union of subject and object, he denies that t h i s union can 
be achieved through i n t u i t i o n alone. The pretended immediacy of 
intu i t i o n i s m excludes a l l movement and development of thought so that 
the differences between subject and object are simply swallowed up i n an 
a l l encompassing absolute. The crucial passage i n which Hegel c r i t i c i z e s 
the Schellingian absolute f o r o b l i t e r a t i n g a l l distinctions between 
subject and object was alluded to e a r l i e r , but i s here quoted i n f u l l : 
To p i t t h i s single assertion, that ' i n the Absolute 
a l l i s one' against the organized v/hole of deteiminate 
and complete knowledge, or of knowledge vMch at least 
aims at and demands complete development - to give out 
i t s Absolute as the night i n which, as vie say, a l l cov/s 
are black - that i s the very naivete'' of emptiness of 
knowledge. (115) 
And elsewhere Hegel makes the same point when he refers to the merely 
quantitative divisions wi t h i n Schelling's absolute meaning that rather 
than providing a concrete knowledge of r e a l i t y he only makes abstract 
and f o r m a l i s t i c statements about i t . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
I n Hegel's view the proper comprehension of r e a l i t y must proceed 
not by some i r r a t i o n a l i s t aesthetic p r i n c i p l e , but must be f i r m l y grounded 
(114) Georg Lukacs, Die Zersfdrung der Vemunft, Berlin, 1954> pp.103-14; 
Roger Garaudy, Dieu est mort; Etude sur Hegel, Paris, 1970, pp.158-59• 
(115) Hegel," Phanomenologie, op.cit., pp.19; Phenomenology, op.cit., p.79. 
(116) Hosenkranz, op.cit., p.201. 
143 
i n reason and lo g i c a l analysis. For him, philosophy cannot rest upon 
some privile g e d insight into the nature of r e a l i t y , but must be 
universally demonstrable and communicable to a l l . According to Hegel, 
absolute knowledge i s the terminus ad quem of philosophy which can only 
be reached through rigorous proof and demonstration. This i s why he 
contemptuously refers to Schelling's i n t u i t i v e point of indifference as 
"the sort of ecstatic enthusiasm vihich. starts straight o f f with absolute 
knov/ledge, as i f shot out of a p i s t o l , and makes short work of other 
points of view simply by explaining that i t i s to take no notice of 
them".^ '^'•'^ ^ For Hegel, knowledge, rather than being immediate, i s a 
process, an a c t i v i t y which may begin with sensible i n t u i t i o n , but 
proceeds from there to the understanding v/hich divides and bifurcates 
and from there to reason which unifies the whole. I n the following 
chapter we shall examine i n some d e t a i l the method which Hegel employs 
to arrive at what he takes to be a true understanding of experience. 
I n conclusion i t should be said that while Hegel certainly intended 
r 
that his philosophical grasp of experience"be, at least i n pr i n c i p l e , open 
to a l l , he always steered clear of the sort of popular philosophizing 
which merely panders to prejudice and public opinion.^^^^^ A t r u l y 
philosophical knowledge of r e a l i t y i s only possible through a lengthy 
and arduous process of education (Bildung). Bildung does not mean 
education i n the narrow sense of simply learning by rote, but i n the 
broad sense of learning through experience. As one c r i t i c puts i t , 
Bildung s i g n i f i e s "maturation, f u l f i l m e n t , joy, suffering, a drenching 
(117) Hegel, Phanomenologie, 8p.cit., p.26; Phenomenology, op.cit., 
pp.88-9. 
(118) Hegel, Erste Druckschriften, op.cit., pp.126-27. 
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i n the stream of time and an emergence to the plateau of judgement".^^^^^ 
I t i s the process whereby the individual acquires the knowledge and 
experience of the species. As Hegel puts i t i n the Preface to the 
Phenomenology, i t i s "the task of conducting the individual mind from 
i t s u n s c i e n t i f i c standpoint to that of science...the formative 
development of the universal individual, of self-conscious s p i r i t " . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
This philosophical education does not, then, r e l y upon some divine or 
privileged i n s p i r a t i o n , but upon the systematic expenditure of 
inte l l i g e n c e . 
This emphasis upon education naturally invites comparison with 
Rousseau and indeed Jean Ifyppolite has observed that i n Emile, Hegel 
found a f i r s t history of the natural consciousness elevating i t s e l f to 
freedom by means of personal and specially formative experience.^''•^^^ 
But such a comparison i s i n many respects misleading. Hegel i s highly 
c r i t i c a l of Rousseau's experiment i n controlled naturalism which 
advocates withdrawal from common everyday l i f e and estranging men from 
the laws of the land. For Hegel, education i s always preparatory f o r 
l i f e i n the p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of the community. I t i s not so much 
concerned with technical mastery over nature as i t i s with the formation 
(122) 
and c u l t i v a t i o n of character. I t i s the art of making men ethical.^ ' 
In t h i s manner a philosophical t r a i n i n g has as i t s end the creation of a 
free and p o l i t i c a l l y conscious citizenry who see the world not as a form 
of estrangement and alienation, but as the manifest embodiment of 
themselves. 
(119) George A. Kelly, P o l i t i c s , Idealism and History; Sources of Hegelian 
Thought, Cambridge, 1969> p.342. 
(120) Hegel, Phanomenologie, op.cit., p.26; Phenomenology, op.cit., p.89. 
(121) Jean Hyppolite, Genese et structure de l a phenomenologie de 1 'esprit 
de Hegel, 2 vols., Paris, 1946, I , p.16. 
(122) a.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford, ,1971, 
addition to paragraph I5I . 
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CHAPOER I I I 
THE MTLOSOHir OF RIGHT i HEGEL'S MTDBE 
SYSTBT-l OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHr 
Ecom 1808 to 1816 Hegel was the headmaster of a Gymnasiian at 
Mttmberg where his duties included i n s t r u c t i o n i n philosophy. I t vra,s 
during these years that he composed the three volumes of the Science 
of Logio which were intended to complete the cycle that he had begun 
e a r l i e r i n the Phenomenoloeyo I n 1816 Hegel was offered the chair of 
philosophy at Heidelberg which he accepted and v;here he wrote the 
Encyclopedia of the PhilosoiduLcal Sciences as a sort of compendium to 
his e n t i r e system» I n t h i s work he outlines i n a series of consecut-
i v e l y numbered paragraphfi the three great branches of his system: lo g i c , 
the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of mind. Final l y i n 1818 
Hegel was offered the chair of philosophy at Berlin whidi had been 
vacant since Fichte's death four years e a r l i e r . I t was here that Hegel 
vrrote h i s chef d'oeuvre on p o l i t i c a l theory e n t i t l e d Natural Law and 
P o l i t i c a l Science i n Outline; Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1821) 
which i s an elaboration of the philosophy of mind and which contains 
his ideas on social ethics and the theory of the state. Before under-
taking an examination of t h i s work, however, i t v r i l l be necessary to 
elucidate the methodological base which underlies i t . 
Hegel alvra-ys viewed philosophy not as one specialized discipline 
among many, but as the ultimate form of human knovdedge, or to use the 
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e3cpression of a contemporary philosopher, Hegel adopted the viev/ of 
philosophy as a "master science", ^"'•^  As such, Hegel i s adamant that 
philosophy have i t s ovm clearl y defined method of inquiry which demar-
cates i t from other subordinate disciplines. The problem of a proper 
methodology f o r philosophy had been taken up already by Schelling i n 
his Lectures on the Ifethods of Academic Study of 1802, But here as 
i n h i s e a r l i e r vnritings, Schelling shows himself unable to proceed 
beyond a mystical inttdtlonism as the only means of cognizing r e a l i t y . 
As opposed to Schelling's i n t u i t i v e point of indifference, Hegel argues 
that the philosophical method must be absolutely rigorous and demon-
strable. As early as the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel equates 
(2) 
the method of speculative philosophy with l o g i c . ^  ' I t i s , he observes, 
the special business of logic to express the way i n which philosophy 
operates. And l a t e r i n the Preface to the f i r s t e d i tion of the Logic 
Hegel remarks that a f t e r the theoretical devestation of the old meta-
physics wrougiht by Kantianism, i t must be the task of logic to once 
more raise philosophy to the l e v e l of a science (Wissenschaft).^^^ 
There i s , however, a crucial difference between Hegel's logic and that 
of previous logicians, a difference which must now be b r i e f l y examined. 
Traditional A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c or fozmal l o g i c , according to Hegel, 
studies purely a n a l y t i c a l transformations i n which thought i s concerned 
only w i t h i t s e l f . This lo g i c concerns only the form of thinking or the 
(1) Peter G. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, London, 1958, ppo7-10. 
(2) G.V/.P. Hegel, Hignomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffineister, 
Hamburg, 1 9 5 2 , pp.52-53 ; c f . also p . 4 0 ; The Phenomenology of Mind. 
trans. J.B. B a i l i e , London, 1 9 7 1 » P<>97; cf. also p.l06. 
(5) G.W.p. Hegel, V/issenschaft der Logik, ed. G. Lasson, 2 vols. 
Leipzig, 1923, I , pp. 3-8; Science of Logic« trans. A.Y, J l i l l e r , 
London, I969, pp.25-9. 
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rules of thougjit i n complete abstraction from a l l concrete empirical 
contento I t i s , as Henri Lefebvre has pointed out, the logic of 
abstraction as s u c h . T h e basic pr i n c i p l e of formal logic i s the 
law o f i d e n t i t y as expressed i n the proposition A i s A. This law 
of i d e n t i t y can only assert that a t h i n g i s what i t i s and not any-
t h i n g else vMch, as Hegel correctly observes, i s nothing more than 
an "empty tautology". From the point of view of formal logic, 
the world i s simply composed of so many isolated and immobile facts 
or things (Sache) each of which i s i d e n t i c a l to i t s e l f alone and only 
externally related to others. These things are what they are and that 
i s a l l that can be said about them. Thought i s therefore character-
ized by a s t a t i c r i g i d i t y , i t s formal i d e n t i t y with i t s e l f . 
Hegel's metaphysics i s largely intended to rescue logic from the 
abstractness and vacuity of formalism. Formal log i c , he believes, has 
a ce r t a i n r e s t r i c t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y i n such disciplines as mathematics 
and the natural sciences, but f o r t h i s very reason i t cannot become the 
method of philosophy. Philosophy, Hegel maintains, must have i t s 
own l o g i c , one more attuned to the nature of man's practical expexieaae 
than t r a d i t i o n a l s c i e n t i f i c or metaphysical reasoning. I n order to 
f i l l t h i s void l e f t by formalism, Hegel proposes a new d i a l e c t i c a l 
l o g i c vMch can provide a more adequate, comprehensive grasp of r e a l i t y . 
( 4 ) Henri Lefebvre, D i a l e c t i c a l Materialism, trans. John Stuttock, 
London, I968, p.57" 
( 5 ) Hegel, Logjik, op. c i t . , I I , p.28; Logic, op. cit», p . 4 1 3 « 
(6) The basis of Hegel's c r i t i c i s m of the old p r e - c r i t i c a l meta-
physics, e.g. that of Descartes, Spinoza* Hobbes and Leibniz i s that 
they merely assume that the method employed by mathematics and the 
natural sciences i s appropriate to the study of philosophy. 
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Dia l e c t i c , Hegel says, i s generally regarded as a purely 
adventitious external a r t which does not so much pertain to the 
subject matter, but has i t s grotind i n the subjective desire to 
uproot everything which i s f i x e d and s t a b l e . ^ " The bad reputation 
which d i a l e c t i c a l reasoning has acquired can be traced back to the 
Greeks, p a r t i c u l a r l y Zeno, who used i t merely to introduce an 
absolute scepticism about a l l things and to deny the posd.bility of 
a t t a i n i n g a f i r m grasp of r e a l i t y . ^  ' To some extent Hegel praises 
Kant f o r attempting to free the d i a l e c t i c fCom t h i s seeming a r b i t -
rariness and integrate i t with precise thinking. But f o r Kant the 
d i a l e c t i c s t i l l remains a "logic of i l l u s i o n " (Logik des Scheins) 
which he defines as a: 
'^sophistical a r t o f giving ignorance, and indeed to 
intentional sophistries, the appearance of t r u t h , 
by the device o f i m i t a t i n g the methodical thorougji-
ness which l o g i c prescribes, and of using i t s 'topic' 
to conceal the emptiness of i t s pretentions,L ( 9 ) 
Nevertheless a substantial part of Kant's argument i s ^ven over to 
developing what he c a l l s "the transcendental d i a l e c t i c " which i s 
intended as:-
'^ a^ c r i t i q u e <£ understanding and reason i n r e j e c t 
of t h e i r hyperphysical employment. I t w i l l expose 
the false, i l l u s o r y character of those groundless 
pretentions, and ... substitute no more than what 
i s a c r i t i c a l treatment of the pure understanding, 
f o r the guarding of i t against sophistical i l l u s i o n ^ - (lO) 
Kant uses t h i s transcendental d i a l e c t i c to miveil the antinomies to 
( 7 ) Hegel, Logika op. c i t , , I , pp .37-8; Logic» op. c i t , , pp , 5 5 - 6 . 
(8) For an excellent accomt o f the relationship between the 
Hegelian d i a l e c t i c and that of the ancients see Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Hegels Dialektik. TCbingen, I 9 7 I , pp . 7 - 3 0 . 
( 9 ) linmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith, London, 1 9 5 0 , po99o 
( 1 0 ) I b i d . , pp . 1 0 0 - 0 1 . 
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which previous metaphysics has f a l l e n prey i n i t s discussions of dog-
matic psychology, cosmology and rat i o n a l theology. The result of t h i s 
devestation of metapl^rsics i s Kant's assertion that the cognitive fac-
u l t i e s cannot go beyond experience without generating fantasies and 
i l l u s i o n s , 
Vfliile i t might be argued that Hegel takes his point of departure 
from Kant's transcendental d i a l e c t i c , he does so only to resolve the 
antinomies of pure reason which Kant had l e f t open ended and thus pro-
vide a new basis f o r a genuine system of metaphysics. Hegel's d i a l -
e c t i c i s used to demonstrate that the s t a t i c concepts employed by the 
formalists (and he ce r t a i n l y includes Kant w i t h i n t h i s camp), contain 
v^ithin them certain contradictory aspects v/hich must be resolved i f a 
satisfactory understanding of the v/orld i s to be reached. These 
contradictions, Hegel says, are not surreptitiously imposed upon the 
concepts by the philosopher, but are i n some sense imminent within 
the concepts themselves. I n opposition to formalism and common sense 
thi n k i n g which claims that the law of i d e n t i t y and non-contradiction 
i s the fundamental pr i n c i p l e of l o g i c Hegel argues that: 
-^'everytliing i s inherently contradictory, and i n 
the sense that t h i s law i n contrast to the others 
expresses rather the t r u t h and the essential nature 
of things.^, ( 1 1 ) 
\Ihlle l o g i c hitherto has claimed ths-t the law of i d e n t i t y i s the 
essential determination of a thing, Hegel claims that the law of 
contradiction i s an even more important determination because: 
^as against contradiction, i d e n t i t y i s merely the 
determination of the simple immediate, of dead 
being; but contradiction is the root of a l l move-
ment and v i t a l i t y ; i t i s only insofar as something 
( l l ) Hegel, Logik, op, c i t . , I I , p.58; Logic, op, c i t . , p . 4 5 9 » 
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has a contradiction w i t h i n i t that itcmoves, 
has an urge and activity^';, ( 1 2 ) 
Generally the p o s s i b i l i t y of contradiction either i n thought or 
r e a l i t y i s dismissed as "a contingency, an abnormality and a 
passing paroxyan of sickness" but here too Hegel points out that 
" "'^'^something i s therefore a l i v e only insofar as 
i t contains contradictions w i t h i n i t and moreover 
i s t h i s power to hold and endure the contra-
dictions w i t h i n i t . ' ( 1 3 ) 
These passages could be m u l t i p l i e d i n abundance, but the point which 
Hegel i s t r y i n g t o make i s that the concepts normally employed i n 
explaining experience are not simple and one-dimensional, but complex 
and multi-faceted. Furthermore, i t i s not the purpose of speculative 
philosophy to avoid these contradictions, but to develop and resolve 
them w i t h the view to at t a i n i n g a comprehensive, all-embracing account 
of experience. 
Unlike the r i g i d antinomies established by f o m a l l o g i c , these 
d i a l e c t i c a l contradictions have a v;ay of resolving themselves i n a 
higjier u n i t y . For every concept with i t s mutually contradictory 
moments, there i s another which contains both these moments, albeit 
without contradiction, and which i s at the same time i m p l i c i t i n 
them. V/hat Hegel has discovered i s the t h i r d t e r n or the excluded 
middle which formalism had banished from the canons of l o g i c a l 
thinking. ^•'•^^ This t h i r d term i s able to reconcile both previously 
c o n f l i c t i n g aspects of a concept i n such a manner that they are no 
longer i n c o n f l i c t . Contradictions are not ossified and r i g i d l y 
( 1 2 ) I b i d . . I I , p.58; I b i d . , p.439. 
( 1 3 ) I b i d . . I I , p,59; I b i d . , p.440. 
( 1 4 ) I b i d . . I I , pp.56-57; I b i d . , pp.438-39. 
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juxtaposed t o one another, but are "sublated" a term which Hegel 
defines i n the following manners 
^To sublate (aufheben) has a two-fold meaning i n 
the language: on the one hand i t means to preserve, 
to maintain, and equally i t also means to cause to 
cease, to put an end to .... Thus what i s sublated 
i s at the same time preserved; i t has ozily l o s t i t s 
immediacy but i s not on that account annihilatedvr ( 1 5 ) 
Only through t h i s l o g i c a l process of opposition and the overcoming 
of opposition i s i t possible, Hegel claims, to arr i v e at a s a t i s -
factory tmderstanding of experience. Such an understanding cannot 
i s o l a t e and fragpient the various aspects of r e a l i t y , but must bring 
out the inter-relationships between them and thus show that r e a l i t y 
i s a l u i i f i e d t o t a l i t y . 
Hegel's d i a l e c t i c a l method i s not merely an external technique 
by which the philosopher i s somehow able to discover the true nature 
of r e a l i t y , but i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y bound up with his system of p h i l o -
sophical idealism. I n the Logic Hegel remarks that any true philosophy 
must be essentially a form o f idealism: 
'^Every philosophy-'.((he saysV)^-'is essentially an 
idealism or at least has idealism f o r i t s p r i n c i p l e , 
and the question then i s only how f a r t h i s principle 
i s acttzally carried out'i?; ( 1 6 ) 
Vlhat Hegel means by idealism i s simply the view that f i n i t e things or 
the basic facts of being have no rea l existences 
^The idealism of philosopl^r^i'Che observes.) -consists 
i n nothing else than i n recognizing that the f i n i t e 
has no veritable being'i?) ( 1 7 ) 
Idealism a t t r i b u t e s existence not to the f i n i t e world of matter, but to 
( 1 5 ) I b i d . . I , p.9 4 ; I b i d . . p o l 0 7 . 
( 1 6 ) I b i d . , I , p , 1 4 5 ; I b i d . , p p . 1 5 4 - 5 5 . 
( 1 7 ) I b i d . . I , p . 1 4 5 ; I b i d . , p . l 5 4 . 
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the i n f i n i t e world o f t h o u ^ t . Thought i s , f o r Hegel, the 
unconditioned absolute and i s f o r t h i s reason completely free. But 
as such i t does not stand opposed to the f i n i t e , material world as 
a cause to i t s effects. Rather the material world i s d i a l e c t i c a l i n 
that i t constantly strives t o surpass i t s f i n i t u d e and become un i f i e d 
with the i n f i n i t e s 
- ^ I t i s the very nature o f the f i n i t e to transcend 
i t s e l f , to negate i t s negation and to become i n f i n i t e . 
Thus the i n f i n i t e does not stand as something finished 
and complete above or superior to the f i n i t e , as i f the 
f i n i t e had an enduring being apart from or subordinate 
to the infinite-;?-. ( 1 8 ) 
Thus the v e i y soul of r e a l i t y i s d i a l e c t i c a l as i t i s forced to pass over 
i n t o the i n f i n i t e realm of thought: 
'^ -!Hius the f i n i t e has vanished i n t o the i n f i n i t e and 
what i s , i s only the i n f i n i t e , r ( 1 9 ) 
I n t h i s manner things which simply appear to be what they are shov: 
themselves over the course of time to be "inwardly self-contradictory" 
and become transfozmed i n t o something "other" than vdiat they are. I t 
i s t h i s view that things are both what they are i n themselves and what 
they are as grasped by t h o \ i ^ t , o r expressed symbolically A i s both A 
and not A, that i s at the root of Hegel's d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c . 
This conception of t h o u ^ t as the true r e a l i t y behind the eph-
emeral appearances o f things i s , Hegel says, a return to the ancient 
notion of metaphysics which afforded a much greater scope to t h o u ^ t 
than i s current amongst modem philosophers. For the modems - and 
here Hegel seems to be thinking o f the empiricist philosophies of 
Locke and Hume - t h o u ^ t i s simply the r e f l e c t i o n of an object which 
( 1 8 ) I b i d . , I , p.126; I b i d . , pol38. 
( 1 9 ) I b i d . , I , p,126; I b i d . , pol38. 
1 5 3 
exists independently of i t . Truth thus rests upon the passive 
ireception of sensations which are then organized by the brain and 
retained as f a i n t traces i n memory. For the ancients, hoi^ever, 
thin k i n g i s i n no sense a l i e n to the object, but i s as much a part 
of the object as any empirically observable feature. Prom t h i s 
vievr Hegel derives an absolutely unique ontological position vMch 
maintains that things are what they are to the extent that they 
have been grasped by thought. ^ ^^^ I n short things are, f o r Hegel, 
p r i m a r i l y objects of consciousness and they have existence only 
insofar as they have been f u l l y comprehended by the thinking mind. 
Hegel credits Anaxagoras as the f i r s t to discover t h i s principle 
that Mbus or thought governs the world thus laying the foundation 
( 2 1 ) 
f o r a purely l o g i c a l view of the universe.^ ' I t i s t h i s desire 
to b r i n g the entire world w i t h i n the dominion of pure thought which 
constitutes the h i ^ e s t aspiration of philosophical idealism. 
Only an accomplished system of philosophical idealian i s able 
to provide an a l l inclusive account of experience, one i n which nothing 
i s excluded and which leaves nothing outside i t s e l f . V/hat we are 
concerned with here, hov/ever, i s the s p e c i f i c a l l y social and p o l i t i c a l 
aspect of Hegel's philosophy o f experience. S t i l l Hegel's p o l i t i c a l 
philosophy as expressed i n the Philosophy of R i ^ t and the sections on 
"GeistesphiloSophie" i n the Encyclopedia i s merely a branch of spec-
u l a t i v e philosophy as a v;hole. These works deal with the realm of 
objective mind which w i t h i n the Hegelian system stands between the 
realm o f subjective mind and the realm o f mind absolute. The realm 
( 2 0 ) I b i d o . I , p p o 2 5 - 6 . I b i d . . p , 4 5 o 
( 2 1 ) I b i d . , I , p.3 1 ; I b i d . , p . 5 0 o 
1 5 4 
of subjective mind consists i n the various stages of consciousness 
through which both the individual and the entire human species pass 
i n i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l developnent from youth to matiirity. This entails 
an elucidation of the evolution of the human mind as i t emerges fx>m 
i t s natural state on i t s eventual path to absolute knowledge. The 
realm o f objective mind consists of man's pract i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the 
world and the manner i n which t h i s a c t i v i t y i s embodied i n certain 
social and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . These i n s t i t u t i o n s are broadly 
divided i n t o the spheres of ( l ) Abstract Right, ( 2 ) r b r a l i t y and 
( 3 ) E t h i c a l L i f e , t h i s l a t t e r being further sub-divided into the 
spheres of (a) Family, (b) C i v i l Society and (c) State. I t i s due to 
t h e i r being somehow products of human a c t i v i t y that Hegel refers to 
these i n s t i t u t i o n s as "objective". But the objective world i s s t i l l 
l i m i t e d and r e s t r i c t e d , i t i s the f i n i t e world o f things and as such 
has a tendency to transcend i t s own conditions of existence and pass 
i n t o i t s other, i n t h i s case the world of mind absolute as t y p i f i e d 
i n a r t , r e l i g i o n and philosophy. Only here i s true and perfect 
freedom possible where man can f i n d comfort and solace from the 
harshness and b r u t a l i t y of r e a l i t y . The condition of pure contemp-
( 2 2 ) 
l a t i o n i s f o r Hegel as f o r A r i s t o t l e , the h i ^ s t good f o r man.^ ' 
( 2 2 ) A r i s t o t l e , The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Sir David Ross, Oxford, 
1 9 7 2 , pp. 2 6 3 - 6 9 , i n which he l i n k s up the contemplative l i f e of 
reason with the divine; see f o r example, p. 2 6 9 : "Now he who 
exercises his reason and cultivates i t seems to be both i n the 
best state of mind and most dear to the gods. For i f the gods 
have any care f o r human a f f a i r s , as they are thought to have, 
i t would be reasonable both that they should de l i s t i n that 
which was best and most akin to them ( i . e . reason) and that they 
should reward those who love and honour t h i s most, as caring f o r 
the things that are dear to them and acting both r i ^ t l y and 
nobly. And that a l l these a t t r i b u t e s belong most of a l l to the 
philosopher i s manifest. He, therefore, i s the dearest to the 
gods". 
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S t i l l Hegel realizes that even though the f i n i t e , objective world 
i s transcended by the absolute mind, only the former can provide the 
environment suitable f o r the development of a r t , r e l i g i o n and 
philosophy. 
The point of a l l t h i s i s that Hegel's p o l i t i c s cannot, as one 
recent c r i t i c has argued, merely be abstracted from his general 
system of metaphysics. ^ ^^^ Rather i t must be shown how the p o l i t i c a l 
philosophy forms a central part o f the overall system or put another 
way, Hegel's p o l i t i c a l t h o u ^ t can only be adequately understood 
v/ithin the context of his metaphysics. This i s so, not because there 
i s a s t r i c t l y necessary connection between the various aspects of 
Hegel's system. I n fa c t i t has been claimed that alternate arrange-
ments are possible. Bather Hegel's p o l i t i c s must be understood withi n 
the nexus of his system as a whole because i t i s only i n terms of a 
t o t a l comprehension of human experience that the facts of alienation 
and estrangement can be overcome and man can become reconciled to the 
world i n which he l i v e s . This need to be reconciled with r e a l i t y i s 
eacpressed with great pathos i n the Preface to the Riilosophv of R i ^ : 
-To recognize reason as the rose i n the cross of the 
present i s the r a t i o n a l insight which reconciles us 
to the actual^-*', ( 2 4 ) 
Thus to extract Hegel's p o l i t i c a l t h o u ^ t from h i s metaphysics would be 
to lose s i ^ t of his ultimate purpose, that i s , to dispel discord and 
fragmentation and restore a sense of harmony and coherence i n the world. 
Let us now examine i n some d e t a i l precisely how Hegel carries out his 
purpose. 
( 2 3 ) Z.A. Pelczynski, Introductory Essay to Hegel's P o l i t i c a l Writings, 
trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford, ISfAi- p . 1 3 6 . 
(24) G,W,P. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M, Knox, Oxford, I97I9 
P0I2; henceforth cited as Hiilosophv of Rig^t. 
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I I 
The s t a r t i n g point of Hegel's science of r i ^ t i s the concept 
of the v 7 i l l . The w i l l i s simply man's power of practical reason. 
I t i s the principle o f praxis and as such i t represents man's 
a b i l i t y t o transform the world, making i t a manifestation of human 
a c t i v i t y . The basic feature o f the w i l l i s freedom. By t h i s Hegel 
means that the w i l l i s self-determining, that there i s nothing out-
side the w i l l \ ^ c h i n any way conditions or l i m i t s i t . This i s 
the point vMch Schelling had argued i n his early work On :the Ego • 
where he says that the q u a l i t y of being conditioned i s the fundamental 
a t t r i b u t e of a thing and i t follows from t h i s that an unconditioned 
(25) 
t h i n g would be a contradiction i n terms. ^  ' Schelling's point here 
i s that only the ego i s unconditioned and cannot be made into a thing. 
This i s precisely Hegel's point of departure as f o r him the w i l l i s not 
a t h i n g which i s determined by something outside i t , but i s a concep-
t u a l form which i s e n t i r e l y self-determining. This supposition o f the 
freedom of the w i l l should not be taken to contravene the e a r l i e r 
statement that t h o u ^ t alone i s free because,for Hegel,the w i l l i s a 
"special way of thinking". ^ ^^^ This d i s t i n c t i o n between t h o u ^ t and 
the w i l l i s the same as the d i s t i n c t i o n betv/een the theoretical and the 
p r a c t i c a l a t t i t u d e . While the theoretical a t t i t u d e involves contem-
p l a t i n g an object, the p r a c t i c a l a t t i t u d e involves acting upon i t . 
But human actions are not a matter of b l i n d impulse or i n s t i n c t . 
Human a c t i v i t y i s always purposive and ra t i o n a l because i t carries 
out a design previously conceived by the intelligence. I n t h i s 
( 2 5 ) P.W.J. Schelling, Werke. ed, Manfred Schrifter, 1 4 vols,, Munich, 
1 9 2 7 , I , Po90. 
( 2 6 ) Philosophy o f Right, OP. c i t . , paragraph 4 -
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manner^ thinking aiid v;illing, i M l e they remain two separate and 
distinct activities^ are nevertheless related to one anothero 
According to Hegel, the metaphysical freedom of the w i l l can 
best be explained by an analogy to the natural world. Ereedom i s 
just as fundamental a feature of the w i l l , he says, as v/ei^t i s 
of bodies* Just as matter i s inconceivable without weight, so i s 
(21) 
the w i l l inconceivable without freedom. ^  ' As an analogy, ho\irever, 
there must be a crucial difference and i t i s this. The Philosophy 
of Right proposes to follow the development of the w i l l , the tiltimate 
end of which i s imminent within i t s e l f . Indeed the whole thrust of 
the work i s to demonstrate that the w i l l cannot find i t s own end in 
nature, but must return into i t s e l f and develop i t s own fteedom. 
The develoiment of the w i l l i s , then, a teleological process and i s 
not subordinate to the mechanically organized, causal network of 
nature. Far from being mutually complementary, nature and freedom 
are antithetical to each other. Hence the work of the w i l l i s 
manifested i n a continuing separation from nature and the creation 
of a "second nature" in vdiich freedom i s actualized. 
After establishing the fcee w i l l as his point of departure, 
Hegel goes on to characterize the w i l l as a dialectical unity of two 
qualities. On the one hand, there i s : 
'^ the element of pure indeterminacy or that pure 
reflection of the ego into i t s e l f which involves 
the dissipation of every restriction and every 
content either iimnediately presented by nature, 
by needs, desires, and impulses, or given and 
determined by any means vfhatever. This i s the 
unrestricted infinity of absolute abstraction or 
tiniversality, the pure thou^t of oneselfvb (28) 
(27) Ibid., addition to paragcaph 4« 
(28) Ibido, paragraph 5-
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IThis pure indeterminacy of the wi l l i s very similar to what 
Schelling had i n mind vdien speaking of intellectual intuition which 
i s produced by the ego abstracting i t s e l f from a l l empirical 
conditions of existence and enclosing i t s e l f i n a state of heznetic 
isolation from the outside world. But this indeterminacy of the 
willp Hegel says, i s a purely negative freedom, a freedom of the 
void which! 
-Stakes shape in religion and politics alike as the 
fanaticism of destruction - the destruction of the 
whole subsisting social order ..o (for) only in 
destroying something does this negative will possess 
the feeling of i t s e l f as existent'cb (29) 
On the other hand, the w i l l contains the quality of deteiminacy i n that 
willing i s never willing as such, but i s always willing some particular 
thing. Here the w i l l freely adapts i t s e l f to the particular concrete 
situation i n which i t finds i t s e l f . What Hegel \rants i s to bring 
these t\;o aspects of the w i l l into harmony and this he believes i s only 
possible throu^ active participation i n political society which i s 
both the manifestation and fulfilment of the free w i l l . 
Freedom of the w i l l i s , however, merely potential freedom. The 
point i s that freedom must be actualized i n the world of objective 
reality. The f i r s t form in which this freedom i s translated into 
reality i s discussed by Hegel tuider the general category of Abstract 
Eight. Here the individual i s conceived as a possessor of r i ^ t s 
and duties. He has the r i ^ t to complete freedom of action, but he 
also has the duty to acknowledge that a l l other men similarly have 
the freedom. Hhis condition i s perhaps best expressed in his phrase: 
"Be a person and respect others as persons".^^^^ This notion of man 
(29) Ibid. 
(50) Ibid., paragraiph 36, 
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as possessed of certain rights and duties i s at the bottom of the 
li b e r a l theory of society as put forward by thinkers from Hobbes to 
Kant v i a Locke and Rousseau. Vflat i s novel in Hegel's treatment of 
natural law i s that he incorporates i t vdthin his system while at the 
same time transcending ito 
Hegel i s here concerned with providing a metaphysical explanation 
for the right to property. His argument i s essentially that the r i ^ t 
to property i s not simply an historical accident, but derives from the 
very nature of the w i l l . According to Hegel, i t i s the tendency of 
the w i l l to extend i t s e l f over the whole of nature making the latter 
a part of i t s e l f . I t i s only when nature has been appropriated in 
this maimer, that i s , when the w i l l has achieved complete domination 
over i t s "other", that freedom i s actualized. The upshot of this i s 
that freedom i s identified with ownership as i t i s the end of a l l 
things to become property of the w i l l ; 
A person has as his substantive end the right of 
putting his w i l l into any and every thing and thereby 
making i t his, because i t has no such end in i t s e l f 
and derives i t s destiny azid soul from his w i l l . This 
i s the absolute right of appropriation which man has 
over a l l 'things'. (51) 
And i n the following paragraph, Hegel further qualifies the nature of 
property: 
To have power over a thing ab extra constitutes 
possession. The particular aspect of the matter, 
the fact that I make something my own as a result 
of my natural need, impulse, and caprice, i s the 
particular interest satisfied by possession. But 
I as free w i l l am an object to myself in what I 
possess and thereby also for the f i r s t time am an 
actual w i l l , and this i s the aspect v;hich const-
itutes the categoiy of property, the true and 
right factor i n possession. (52) 
(31) Ibid., paragraph 44. 
(32) Ibid., paragraph 45. 
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\^en Hegel says that man has mastery over nature and thus the 
right to make a l l things his property, he i s clearly falling back 
upon a traditional argument f i r s t put forward i n Book I of Aristotle's 
Pblitics. Here Aristotle describes nature as a system of ends and 
purposes i n which the lower serves the h i ^ e r and the h i ^ e r rules 
the lower. As an example he says that i t i s the purpose of plants 
and animals to become the property of man who as a rational being i s 
alone capable of giving them a function. ^'^"^^ I t follows from this 
that i n a world idthout men, neither plants nor animals would have a 
purpose, but rather they acquire a telos only insofar as they provide 
for human subsistence. Aristotle goes on to argue, however, that 
there are also certain human beings of a lower order \itio are intended 
by nature to be ruled by others thus establishing a philosophical 
foundation for slavery. We shall see shortly how Hegel treats this 
aspect of Aristotle's doctrine. The point here i s that Hegel adopts 
Aristotle's argument to show that man has a legitimate right to 
appropriate nature as his property. His claim i s that things as they 
stand i n the material vrorld are finite and limited and i t i s their 
fate to be appropriated by the w i l l which i s infinite and unconditioned. 
In this manner he attempts to link up the principle of philosophical 
idealism which holds that things have existence only to the extent that 
they are grasped by thought - or in this case the will - with the r i ^ t 
to property.^^^^ 
Having deduced property from the nature of the w i l l , Hegel goes 
on to in s i s t that property must be private i n character. Hegel reasons 
(33) Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Ernest Barker, Oxford, 1957, pp.25-26. 
(34) Philosophy of R i ^ t , op. c i t . , addition to paragraph 44. 
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that since the w i l l i s always the w i l l of a singLe individual, i t 
follows that what i s appropriated by the w i l l must acquire the 
distinction of private property. He accomplishes this tortuous 
deduction as follows: 
In property my w i l l i s the w i l l of a person; but a 
person i s a unit and so property becomes the personality 
of this luiitary w i l l . Since property i s the means 
whereby I give my w i l l an embodiment, property must 
also have the character of being 'this' or 'mine'. 
This i s the important doctrine of the necessity of 
private property, (55) 
This insistence that property be held i n private represents 
something of a departure from Hegel's earlier statements on this 
subject. I t w i l l be recalled that in his essay on "Natiiral H i ^ t " , 
Hegel had criticized Kant's moral philosophy for attempting to apply a 
purely a priori standard of reason to determine whether or not the 
theft of a piece of property could be ethically justified. Kant's 
conclusion was that such an act coTild never be morally justifiable 
on the grounds that i f luiiversalized i t would become self-contradictory 
as i t would result i n the negation of a l l property. Hegel's argument 
against Kant \ra,s that the case for property can never be substantiated 
in terms of logical consistency as taken by i t s e l f private property or 
communal property i s perfectly self-consistent, a point which he force-
fully reiterated i n the Hienomenology: 
Property per se does not contradict i t s e l f . I t i s a 
specifically determinate isolated element, or merely 
self-identical. Absence of property, absence of 
ownership of things, or again, community of goods, 
contradicts i t s e l f just as l i t t l e . That something 
belongs to nobody at a l l , or to the f i r s t best man 
who puts himself in possession, or again, to a l l 
together, and to each according to his need or in 
equal portions - that i s a simple characteristic, a 
fomal thought, like i t s opposite, property. (56) 
(35) Ibid., addition to paragra)^ 46. 
(36) Hegel, Phgnomenologie, op. c i t . , p.507; Phenomenolofiy, op. c i t . , p.447 
162 
I t i s only i n the Philosophy of Right that Hegel definitely 
comes out i n favour of private ovmership of property. Here his argu-
ment i n favour of private property i s directed against the Hatonic 
republic, an argument which also derives from Aristotle. Aristotle 
had criticized Plato's theory of collective ownership of property for 
attempting to reduce the state to an absolutely undifferentiated unity 
with no scope for individual self-determination. While Aristotle agrees 
that a certain degree of vaity i s necessary both within the household 
and the community, total unity i s not, and i s indeed even destructive: 
-There i s a point-', (Aristotle saysr)'-at which a polls, 
by advancing i n unity, w i l l cease io be a polls: there 
i s another point, short of that, at which i t may s t i l l 
remain a polls, but w i l l none the less come near to 
losing i t s essence, and w i l l thus be a worse polls. I t 
i s as i f you were to turn harmony into mere unison, or 
to reduce a theme to a single beat.b (37) 
This i s precisely Hegel's point when he says that the communization of 
property i n Plato's republic can only do great violence to the will for 
i t i s i n some sense the nature of the w i l l that i t possess property. ' 
Hegel explicitly rejects the attempt to apply the philosophical notion 
of equality to the inequalities i n the distribution of property. The 
most he i s ready to concede on this point i s that every will i s in 
principle capable of coming property, but that the magnitude of this 
property i s a completely contingent matter.^^^^ For Hegel, the 
emergence of property goes hand in hand with the autonomous develop-
ment of the w i l l . 
Even while property has i t s origin in the w i l l , the mere act of 
willing i s not in i t s e l f sufficient to establish aamething as property. 
(37) Aristotle, The Politics, OP. c i t . . p.62. 
(38) Hiilosophy of R i ^ t , op. cit«, paragraph 46. 
(39) Ibid., paragraph 49-
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In a characteristically ambiguous passage, Hegel says that a thing 
only becomes property i n the course of the will's relation to i t . ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Vfliat I take this to mean i s that property i s not an inherent attribute 
of a thing prior to i t s being appropriated by the w i l l . Bather a 
thing becomes property only when i t enters same sort of practical 
relationship with the w i l l . Only when objects enter into this 
practical relationship with the \d.ll, do they cease to be "dead 
things" and become property, an essential medium of human development. 
Hegel designates three possible foms of this relationship. F i r s t , 
there i s the direct physical possession of a thing.^^^^ Second, a 
new foxm may be imposed upon the thing through laboxir.^^^^ And third, 
there i s the use of the thing, ^ ^^ ^ Of these, the second, the dialectics 
of labour, i s the most permanent means of establishing something as 
property. Both the f i r s t and the third instances^ the physical 
possession of a thing and the use of the thing, are fleeting and 
transitory for as soon as the thing ceases to be grasped physically 
or utilized directly, i t simultaneously ceases to be property. Only 
through labour i s the w i l l indelibly imprinted upon the thing so that 
i t becomes i t s permanent property. In;this manner the relationship 
between the w i l l and the thing i s no longer purely external, but i s 
inscribed upon the thing i t s e l f , Following his earlier writings, 
Hegel shows that labour i s not the negation or destruction of the 
object, but i t s positive transformation - what he had once called 
"purposive desttuetion" - into another object. Labour i s , for Hegel, 
a middle term which overcomes the sense of estrangement between man, 
(40) Ibid., paragraph 55. 
(41) Ibid., paragraph 55. 
(42) Ibid,, para^^b 56. 
(45) Ibid.. para^§i^ 59. 
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the subject, and the objective world as i t gives this world a 
specifically human d.gaificance which i t did not have prior to the 
mise en marche of the labour process. While the mode of labour 
obviously varies endlessly with the character of the object being 
worked upon, i t always remains a purposive and not an instinctual 
activity through which property i s realized i n the world of 
existential reality. This whole problem of labour and the economic 
domain w i l l be taken up again later on. 
Only i f a person has impressed his w i l l upon an object in one of 
the three v/ays mentioned above can he be said to be i n a position to 
alienate i t s ownership to someone else. Hegel i s careful to point 
out, however, that this only extends to things which are "external by 
natTire" and not to inherent attributes of the will such as freedom or 
personality. ^''^ ^ Since freedom i s not external to the w i l l , but i s 
i t s very substance, i t cannot become the property of another. For 
this reason he rejects slavery as the most extreme fom of the 
alienation of freedom. Hegel's remarks here are primarily intended 
as an elaboration of the famous dialectic of master and slave in the 
Phenomenology. Since the significance of this has already been 
masterfully analysed by Alexandre Kbj eve among others ^^^ ^ we need not 
go into any great detail here. What i s important though i s the way 
(44) Ibid., paragraph 66. 
(45) Alexandpe Kbjeve, Introduction a l a lecture de Hegel: lecons sur l a 
ph^omenologie de 1'esprit, ed. Raymond Queneau, Paris, 1947? cf. 
also Jean Hyppolite, Genfese et structure de l a phenomenologie de 
1'esprit de Hegel, 2 vols., Paris, 1946, I , pp.l66-71 and John 
Plamenatz, Man and Society, 2 vols., London, 1963» II» PP»154-56; 
for an interesting critique of the Kojeve/^polite/ELamenatz line 
of interpretation see G.A. Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's 'Lordship and 
Bondage'" i n Hegel, ed. Alasdair Maclntyre, New York, 1972, pp. 189-217. 
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in which Hegel's remarks serve as repudiation of Aristotle's just-
ification of slavery. 
As has already been said, Aristotle viewed the world as a vast 
hierarchy of ends and purposes in which the higher and truer forms 
of being gradually emerge from the lower and less true. Starting 
from this premise the relationship between master and slave ms seen 
as a perfectly natural one since there are men of an inferior order 
who are incapable of ruling themselves and must therefore be set to 
vrork i n the service of others \iho are capable of ruling. On Aris-
totle's account, the great benefit to be derived ftom slavery i s that 
i t frees the master from a l i f e of t o i l and drudgery to engage in the 
l i f e of the mind, the pursuit of wisdom. Indeed i n the Metaphysics 
he remarks that only with the creation of a leisure class were men able 
to direct their attention to the theoretical arts.^^^^ While Hegel 
accepts Aristotle's account of slavery as a necessary stage in the 
development of mind, the msiin thrust of his argument i s directed 
against the Aristotelian standpoint. He wants to show that when 
scrutinized philosophically the master^slave relationship shows i t s e l f 
to be both morally and intellectually unsatisfactory. On the master's 
side this proves to be -unsatisfactory because by cutting himself off 
from a l l activity and practical experience, he condemns himself to a 
l i f e of sterile passivity and enjo^ent. Pgr from attaining a sense 
of contemplative autonomy, the master becomes aware of his dependence 
upon the slave to satisfy his material needs. The slave's position i s 
more obviously unsatisfactory as his entire existence i s reduced to 
(46) Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed, and trans, John Warrington, London, 
1970, p.55: "These theoretical a r t ^ moreover, were evolved in 
places v;here men had plenty of free time: mathematics, for 
example, originated in Egypt, where a priestly caste enjoyed 
the necessary leisure". 
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that of a thing, a mere instrument which the master interposes 
between himself and nature. The slave, however, becomes disciplined 
throu^ v;ork and develops a character and personality of his own. 
As Hegel puts i t : 
*^ The consciousness that t o i l s and serves accordingly 
attains by this means the direct apprehend on of 
that independent being as i t s selfvc (47) 
Qlirou^ labour the slave gains a technical expertise over nature which 
i s denied the master. And i n transforming nature, the slave also 
transforms himself. No longer does he view himself as abject and 
servile, but as an active creative being who exerts conscious control 
over his environment. The only thing which keeps the slave in check 
i s fear, but at a certain point he overcomes his fear and demands 
parity with the master. I t i s with this demand for equal legal 
status that the whole basis of mastery and slavery i s \mdeimined. 
The purpose of this brief excursus on sLaveiy i s to demonstrate 
that for Hegel one man cannot legitimately become the property of 
another. Property rights extend only to things which do not have a 
w i l l of their own, and not to other men. For this reason, Hegel says, 
slavery i s eo ipso to be condemned and a slave therefore has "an 
absolute right to free himself". ^ ^^^ S t i l l Hegel does not put a l l 
the blame for slavery at the door of the master. Since i t i s a 
mutually determining relationship, the dave i s himself to some degree 
responsible for his own condition. As Hegel puts i t in the Philosophy 
of Right: 
-Yet i f a man i s a slave, his own w i l l i s responsible 
for his slavery, just as i t i s i t s id.ll which i s 
responsible i f a people i s subjugated. Hence the 
(47) Hegel, Phanomenologie, op. c i t . , p.l49; Phenomenology, op. cit«, 
p.238. 
(48) Philosophy of Rifjit, op. c i t . , addition to para^ph 66. 
167 
wrong of slavery l i e s at the door not simply 
of enslavers or conquerors but of the slaves 
and the conquered themselves"'. (49) 
Having deduced private property from the free w i l l , Ifegel goes 
on to elaborate the condition under which one individual may legally 
transfer his property to another. This, he conclude^ i s made possible 
by means of contract vTalch regulates the relations between property 
owners. A contract assumes that the persons entering into i t 
recognize each other as independent owners of something from which a l l 
others axe excluded: 
This contractual relationship, therefore, i s the 
means whereby one identical w i l l can persist within 
the absolute difference between indepeMent property 
owners. I t implies that each, in accordance id-th 
the common w i l l of both, ceases to be an owner and 
yet i s and remains one. I t i s the mediation of the 
w i l l to give up a property, a single property, and 
the w i l l to take up another, i.e. another belonging 
to someone else; and this mediation takes place when 
the two wil l s are associated in an identity in the 
sense that one of them comes to i t s decision only in the 
presence cf the other, (50) 
Hegel makes i t clear that contractual relations only extend to the 
transfer or alienation of property and must .therefore ,be kept apart 
from political theory proper, Hegel i s here principally opposed to 
those natural law theorists, and he singles out Kant in particular, 
who extend the concept of contract to account for the origin of states. ^ "^^ ^ 
Contracts, Hegel rightly observes, are matters of pure convenience 
arising quite arbitrarily from the wil l s of the parties involved. To 
say that the state has such contingent foundations i s to completely 
misconstrue i t , A person cannot separate himself from the state as he 
(49) Ibid,, addition to paragraph 57-
(50) Ibido, paragraph 74. 
(51) Ibid,, paragraph 75» 
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can from a contract. Rather he i s bom into a state and i f he wishes 
to leave i t , he requires the permission of the state. To maintain 
that the state i s at the option of i t s individual members i s to 
confuse property relations with political relations. Indeed Hegel 
remarks that the great advance of the modem state i s that i t i s above 
a l l private arrangements and i s no longer open to individuals to make 
(52) 
stipulations in connection with i t . ^ ^ 
Since contractual relations are always to some degree arbitrary, 
Hegel deduces the posdbility that one of the parties may decide to 
violate the terms of the agreement. Hence he concludes his treatment 
of Abstract Right with a discussion of wrong and punishment. Here 
again he traces this back to the w i l l . Since, i t has already been 
shovm, the w i l l i s always the vdll of a particular individual, i t 
necessarily affirms the individual's private interest. By i t s very 
nature, i t cannot w i l l the universal or general good. As a result, 
the individual i s bound to come into conflict with the community of 
other wil l s and thus vn?ong i s generated. There are, however, various 
degrees of wrong. The f i r s t i s non-malicious or unintentional wrong 
which consists in an honest disagreement over property r i ^ t s . But 
such a dispute only involves the right to a given property and does 
not endanger r i ^ t per se.^^^ Second i s fraud which involves making 
a false pretense of accepting property rights while in fact rejecting 
them.^^^^ Third i s crime which consists in an explicit violation of 
property rights. ^^^^ Since crime i s the denial or negation of r i ^ t , 
(52) Ibid., addition to paragraph 75. 
(53) Ibid., paragraph 84. 
(54) Ibid., paragraph 87. 
(55) Ibid., paragraph 90. 
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i t consequently demands punishment. Here Hegel s k i l l f u l l y brings 
his dialectical analysis into play since punishment i s conceived 
as the negation of the negation. Through punishment crime i s 
transcended. I t becomes something other than i t i s by restoring 
the proper appreciation of property r i ^ t s to the criminal, 
Hegel's vievs on punishment are developed largely i n opposition 
to Beccaxia, Beccaria was an XTIIIth century Italian j u r i s t who, 
like Bentham, was primarily concerned with reforming existing legal 
codes. Following Helvetius and the philosophy of utilitarianism, 
Beccaria suggested in his widely read Crimes and Punishments^^^^ that 
the main question to be considered in this matter i s the public 
advantage. The point i s not so much to make punishment unpleasant or 
painful, but to make i t "useful" by discouraging anti-social behaviour 
and promoting socially desirable conduct. The relationship between a 
crime and i t s punishment, Beccaria argue^ shotAld be established with 
"geometrical precision" the purpose being to obtain the most beneficial 
results for the least cruel effects, Hegel says, howver, that the 
ut i l i t a r i a n notion of punishment i s based upon an utterly immoral 
attitude toward the criminal as i t views punishment as a threat which 
inevitably follo\*s a criminal action. Such a notion of punishment, 
Hegel maintains, denies the basic digiity of man as "to base a just-
ification of pimishment on threat i s to liken i t to the act of a man 
who l i f t s his stick to a dog".^^^^ Rather than treating him as a 
madman or a child, Hegel assumes that the criminal i s a resfponsible 
(56) Cesare Bonesana Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments trans. K. Foster 
and J . Grigson, introduction by A,P, d'Entreves, London, I964. 
(57) Philosophy of Rigjit. op. cit», addition to paragraph 99« 
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individual, and that his actions must be looked upon in this l i ^ t . 
In his very action the criminal consents to punishment and by being 
punished he i s "honoured as a rational being". ^^^ -^  In this manner 
punishment i s the criminal's right, a r i ^ t which i s denied him i f 
i t i s justified on the ground's of deterrence or reform. S t i l l Hegel 
recognizes that Beccaria's arguments against capital punishment for 
the reason that men cannot be t a u ^ t to detest homicide i f magistrates 
themselves are forced to engage i n i t , has not been without certain 
positive consequences. Capital punishment, Hegel observes, has become 
(59) 
rarer as shoiild be the case with extreme penalties. ' 
In the sphere of Abstract R i ^ t , punidiment can only take the fom 
of revenge, because there are as yet no legal channels for dealing with 
the violation of right. Revenge, Hegel i s quick to point out, i s a 
totally inadequate means of dealing with this since i t i s an arbitrary 
act of the w i l l vMoh in requiting the injury inflicted upon i t may go 
too far the other direction and involve i t s e l f in a new transgression 
of righto The i n i t i a l wrongdoer \rould then feel himself violated, 
demand satisfaction and this contradictory state of affairs would 
descend from one generation to another ad infinitim: 
The demand that this contradiction, which i s present 
here in the manner in which wrong i s annulled, be 
resolved like contradictions i n the case of other 
types of vrrong, i s the demand for a justice freed'from 
-jsubjective interest and a subjective form and no 
longer contingent on might, i.e. i t i s the demand for 
justice not as revenge but as punishment. (60) 
Revenge i s the demand of the injured party who i s motivated not from the 
love of right, but by feelings and emotions resulting from his injury. 
(58) Ibid., paragraph 100. 
(59) Ibid., addition to paragraph 100. 
(60) Ibid., paragraph 103. 
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Punishment can only be properly administered by a detached, dis-
interested party, a legally constituted public authority who has 
no personal stake i n the case at hand. Hence Abstract Right i s 
forced to transcend i t s e l f in order to establish positive 
institutions for the preservation of r i ^ t , 
I I I 
In the sphere of Abstract R i ^ t Hegel's point of departure i s 
the liberal natural law construction of society which treats man as 
a legal person endov/ed with certain innate r i ^ t s and duties. In the 
second section of the PSiJdsopSn^" og Righi' he treats man as a moral 
subject endowed with a conscience. Hegel accomplishes this transition 
from legality to morality by showing that v/hen the w i l l collides with 
the objective order of r i ^ t , i t i s forced to turn inward and produce 
a set of moral imperatives which can govern i t s relation with other 
w i l l s . While previously the vill had sou^t freedom in the external 
vrorld of property, i t now realizes that freedom resides in i t s ovm 
subjectivity. The standpoint of morality i s the explicit self-
determination of the w i l l which i s internally free regardless of 
what i t s external circumstances may be,^^^^ Here for the f i r s t time 
the w i l l becomes conscious of i t s freedom v/hich i s expressed in the 
word " I " , This view of morality obviously derives from the practical 
philosophy of subjective idealism which Hegel had criticized in his 
early essay on natural r i ^ t . Now i n the PRiTosophv-o'f RiaKtl'. hwever, 
he interprets this moral idealism as an advance in the developaent of 
human consciousness. S t i l l there remains a decisive difference between 
(61) Ibid., addition to paragraph 106, 
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Hegel's position and that of Kant and Fichte, For the latter, 
morality and legality are qualitatively distinct from one another 
on the grounds that legal acts always contain a residue of external 
compulsion while moral choices are essentially self-coercive. Hegel, 
however, rejects this distinction between legality and morality asj.a 
primary form of biftircation and fragnentation. For Hegel, the legal 
person and the moral subject - or to use Kant's terminology "homo 
phenomenon" and "homo noumenon" - are complementary one to the other. 
They represent tvo different sides of a ful l y integrated, harmonious 
personality. Thus by treating l e n i t y and morality in this manner 
Hegel hopes to restore the classical humanistic idea of vfholeness. 
Hegel characterizes the moral subject by his ability to act in the 
world and accept responsibility for his actions. To act, however, i s 
to open oneself to any number of unforeseen contingencies. But the 
moral subject i s responsible only for: 
-those presuppositions of the d6ed of v/hich i t was 
conscious i n i t s aim and those aspects of the deed 
which were contained i n i t s purposevQ (62) 
Hence responsibility only extends as far as the intentions of the agent. 
To judge an act solely on the basis of subjective intention i s , according 
to Hegel, a peculiarly modem phenomenon. The ancient Greeks, for example, 
held a man responsible for the entire compass of his deed. This i s why 
Oedipus who killed his father and married his mother put out his eyes 
in shame after discovering his true relation to then. He believed him-
self guilty of parricide and incest and was ready to suffer for the 
f u l l extent of his crime. ^ ^^^ The ancient^ unlike the modems, drew 
(62) Ibid., paragraph 117. 
(63) Ibido, paragraph 118. 
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no distinction "between the objective consequences of an action and 
the subjective intention "behind i t . As we shall see i n more detail 
later, i t i s this emphasis upon su"bjective l i b e r t y as the essence of 
morality which represents for Hegel the great difference between 
ancient and modem times« 
The morally responsible individual must always t r y to act i n 
accordance with the goodo The good i s "fteedom realized, the absolute 
end and aim of the world"o^^^^ The good i s not that which satisfies ' 
one man's whim or desire, "but that which aims at the welfare of a l l men. 
The true good must be that which i s good for a l l . The individual i s 
able to determine whether or not his actions conform to the good 
because he i s possessed of a conscience. Hegel defines conscience i n 
the following terms: 
Conscience i s the expression of the absolute t i t l e of 
subjective self-consciousness to know i n i t s e l f and from 
within i t s e l f vAiat i s right and obligatory, to give 
recognition only to v/hat i t thus knows as good, and at 
the same time to maintadn that whatever i n this way i t 
knows and w i l l s i s i n truth right and obligatory. Con-
science as this unity of subjective knowing with vdiat 
i s absolute i s a sanctuary vMch i t vrould be sacrilege 
to violate. But whether the conscience of a specific 
individual corresponds with this idea of conscience, or 
whether \iiat i t takes or declares to be good is actually 
so, i s ascertainable only from the content of the good 
i t seeks to realize. (65) 
The fact that man has a conscience i s not a guarantee of his goodness. 
Bather i t i s only a guarantee of his capacity for good and likev/ise 
his capacity for e v i l . Both good and evil have their origin i n the 
self-determination of the w i l l and the w i l l i s only good to the extent 
that i t gives expression to vh&t i s universal and impartial and avoids 
(64) Ibid., paragraph I29. 
(65) Ibid., paragraph 137« 
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mere gratification as the principle of action. 
I t i s at this point, hov/ever, that the moral view of the world 
runs into a dilemma. Against Kant and Pichte who argue that the 
individual conscience i s able to generate a set of universally valid 
moral imperatives, HegeL says that the claims of conscience may 
conflict with one another. Any man may, for instance, claim that 
his actions are good and conscientiously uphold them as such, but i t 
i s s t i l l possible for conscience to deceive i t s e l f and perpetrate 
any misdeed despite the purity of i t s intentions. Conscience i s , 
then, not an i n f a l l i b l e guide i n deteimining matters of good and 
e v i l . 3b base morality on the conflicting claims of conscience i s 
to deny any absolute moral standard. I t i s to f a l l into moral 
relativism which i s indeed not morality at a l l . Hegel describes 
this pattern thus! 
But i f a good heart, a good intention, a subjective 
conviction are set forth as the sources from which 
conduct derives i t s worth, then there i s no longer 
any hypocrisy or immorality at a l l j for whatever a 
man does, he can always j u s t i f y by the reflection 
on i t of good intentions and motive^ . and by the 
influence of that conviction i t i s good. !I!hus there 
i s no longer anything absolutely vicious or criminal; 
and instead of the above-mentioned frank and free, 
hardened and unperturbed sinner, we have the man who 
i s conscious of being f u l l y j u s t i f i e d by intention 
and conviction. % good intention i n my action and 
my conviction of i t s goodness makes i t good. We 
speak of judging and estimating an action; but on 
this principle i t i s only the intention and conviction 
of the agent, his f a i t h , by which he ought to be 
judged. (66) 
Hegel's general point i s that this subjective morality is merely 
concerned with the form or principle by which an action i s carried out 
and not with the actual content or result of that action. Consequently 
(66) Ibid., paragraph 140. 
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i t i s incapable of producing an objective code of behaviour governed 
by t r u l y universal c r i t e r i a . Prom the standpoint of purely subjective 
morality, this sort of moral code remains something which ought-to-be, 
but never i s . 
For Hegel, the insights generated by the conscience have only a 
"relative" v a l i d i t y . While they are generally adequate to govern 
man's relations with other individuals, they are inadequate to govern 
his relations with the community as a whole. Fortunately, however, 
the individual i s not usually l e f t on his own to produce moral 
imperatives ex nihilo. Rather these standards are significantly 
determined for him by the social milieu i n which he is situated. 
This social milieu or Sitt l i c h k e i t i s the ethical l i f e of a people by 
which Hegel means the laws and institutions which inform a people's 
sense of collective identity. Here i s how Hegel characterizes the 
nature of ethical l i f e i n relation to private morality: 
The objective ethical order, which comes on the scene 
i n place of good i n the abstract, is substance made 
concrete by subjectivity as i n f i n i t e form. Hence i t 
posits within i t s e l f distinctions whose specific 
character i s thereby determined by the concept, and 
which endow the ethical order with a stable content 
independently necessary and subsistent i n exaltation 
above siibjective opinion and caprice. These distinc-
tions are absolutely valid laws and institutions. (67) 
I t i s only as a participant i n the ethical l i f e of the community that 
man's moral faculties are able to develop. Even \irhile the determin-
ations of the ethical universe - family, c i v i l society and state -
may not be freely chos^ by the individual, he has no right a r b i t r a r i l y 
to set the subjective claims of his conscience up against them. Hegel's 
argument i s that these institutions are not alien to man, a sotirce of 
(67) Ibid., paragraph 144. 
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alienation and estrangement, but are a further aspect of man's self-
determination t h r o u ^ which he can become reconciled to the world. 
'She fact that Hegel views morality as part of a wider, more 
comprehensive f i e l d of social ethics t e s t i f i e s to the classical 
inspiration of his p o l i t i c a l thou^t. I t has already been noted that 
for Hegel, as for Aristotle, politics and ethics are inseparable from 
one another. Eor both these thinkers, man i s capable of ethical 
behaviour only by virtue of his membership within the community. This 
way of thinking i s quite different from the modem tradition a l a 
Hobbes and Kant i n which the ethical conduct of the individual who i s 
free only im/ardly i s s t r i c t l y delineated from the legality of his 
external actions. Following Hato, Hegel argues that the good consists 
i n conformity to the duties of one's station i n l i f e . This i s not duty 
i n the sense of obedience to the vacuous "ought" of the categorical 
imperative of Kant and Pichte, but duty here consists of following 
(68) 
certain v;ell^stablished, conventional patterns of behaviour. ^  ' In 
this respect duty elevates the individual above his arbitrary, natural 
impulses and makes him conscious of the social whole of which he i s a 
part. In such a society where each individual knows his position and 
the pattern of conduct appropriate to i t , there does peace and hannony 
prevail. 
I t i s interesting to observe that Hegel interprets this transition 
frm subjective morality to social ethics both i n terms of the l i f e of 
the individual and the l i f e of the species as a whole. I t w i l l be 
recalled that during his early years i n Frankfurt Hegel underwent a 
severe emotional and intellectual crisis which he referred to as a 
(68) Ibid., paragcaph 150. 
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state of hypochondria. Mow i n the ;Ency1;loip^d^^ he uses the same 
terms to describe the experience i n which man passes from adolescence 
to adulthood. The ideals of youth, he says, have a subjective quality 
which correspond! r o u ^ y to the purely moral view of the world already 
outlined: 
In youth the ideal has a more or less subjective 
quality, whether i t lives i n him as an ideal of 
love and friendship or as an ideal of a universal 
state of the vrorld ... The subjectivity of the 
substantive content of such an ideal implies not 
only an opposition to the vrorld as i t i s , but also 
an urge to do away with this opposition by realizing 
the ideal. (69) 
I t i s only later that the youth attempts to accommodate himself to the 
world of which previously he had disapproved. This accommodation is 
not an easy one, however, but i s a long and painful process of readjust-
ment: 
There i s no easy escape ... from this hypochondria. 
The later one i s infected by i t , the more serious 
i t s spiptoms are ... In this morbid mood, a man is 
reluctant to surrender his aibjectivity, he i s 
unable to overcome his antipathy for reality and so 
finds himself i n a state of relative impotence which 
can easily turn into true impotence. Therefore, i f 
a man wishes to survive, he must acknowledge that 
the world i s independent and essentially complete. (70) 
This process by v/hich man learns to renounce his youthful moral ideals 
i n favour of the more rational norms and values l a i d down by the 
community, shoiiM not be taken to mean that Hegel i s advocating 
\mqualified capitulation to reality. On the contrary, i t i s the mark 
of the morally educated individual that he does not blindly accept 
the ethical standards of the community as a child accepts the commands 
(71) 
of i t s parents.^ ' Bather man i s an educated moral being to the 
(69) G.V.F. Hegel, Sgntliche Werke. ed. H, Glockner, 20 vols., Stuttgart, 
1927-30, X, addition to paragraph 396. 
(70) Ibid. 
(71) Philosophy, of Bight, op. c i t . , addition to paragraph 10?. 
178 
extent that he c r i t i c a l l y reflects upon these standards and only 
then decides to adopt them for his own. He internalizes the moral 
principles upheld by society making than a part of his own conscious-
ness. Man can only feel at home i n the v;orld when he comes to view 
these noims and values not as something imposed upon him ftom without, 
a form of coercion, but as a manifestation of his own \dlle 
17 
The f i r s t and most fundamental determination of ethical l i f e i s 
the family. Because they are connected with and oriented towards other 
human beings, family relationships cannot be based upon some private, 
individual morality. Rather, they provide a suitable ftamevrork vrithin 
which man's moral faculties may develop. In the family, Hegel says; 
-^'bne's frame of mind i s to have self-consciousness of 
one's individuality v/ithin this unity as the absolute 
essence of oneself, with the result that one is i n i t 
not as an independent person but as a member.'- (72) 
For t h i s reason Hegel refers to the family as an ethical institution for 
within i t the individual renounces his egoism and for the f i r s t time 
becomes conscious of his membership i n a unity which transcends him. 
The bond v;hich holds the family together i s love: 
•'Love means i n general terms the consciousness of my 
unity with another, so that I am not i n selfish 
isolation but win my self-consciousness only as the 
renunciation of my independence and t h r o u ^ knowing 
myself as the unity of myself with another and of 
the other with me»-o (75 ) 
This rather mystical characterization of love as the process whereby 
the individual gains consciousness of himself t h r o u ^ consciousness of 
(72) Ibid., paragraph 158. 
(75) Ibid., addition to paragraph 158. 
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another obviously invites comparison with his Frankfurt TOitings. 
In Frankfurt Hegel had spoken of love as one with religion, a means 
of overcoming the dead objectivity of the mrld. and uniting man with 
God. Now, however, he insists that love i s not merely a subjective 
sentiment, but must acquire an objective institutional side as well. 
The objective side of love takes shape i n the form of the family 
capital which i s the common property of the household and whicsh can 
be handed dovm from one generation to the next. Most important of 
a l l , the parents see their love objectified i n the procreation of 
children: 
- I t i s only i n the childrenVo (Hegel says), --that the 
unity i t s e l f exists externally, objectively, and 
expli c i t l y as a unity, because the parents love the 
children as their love, as the embodiment of their 
own substance"b (74) 
Thus as against Schlegel's romantic idealization of love, Hegel 
demonstrates i n a far more rea l i s t i c manner how i t comes to be 
institutionalized within society, ^^ ^^  
One point upon which Hegel insists i s that marriage and the family 
i s not a contz^ctual relationship. Marriage, Hegel says, i s an ethical 
bond ajid cannot, therefore, be understood by the concept of contract 
which belongs to the sphere of Abstract Right. I t w i l l be recalled 
that for Hegel a contract i s a purely fortiiitous agreement reached by 
two parties to f a c i l i t a t e the transfer of a piece of property. V/hile 
marriage may seem to entail such a contract, i t s end i s the i d e n t i f i -
cation of personalities which i n fact goes beyond contract: 
-Thougji marriaeeT:.(Hegel remarks.)'begins i n contract, 
i t i s precisely a contract to transcend the standpoint 
of contract, the standpoint from which persons are 
(74) Ibid., paragraph 175. 
(75) Ibid., addition to paragraph 164« 
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regarded i n their individuality as self-
subsist^nt units?- (76) 
For this reason Hegel criticizes Kant's "crude" and "shameful" error 
of classifying marriage as a c i v i l contract as this mistakenly 
transfers the characteristics of private property into the h i ^ e r 
reaches of ethical l i f e , ^ ^ ^ ^ 
While the family i s the foundation of the community, i t i s by 
i t s very nature a transitory body. With the appearance of children, 
the dissolution of the family begins. Once the children are educated 
and come of age, they become persons i n the eyes of the law capable 
of owning property and starting families of their own. The parental 
family f a l l s into the background and with the death of the mother and 
father and the division of the family capital, i t disintegrates 
entirely. The single family becomes dissolved into: 
•a p l u r a l i t y of families, each of which conducts 
i t s e l f as i n ptinciple a self-subsistent concrete 
person and therefore as externally related to i t s 
iieighbours''>5 (78) 
When this occurs the stage of c i v i l society has been reached. 
Hegel defines c i v i l society as: 
>--an asao ciation of self-subsistent individuals i n 
a universality which, because of their self-
subsistence, i s only abstract. Their association 
i s brought about by their needs, by the legal 
system - the means to security of person and 
property - and by an external organization for 
(76) Ibid., paragraph I63. 
(77) Ibid., addition to paragraph I6I . 
(78) Ibid., paragraph 181. 
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attaining their particular and common interests.} (79) 
Civ i l society i s , for Hegel, the unique achievement of the modem world* 
"Unlike the classical c i t y state, here each individual i s an absolute 
end i n himself to whom a l l others are nothing or at most a means to 
satisfy an end. V/hat i s distinct to modem c i v i l society i s that for 
the f i r s t time man's self-seeking egoism i s completely liberated firom 
any p o l i t i c a l or moral considerations which previously had restricted 
the ftee development of private interests. I t might appear that the 
predominance of this unfettered egoism represents the destruction of 
the ethical dimension i n l i f e and this would indeed be the case i f there 
were not a hidden tendency working within c i v i l society \<hich brings the 
individual good into harmony with the universal good. In the course of 
pursuing their selfish ends there i s created: 
-a system of complete interdependence, wherein the 
livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man 
is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and 
rights of air^b (80) 
In this manner a degree of rationality and harmony i s developed within 
the competitive commercial relations of c i v i l society. 
I t should be said that v;hat i s here called c i v i l society i s i n 
fact the English translation of bttrgerliche Gesellschaft which i n 
German has the twofold meaning of c i v i l society and bourgeois society. 
Thus bttrgerliche Gesellschaft is the home of the Bgrger or bourgeois 
who, unlike the classical citizen, is not concerned with public, p o l i t i c a l 
matters, but only with his ovjn private economic affairs. I t i s the 
regime of laisser-faire economic individualism which Hegel saw not i n 
his own Germany, but i n the ifritings of the classical p o l i t i c a l 
(79) Ibid., paragraph 157* 
(80) Ibid., paragraph 185. 
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economists particularly Smith, Steuart and Ferguson whose Essay on 
the History of Ci v i l Society he had re-read during his years i n 
(81) 
Berlin.^ ' In a key passage Hegel discusses the type of eaqplanation 
p o l i t i c a l economy attempts to provide of c i v i l society: 
I b l i t i c a l economy i s the science which starts from 
the view of needs and labour but then has the task 
of explaining mass-relationships and mass-movements 
i n their complexity and their qualitative and 
quantitative character. This i s one of the sciences 
which has arisen out of the conditions of the modem 
world. I t s developnent affords the interesting 
spectacle (as i n Staith, Say and Ricardo) of thought 
working upon the mass of details v^hich confront i t 
at the outset and extracting therefrom the simple 
principles of the thing, the understanding effective 
i n the thing and directing i t . I t i s to find 
reconciliation here to discover i n the sphere of 
needs this rationality lying i n the thing and 
effective there; but i f we look at i t from the 
opposite point of view, this i s the f i e l d i n which 
the understanding with i t s subjective aims and moral 
fancies vents i t s discontent and moral frustration. (82) 
Vftiile this may or may not be an accurate definition of what pol i t i c a l 
economy i s , Hegel's general claim i s that i t i s limited to the stand-
point of the understanding and can therefore only grasp the external 
connection between thingshr- Unlike philosophy vdiich operates at the 
h i ^ e r level of reason, i t cannot comprehend the inherent reason 
behind i t . S t i l l Hegel views p o l i t i c a l economy as the theory of c i v i l 
society and this i s why i t i s given a significant place within the 
system as a whole. 
As i n his Jena writings, Hegel here refers to c i v i l society as 
a "system of needs" by which he means that i t i s a complex pattern of 
relationships i n which men jo i n together to satisfy their mutual wants 
and desires, Hegel i s careful, ho^vever, to distinguish human needs 
(81) G.V/.P. Hegel, Berliner Schriften, ed, J. Hofflneister, Hamburg, 
1956, p.690, 
(82) Philosophy of Right, ov. o i t . . paragraph 189. 
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flxjm animal needs. Vftiile an animal's needs are narrowly circum-
scribed to i t s physical existence, human needs extend far beyond the 
mere sustenance of l i f e . Kan, of course, has certain corporal needs 
vfhich he must satisfy, but these are only a necessary and not a 
sufficient condition for the fidfilment of his existence. ^ ^^ ^ Most 
important of a l l i s that while an animal merely consumes the f r u i t s 
of the eairbh, man labours upon i t so that what i s consumed i s not a 
raw, natural product, but the result of human labour. As opposed to 
the often convoluted reasoning of his earlier writings, what stands 
out here i s the extreme c l a r i t y and precision of Hegel's definition 
of work: 
The means of acquiring and preparing the particularized 
means appropriate to our ^ m i l a r l y particularized needs 
is vrork. Through work the raw material directly supplied 
by nature i s specifically adapted to these numerous ends 
by a l l sorts of different processes. Now this formative 
change confers value on means and gives them their u t i l i t y , 
and hence man i n what he consumes i s mainly concerned with 
the products of men. I t i s the products of human effort 
which man consumes. (84) 
According to Hegel, work i s a crucial feature i n the overall 
development of human consciousness. Since i t i s not an instinctual 
a c t i v i t y , but requires the expenditure of intelligence, labour becomes 
one of the primary sources of education.^^^^ Consequently i t i s not, 
as i n the Biblical sense, a curse upon man due to his sinful nature. 
Bather Hegel's conception of work falls squarely within the Protestant 
t r a d i t i o n which views work not as an e v i l , "but as SDmething to be 
valued i n i t s own r i ^ t as giving l i f e a significant content. Work 
i s , for Hegel, an aspect of human f2reedom as i t raises man above the 
(83) Ibid., paragraph I90. 
(84) Ibid., paragraph I96. 
(85) Ibid., paragraph 
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level of brute nature and creates a realm of culture or mind. I t 
is an eminently c i v i l i z i n g activity, a point which Hegel forcefully 
makes i n the course of a polemical aside a^inst Rousseau: 
The idea has been advanced that i n respect of his 
needs man lived i n freedom i n the so-called 'state of 
nature' when his needs were supposed to be confined 
to what are knora as the simple necessities of 
nature, and when he required for their satisfaction 
only the means which the accidents of nature directly 
assured to him. This view takes no account of the 
moment of liberation intrinsic to work «,. And apart 
from this, i t i s false, because to be confined to 
mere physical needs as such and their direct satis-
faction v/ould simply be the condition i n which the 
mental i s plunged i n the natriral and so would be one 
of savagery and unfreedom, while freedom i t s e l f i s 
to be found only i n the reflection of mind into 
i t s e l f , i n mind's distinction from nature, and i n the 
reflex of mind i n nature. (86) 
I t i s not d i f f i c u l t to see that there i s only one step from Hegel's 
acceptance of the bourgeois estimation of work to the paradoxical 
proposition of Marx and Engels that the working class i s the heir to 
(87) 
classical Gennan philosophy.^ ' 
Work i s , for Hegel, not an isolated activity i n vdaich man engages 
to satisfy his own individual needs, but i s a universal activity i n 
which he participates on a reciprocal basis vdth others to satisfy a 
more general social need. There i s thus created a division of labour 
which brings about the increasing specialization of work within the 
t o t a l process of social production. ^ ^^ ^ And i t i s only with the 
(86) Ibid,, paragraph 194. 
(87) Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Selected Works, 5 vols., Moscow, 1975f 
I I I , Po576: "The new tendency, which recognised that the key to the 
understanding of the vrhole history of society l i e s i n the history of 
the development of labour, frm the outset addressed i t s e l f by prefer-
ence to the working class and here found the response which i t neither 
sou^t nor expected from o f f i c i a l l y recognised science. The Gennan 
working-class movement i s the inheritor of Geiman classical philossphy", 
(88) Hiilosophy of R i f ^ t , op. c i t . , paragraph 198. 
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introduction of the division of labour that class divisions f i r s t 
begin to appear within c i v i l society! 
The i n f i n i t e l y complex, criss-cross, movements of 
reciprocal production and exchange, and the equally 
i n f i n i t e m u l t i p l i c i t y of means therein employed, 
become crystallized, owing to the universality 
inherent i n their content, and distinguished into 
general groups. .As a result, the entire compDex i s 
b u i l t up into particular systems of needs, means, 
and types of work relative to these needs, modes of 
satisfaction and of theoretical and practical 
education, i.e. into systems, to one or other of 
which individuals are assigned - i n other word% into 
class-divi sions. (89) 
In referring to these classes, Hegel uses the rather parochial German 
word Stand which l i t e r a l l y means estate. This linguistic peculiarity 
requires a word of explanation. 
In his Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" of 1843 Marx 
shows that the meaning of the word Stand derives from the European 
Middle Ages i n which there was a direct identity between the p o l i t i c a l 
state and socio-economic l i f e . This identity also held true for 
classical antiquity, but with this difference, V/hile i n republican 
Greece and Rome an individual's p o l i t i c a l poation immediately 
determined his social standing, i n medieval times the opposite was 
the case, an individual's social standing determined his p o l i t i c a l 
position, I t i s only i n the modem era, Marx shows, that c i v i l 
society and the classes contained therein has broken completely av;ay 
from the state as a l l p o l i t i c a l restrictions on property and economic 
ac t i v i t y have been abolished. The result i s that private l i f e has 
become separated from a l l public considerations, a dichotomy best 
expressed i n the French revolutionary, constitutions i n which the 
(89) Ibid., paragraph 201. 
(90) Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Werke. 39 vols., Berlin, 1956-, I , 
ppo274i-76; henceforth cited as MEW. 
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r i ^ i s o f man are s t r i c t l y demarcated from the r i ^ t s of the citizen, 
Hegel i s of course aware of this historical phenomenon and he himself 
acknowledges the separation of c i v i l society and the state and 
(91) ex p l i c i t l y criticizes those theorists v/ho f a i l to draw this distinction.^'' ' 
The point i s , however, that by retaining the word Stand which signifies 
both social st r a t i f i c a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l organization, Hegel inadver-
tently contributes to this confusion. This confusion is perhaps best 
explained i n tems of the semi-feudal backwardness of Gezmany i n the 
early XlXth century, a period which Marx i n The German-Ideology charac-
terized as one i n which "one could speak neither of estates nor of 
(92) 
classes but at most of past estates and uiibom classes".^ ^ Indeed 
both Hegel and Marx were well aware that Germany had failed to keep 
abreast of contemporary developnents i n Westem Europe generally ^ dth 
the result that i t s p o l i t i c a l estates had not yet, or only partially, 
been transformed into a-political social classes. Taken i n this 
specifically Gennan context, Hegel's use of the term Stand simply 
reflects a state of affairs i n which the private nature of the estates 
vreis s t i l l bound up with their public, p o l i t i c a l status. I t is thus on 
account of this transitional period of German history where a nascent 
industrialism was just emerging from a protracted feudalism that Hegel 
feels i t necessary to retain the rather anachronistic medieval concept 
of Stand to define the major divisions within c i v i l society. 
Unlike Iferx and other socialist thinkers, Hegel does not view the 
division of society into classes or estates as a bad thing. On Hegel's 
(91) Philosophy of Rifiht. op. c i t . , paragraph 185: "This system ( i . e . the 
system of needs) nay be prima facie regarded as the external state, 
the state based on need, the state as the understanding envisages 
i t " . 
(92) lEW, OP. c i t , . I l l , p,178. 
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account, the system of estates serves a positive function as i t i s 
a means of integrating the individual into society without which 
society would degenerate into so many isolated atomic units, A 
person' s estate piravides him with an ethical esprit de corps v/hich 
makes him a "somebody" and not merely a private individual. Hegel 
views the system of estates as a further determination of the free 
w i l l as i t represents the high degree of pluralism and inner-
differentiation which modem c i v i l society has attained. I t i s for 
this reason that Hegel favourably contrasts the social mobility of 
modem society to the "substantial" Platonic republic i n which a 
person's occupation i s determined for him: 
^'In Plato's state7"(Hegel says) '^subjective freedom 
does not count, because people have their occupations 
assigned to them by the Guardians. In many oriental 
states, this assignment i s determined by bi r t h . But 
subjective freedom, v;hich must be respected, demands 
that individuals diould have free choice i n this 
mattef^o (93) 
\ilhat the antique c i t y lacked was the element of subjective particularity, 
of individual self-determination, vMch Hegel sgiys i s paramount i n 
contemporary times. This i s why he insists that modem c i v i l society 
must leave open-ended the question of to which estate any individual 
i s to belong: 
But the question of the particuJar estate to which an 
individual i s to belong i s one on which natural capacity, 
b i r t h , and other circumstances have their influence, 
t h o u ^ the essential and f i n a l determining factors are 
subjective opinion and the individual's arbitrary w i l l , 
which win i n t h i s sphere their right, their merit, and 
their dignity. (94) 
We shall see later how Hegel attempts to combine the particularity of 
(93) Philosophy of Rigjit, op. cito, addition to paragraph 262. 
(94) Ibid., paragraph 206. Translation modified. 
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the individual w i l l as manifest within the domain of c i v i l society 
nith the universal structure of the p o l i t i c a l state. 
Following the typology set out i n his Jena writings, Hegel 
specifies three main estates: the immediate or agricultural estate, 
the business estate and the universal estate. The f i r s t of these, 
the agricultural estate, consists of both the peasantry and the landed 
aristocracy. The agrarian mode of l i f e i s very closely linked to the 
family and HegaL notes that the foundation of states has often been 
ascribed to the introduction of agriculture and marriage. V/hat i s 
outstanding here i s the unreflective immediacy with which this estate 
lives with nature. The agriculturalist has an implicit trust i n the 
goodness of nature which, he believe^ has taken care of his needs i n 
the past and w i l l , no doubt, continue to do so i n the future. So far 
as this estate i s concemed, nature does the major part of the work 
while individual effort i s secondary. Even here Hegel is cognizant 
of the introduction of industrial techniques into agriculture and 
observes that the offices of many large factories could not be readily 
distinguishable from the offices of large farms. Nevertheless this 
only affects the out\rard form and appearance cf this estate and not 
(95) 
i t s essential content. 
The buisness estate (Bgrgerstand) or urban bourgeoisie whose 
development i n Germany lagged far behind that of France and England 
has itBJDode of l i f e i n the adaptation of raw materials for human 
needs. This estate i s subdivided into craftsmen who work directly 
upon a single product to supply a single need, manufacturers who also 
satisfy single needs but because of an intensified division of labour 
(95) Ibid., paragraph 205 and addition. 
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axe able to produce i n great quantity, and traders who exchange 
commodities produced by others throu^ the "universal mediim" of 
moneyo^ ^^^ At one point Hegel claims that the BHrgerstand i s more 
inclined to intelligence than the agcicultural estate \ihich has 
l i t t l e occasion to think of i t s e l f . This claim needs to be br ie f ly 
examined for i t i s more than a casual offhand remark. Indeed, i t 
gets at the centre of the Bflrger's way of l i f e . V/hat characterizes 
the BtCraer i s his emphasis upon a certain form of practical intelligence 
or Bildung vihich as we have seen means more than education, but 
d. gnifies something l i k e moral and intelle ctual maturation. In a 
different context George Lichtheim has observed that Bildun^ achieves 
i t s aims when the individual - a term wholly meaningLess to the 
peasantry and the landed gentry - attains a grasp of the ideal values 
which make up the Bgrger's l i f e style. Ttcas the Bgrger i s not merely 
identified by his socio-economic position, although Bildung and 
Besitz, culture and pjopeirty, often go hand i n hand, but by his 
famil iari ty vriLth a certain universe of discourse vtoich found i t s 
(97) 
highest expression i n c lass ica l Weimar culture.^ ' I t i s probably 
for reasons such as this that Hegel sees in the Bgrgerstand the most 
developed form of consciousness: 
*Jln the business estate, however, i t i s intelligence 
which i s the essential thing . . . the individual i s 
thrown back on himself, and this feSLing of selfhood 
i s most intimately connected \r±th the demand for law 
and order. The sense of freedom and order has 
therefore arisen above a l l in toyms^c (98) 
I t i s only i n h i s discussion of the universal estate that Hegel's 
(96) I b i d . , paragraph 204. 
(97) George Lichtheim, George Lukacs. New York, I97O, pp,88-90. 
(98) Hiilosophy of Right, op. c i t « , additions.otcppdxiageiphs-'-205 and 2O4. 
Translation modified. 
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account di f fers markedly from his earl ier utterances I t w i l l be 
recalled that in Jena Hegel had modelled this estate along the l ines 
of IJgpoleon's military aristocracy the purpo^ se of which was the defence 
of the state in times of war. In the almcrst t\7enty years since then, 
however, the Napoleonic ideal had greatly diminished. In modem, 
ioe. post-1815 European society, the universal estate takes the form 
of a class of c i v i l servants whose administrative s k i l l s are 
necessary to run the legal apparatus of the community. Vfhile Hegel 
had br ie f ly mentioned the c i v i l service in his Jena wi t ings , i t i s 
clear that he s t i l l reg^ded the soldier, "the class of nobles" as 
standing at the apex of society. Now in the Philosophy of Right the 
bureaucrat has come to occupy this position. Hegel defines the 
universal estate thus: 
-The universal estate (the estate of c i v i l servants) 
has for i t s task the universal interests of the 
community. I t must therefore be relieved from direct 
labour to supply i t s needs, either by having private 
means or by receiving an allowance from the state 
which claims i t s industry, with the result that private 
interest finds i t s satisfaction i n i t s work for the 
universal j ( 9 9 ) 
• J 
This shift from a mil itary to a bureaucratic el i te does not merely 
represent a subjective change in attitude on Hegel's part. Rather i t 
ref lects an actual historical movement from the old Obri^eitsstaat to 
the modem Beamtenstaat. Hegel does not go into any great detail over 
the method or recruitment into the service, but he does say that the 
majority w i l l come not from the traditional landed aristocracy, but 
from the new middle c lass . The reason for th is , as mentioned above, 
i s that i t i s only i n the class of Hirers that education and i n t e l l -
igence i s most highly developed. As Hegel puts i t s 
( 9 9 ) I b i d . , paragraph 2 0 5 . Oiranslation modified. 
1 9 1 
- C i v i l servants and the members of the executive 
constitute the greater part of the middle class 
(Mittelstandes), the class in v/hich the conscious-
ness of right and the developed intelligence of the 
mass of the people i s found-^3 (lOO) 
And elsev:here he makes the same point again although even more force-
fu l l y : 
:^The middle class, to which c i v i l ser\rants belong, 
i s po l i t i ca l ly conscious and the one i n which 
education i s most prominent. For this reason i t 
i s also the p i l l a r of the state so far as honesty 
and intelligence are concerned. A state without 
a middle class must therefore remain on a low 
level% ( 1 0 1 ) 
I t should perhaps gdso be bome i n mind that there i s an elanent of 
self-congratulation i n Hegel's glorification of the c i v i l service for 
at this time university professors as well as clergymen and members of 
the l i b e r a l professions were considered servants of the state. This i s 
why in the Preface Hegel remarks that unlike the ancient Greeks who 
practiced philosophy in private l ike an art , i n modem times philosophy 
has an existence i n the open i n the service of the state. "^'"^ ^^  I t can 
never be established with certainty v/hether this statement implies 
"servility" to the Prussian government or whether i t i s simply an 
empirical observation of the organized study of philosophy in the 
university where professors are ex off ic io c i v i l servants, that i s , i n 
the service of the government. •^'"^ ^^  \fhat i s certain however i s 
that as a notable representative of this estate Hegel was aware of 
h is responsibility for the ideology which would express i t s values. 
( 1 0 0 ) I b i d . , paragraph 2 9 7 . 
( 1 0 1 ) I b i d . , addition to paragraph 2 9 7 . 
( 1 0 2 ) I b i d . . p o 7 . 
( 1 0 3 ) See T.M, I&iox, "Hegel and Prussianism" in Heel's Pol i t ical 
Philosophy, ed. V/alter Kauflnann, New York, 1 9 7 0 , p o l 9 « 
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One point upon which Hegel ins is ts i s that c i v i l service posts 
are based upon merit and not b ir th or family connections. He i s 
extremely disparaging about certain corrupt practices then prevailing 
i n both France and SngLand where parliamentary seats and amy commissions 
are saleable. This he views as a vestige of a medieval constitution in 
which public off ices were seen as the private property of their holders 
to be disposed with as they vrill.^^^^^ On Hegel's account i t i s 
kno\dedge and proof of abi l i ty v/hich i s the criterion by vMch a pers) n 
becomes a member of the universal estates 
Between an individual and his office there i s no 
immediate natural l ink . Hence individuals are not 
appointed to office on account of their birth or 
native personal g i f t s . The objective factor i n their 
appointment i s knowledge and proof of abi l i ty . Such 
proof guarantees that the state w i l l get what i t 
requires; and since i t i s the sole condition of 
appointment, i t also guarantees to every citizen the 
chance of joining the class of c i v i l servants. ( 1 0 5 ) 
And he goes on to say that whi]e c i v i l servants enjoy f u l l tenure of 
off ice , this depends upon the satisfactory fulfilment of their public 
functions: 
Once an individual has been appointed to his o f f i c i a l 
position by the sovereign's act, the tenure of his post 
i s conditional on his f u l f i l l i n g i t s duties. Such 
fulfilment i s the very essence of his appointment, and 
i t i s only consequential that he finds in his office 
his livelihood and the assured satisfaction of his 
particular interests, and further that his external 
circumstances and his o f f i c i a l work are freed from 
other kinds of subjective dependence and influence. ( 1 0 6 ) 
Only thus i s the c i v i l service protected against corruption and the 
particularist property owning ethos which pervades the rest of c i v i l 
so ciety. 
( 1 0 4 ) Philosophy of Right, op. c i t . , addition to paragraph 2 7 7 . 
( 1 0 5 ) I b i d . , paragraph 2 9 I . 
( 1 0 6 ) I b i d . , paragraph 2 9 4 . 
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Even thou^ Hegel never seriously cal ls into question the 
essential honesty and moral integrity of the c i v i l servant, he does 
say that as purveyors of the public interest there i s a tendency for 
them to view the state as their property. This i s the ag>ect of the 
bureaucracy upon which Marx chose to focus in his 1843 Critique. F&r 
from representing the general public interest, Marx sees the bureau-
cracy as pursuing private corporate interests v/hich in fact run 
counter to those of the community. In a series of dazzling metaphor^ 
Marx compares the hierarchical structure of the c i v i l service to the 
hierarchy of the medieval church: 
--'The bureaucratic mind--(he says) -^is through and 
throu^ a Jesu i t i ca l , theological mind. The 
bureaucrats are the Jesuits and theologians of the 
state. The bureaucracy i s l a r^mblique pretre»<. (107) 
Marx goes on to ridicule Hegel's claim that the c i v i l service i s in 
principle open to a l l on the basis of free and competitive examinations. 
This examination he says i s : 
•^nothing but the bureaucratic baptism of knowledge, 
the o f f i c i a l recognition of the transubstantiation 
of profane into holy knov/ledgeVo (l08) 
Thus rather than making knovrledge and abi l i ty the basis of entering 
the service, Marx says that i t i s authority and the vrorship of authority 
which typif ies the true bureaucratic mentality. While Marx's viev;s on 
bureaucracy cannot be considered here in any depth, his criticisms of 
Hegel are illuminating i n that they show that other interpretations of 
the Prussion c i v i l service are indeed possible. 
Hegel does not conclude his description of c i v i l society \iith the 
system of estates. I f he did i t \rouM certainly be a far from adequate 
description. The estates only accfaunt for those people who possess the 
(107) 0T3. c i t . . I , p.248. 
(108) I b i d . . I , p . 2 5 3 . 
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requisite degree of either property or education which thus enables 
them to engage in agriculture, business or public administration. 
There s t i l l remains a large section of the populace which possesses 
neither of these and which cannot, therefore, be subsumed under the 
system of estates. This section of the populace constitutes the vrorking 
class, the industrial poor, vMch Hegel designates not by the traditional 
term Stand, but by the modem term Klasse. \!hat particularly concerns 
Hegel, moreover, i s the problem of worldng class poverty. As in his 
Jena writings Hegel ca l l s on the state to alleviate the worst extremes 
of poverty and economic alienation. But vMle in Jena the precise 
relationship between the state and the economic domain VSLS not spelled 
out, but merely l e f t as a formal statement of principle, in the 
Philosophy of Rie^t Hegel shows in considerable detail how the state 
attempts to regulate the market mechanism. Yet even here Hegel i s 
unable to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of poverty 
and i s i n the end forced to admit that: 
the important question of how poverty i s to be 
abolished i s one of the most disturbing problems 
which agitate modem society* ( 1 ^ 9 ) 
Hegel' relates poverty directly to the type of labour performed by 
the working class. This type of labour which, as vre have seen, Ifesx 
vroxild later c a l l alienated labo\ir, i s exemplified in the fact that the 
more objects v/hich the ^rorker produces, the greater the power of these 
objects become and the smaller the worker's ova means of appropriating 
them. Thus labour which, for Hegel, i s one of the decisive forces i n 
the development of society nov becomes the victim of the very society 
i t has i t s e l f created. Par from integrating man into society, labour 
( 1 0 9 ) PhilosDphy of Right, op. c i t . , addition to paragraph 2 4 4 o 
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in a commodity producing society has brought about an estrangement 
between man and his environment. Hegel describes this process thus: 
Vflien c i v i l society i s in a state of unimpeded activity, 
i t i s engaged i n expanding internally in population and 
industry. The amassing of wealth i s intensified by 
generalizing (a) the linkage of men by their needs, and 
(b) the methods of preparing and distrLbuting the means 
to sat isfy these needs, because i t i s from this double 
process of generalization that the largest profits are 
derived. That i s one aide of the picture. The other 
side i s the subdivision and restrict ion of particular 
jobs. This results in the dependence and distress of 
the class tied to voxk of that soirt, and these again 
entail inabi l i ty to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms 
and especially the intellectual benefits of society. ( l lO) 
For Hegel, poverty i s not an indifferent fact of nature, but takes 
the form of a \7rong done to one class by another. Thus even before tferx, 
Hegel realized that the existence of poverty i s a consequence of the 
division of society into classes and that the poverty of the many i s in 
direct proportion to the massive accumulation of wealth in the hands of 
a fev;. Alluding to what the c lass ical economists called "the iron ISM 
of wages" Hegel shows how the working class becomes increasingly 
pauperized unt i l i t s standard of l i v ing eventually fa l l s below the 
subsistence leve l . In teams reminiscent of the then prevailing 
economic determinism, Hegel remarks that no matter how much v/ealth 
c i v i l society produces, i t w i l l be insufficient to check the gradual 
immiseration of the proletariat. '^'"^ ^^  
V/hat i s striking i s the way Hegel analyses the effect of poverty 
upon human consciousness. I t i s not surprising that Hegel should 
chose to emphasize this aspect of poverty since writing from the 
standpoint of German idealism he would naturally tend to give priority 
to ideas over things or facts. In this respect his account differs 
(no) I b i d . , paragraph 243. 
( i l l ) I b i d . , paragraph 245. 
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signif icantly from that of Marx for vrhom, as a philosophical 
materialist , economic alienation i s built into the very structure 
of the capital ist mode of production and as such exists quite 
independently of oonsoiousness. For Marx, alienation i s not so 
much a feattire of mind, as i t i s a social relation in which the 
wage earner i s forced to s e l l his labour power to the capital ist 
v;ho then uses i t simply as a tool in the production of capital . 
For Hegel, however, the worst aspect of poverty i s not wage labour 
per se, but the irreparable damage done to the human spirit which 
reduces men to a rabble. Here are a couple of passages vMch 
elucidate this point: 
VJhen the standard of l iv ing of a large mass of 
people f a l l s below a certain subsistence level -
a level regulated automatically as the one necessary 
for a member of the society - and when there i s a 
consequent loss of the sense of right and \jxons, of 
honesty and the self-respect which makes a man 
ins is t on maintaining himself by his own work and 
effort , the result i s the creation of a rabble of 
paupers. At the same time this brings with i t , at 
the other end of the social scale, conditions v:hich 
greatly fac i l i ta te the concentration of dispro-
portionate wealth in a few hands. ( 1 1 2 ) 
And elsewhere he says: 
Poverty in i t s e l f does not make men into a rabble; 
a rabble i s created only when there i s joined to 
poverty a disposition of mind, an inner indignation 
against the r i ch , against society, against the 
government, etc. A further consequence of this 
attitude i s that through their dependence on 
chance men become frivolous and idle, l ike the 
Neopolitan lazzoroni for example. In this way 
there i s bom in the rabbis the ev i l of lacking 
self-respect enou^ to secure subsistence by i t s 
own labour and yet at the same time of claiming 
to receive subsistence as i t s r i ^ t . ( l l 5 ) 
There i s at least one vjay in vfhich c i v i l society i s able to 
( 1 1 2 ) I b i d . , paragraph 2 4 4 . 
( 1 1 3 ) I b i d . , addition to paragraph 2 4 4 . 
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redress this imbalance in wealth v/ithout recourse to state inter-
vention. According to Hegel, one of the chronic ailments of modem 
industry i s the phenomenon of overproduction. This occurs when the 
production of good's at home eventually outstrips the abi l i ty of 
consumers to assimilate them, the result being that the market i s 
glutted v/ith a vast surplus of unsaleable commodities. The internal 
expansion of c i v i l so ciety can thus no longer be contained within the 
geographical restrictions of that society. C i v i l society i s consequently 
forced into imperial escploits abroad in order to find new markets 
to absorb this surplus: 
^This iimer dialectic of c i v i l society thus drives i t -
or at any rate drives a specific c i v i l society - to push 
beyond i t s own l imits and seek markets, and so i t s 
necessary means of subsistence, in other lands v/hich 
are either deficient in the goods i t has overproduced, 
or else generally bactojard i n industry, &c.Sl,- ( 1 1 4 ) 
The founding of colonies abroad not only provides an outlet for surplus 
products as well as a source of raw materials, but serves as a new home 
for the industrial poor who want to emigrate to the colonies. For this 
reason Hegel describes colonization as "one of the most potent instruments 
of culture" as i t rescues men from what wouM othervirise have teea a l i f e 
of suffering and misery. ^ •^'"^  ^  
Hegel's ranarks on the abi l i ty of colonialism to alleviate the 
worst aspects of poverty are s t i l l only tentative and abstract. More 
important i s the way in which he says the state actually intervenes in 
economic act iv i t ies to control the fluctuations and contingencies of 
the market place. I t has already been pointed out that Hegel's ideas 
on state intervention i n the economic domain were perhaps borrovred 
( 1 1 4 ) I b i d . , paragraph 2 4 6 . 
( 1 1 5 ) I b i d . , paragraph 2 4 7 * 
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from Steuart and Fichte who both advocated varying degrees of 
economic protectionism. There i s , however, as Hegel sees i t , a 
certain philsophical problem here aris ing from the tvro conflicting 
views on this matter. The f i r s t viev; advocates government supervision 
of a l l economic a f f a i r s . As an example of th is Hegel cites the rather 
extreme case of huge public undertakings such as the pyramids in ancient 
Egypt which were completely organized by the state and in which the 
worker had no dlioice but vvas simply forced to participate. Hov/ever, 
as Hegel never t i res of saying, the great difference between the 
ancient and the modem worlds i s precisely this element of subjective 
choice and freedom from external coercion. This idea of subjective 
freedom, he remarks i n paragraph 482 of the Encyclopedia, was f i r s t 
introduced by Christianity with i t s notion that the individual as such 
has inf in i te value as the object of divine love.^ "^*"^ ^ And in the 
Philosophy of History he says that while the Oriental vrorld only knew 
one man to be free and the Greek democracies only knew some men to be 
fll7^ 
free, Christianity f i r s t announced that a l l men can be free. ^ ' But 
v/hile Christ ianity f i r s t proclaimed the idea of subjective freedom, 
this idea was only actualized later with the advent of the Etxstestant 
Reformation, the French Revolution, Kantian morality and f i n a l l y in 
modem society v/ith i t s specialized division of labour and i t s world-
wide complex of commercial relations. Thus the second view vMch 
advocates total economic individualism woiild seem to be more in 
accordance v:ith the Zeitgeist of the modem vrorld. But Hegel s t i l l 
maintains that some degree of state control i s compatible \dth freedom, 
i f only to diminish the possibil ity of upheavals arising from clashing 
( 1 1 6 ) Hegel, SHptliche Werke. O P . c i t . , X, paragraph 482. 
( 1 1 7 ) Cf. Philosophy of Rifiht. op. c i t . , paragraph 62. 
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private interests. "^'•"^ ^^  Some public supervision of the market 
mechanian i s thus necessary to bring individuality into harmony 
with universality which for Hegel i s a precondition of both freedom 
and community. 
I t i s primarily the function of the police or public authorities 
to cope with the problem of poverty and provide some sort of economic 
protection. Tf/hat Hegel here ca l l s the police has nothing in common 
with the Fichtean "police state" which he had ridiculed in the 
Difference and in the Preface of the Philosoiahy of Right. In the 
Pichtean state the public authorities control everything from top to 
bottom even dov/n to the type of passport a perajn i s to carry. In 
contrast to Fichte's 'trice l i s t " Hegel views the police as exercising 
only an external supervisory capacity. F i r s t , the police have the 
right to exercise price control at least where the baac necessities 
of l i f e are concerned. Second, they have the right to inspect the 
goods which are offered to the public, a fom of consumer protection 
service. And third, they have the tadc of supervising large industrial 
concerns vMch Hegel ju s t i f i e s thus: 
-But public care and direction are most of a l l necessary 
i n the case of the larger branches of industry, because 
these are dependent on conditions abroad and on combin-
ations of distant circumstances vMch cannot be grasped 
as a whole by the individuals tied to these industries 
for their living'^J. (119) 
I n th is manner the public authorities are able to achieve a measure of 
social integration which l e f t on i t s o\ja c i v i l society \iovld be unable 
to attain. I t i s the purpose of philosophy to make this explicit thus 
shov i^ng how the police form a necessary part of a fu l ly civil i;zed 
community. 
(118) I b i d . , paragraph 236. 
(119) Ibid . 
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\'ilhile the function of the public authorities i s to mitigate 
tensions within c i v i l society, i t cannot accomplish this entirely 
on i t s o\m. Even though the need for this authority may be grasped 
philosophically, i t sometimes appears as divisive organization 
involving a separation betvreen the controller and the cont3?olled. This 
i s v/here the assistance of the corporations comes in . Corporations 
are organizations based upon the vocational groupings within society 
and which act as inteimediaries between the individual and the state. 
Unless he i s a member of an authorized corporation an individual i s 
without rank and dignity and his livelihood i s reduced to mere se l f -
seeking. In the corporation the individual i s brought into a 
reciprocal relation with the other members of his profession so that 
his egoistic pursuits are integrated into a universal structtjre. The 
corporations also ass ist the public authorities in taking care of 
poverty: 
•-¥ithin the Corporation-.- (Hegel saySf) '"the help which 
poverty receives loses i t s accidental character and 
the humiliation vawngfully associated with i t . The 
wealthy perform their duties to their fellow 
associates and thus riches cease to inspire either 
pride ox: envy, pride in their o-mexs, envy in 
others-. (120) 
I t i s with the corporation that Hegel's analysis of c i v i l society comes 
to a close and he reaches the apotheosis of ethical l i f e , the state. 
VI 
"The state", says Hegel, "is the actuality of the ethical idea". •^'•^ •'•^  
!feken in a Platonic sense this means just ice , but for Hegel i t means 
(120) I b i d . , paragraph 253. 
(121) I b i d . , paragraph 257. 
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freedom. We have already seen that Hegel begins the Hiilosonhy of 
Right with the concept of the free \ id l l , but as we have also seen the 
freedom of the \dll i s only potential freedom. Ultimate freedom, as 
Hegel observes in the Logic i s only to be found in the realm of pure 
thought. Thus i t i s in the thou^t of the state, rather than in the 
state i t s e l f that freedom i s located. Only through being philosophically 
comprehended can the state be raised to freedom. Here i s how Hegel 
philosophically comprehends the free state: 
The state i s the actT;iality of concrete freedom. But 
concrete freedom consists in this , that personal 
individuality and i t s particular interests not only 
achieve their complete development and gain explicit 
recognition for their r i ^ t (as they do in the sphere 
of the family and c i v i l society) but, for one thing, 
they also pass over of their o\m. accord into the 
interest of the universal, and, for another thing, 
they knov; and w i l l the universal; they even recognize 
i t as their ovm substantive mindj they take i t as 
their end and aim and are active in i t s pursuit. The 
result i s that the universal does not prevail or 
achieve completion except along vath particular 
interests and throu^ the co-operation of particular 
Imowing and wil l ing; and individuals likevdse do not 
l i v e as private persons for their own ends alone, but 
i n the very act of wi l l ing these they w i l l the universal 
i n the l ight of the universal, and their activity i s 
consciously aimed at none but the universal end. The 
principle of modem states has prodigious strength and 
depth because i t allov7S the principle of subjectivity 
to progress to i t s culmination in the extreme of se l f -
subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same 
time brings i t back to the substantive tinity and so 
maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity 
i t s e l f . (122) 
This lengthy paragraph reveals a great deal and must now be brief ly 
examined. 
\'Jhat Hegel says here concerning freedom and the state relates back 
to a crucial section in the Logic vMch deals vath the syllogism 
(Schluss). The syllogism i s , for Hegel, a special form of reason 
(122) I b i d . , paragraph 260, 
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v/ithout vfhich real i ty cannot be adequately comprehended. Unlike 
previous philosophers for whom the syllogism merely expressed the 
fomal laws of thought in abstraction from a l l concrete real i ty , 
Hegel wants to show that the syllogism expresses the actual content 
of reason. For him, everything rational i s a syllogiBm or as he 
puts i t : "Alles i s t ein Schluss".^^^^^ Yaxch of \*hat Hegel has to 
say about the syllogism derives from Aristotle's Prior Analytics to 
vihich, he observes, there i s "essentially" nothing to add. '^'"^ ^^  ®^ 
borrows from Aristotle the three basic figures of the ^llogism -
individuality ( l ) , particularity (P) and universality (u) ( in German: 
Bins ( E ) Besonderes ( B ) and Allgemeines (A)) - and shows how these are 
united together in various combinations to form a single whole or in 
Hegel's terms a "concrete universal". The basic difference between 
Aristotle and Hegel, hov/ever, l i e s i n their arrangements of these 
figures. The development of the Aristotelian syllogism takes the 
form of I -P-U, P-U-I and U-I-P. Only the f i r s t figure, according to 
Aristot le , exhibits the correct form of sc ient i f ic demonstration, the 
la t ter tvra representing a distortion of the ideal f i r s t figure. Hegel, 
on the other hand, begins with Aristotle's f i r s t figure I-P-U, but 
inverts the second and third figures so that the third and perfect 
form of syllogism reads IMI-I with the universal acting as mediator 
between the particular and the individual.^^^^^ S t i l l Hegel's basic 
quarrel i s not with Aristotle whom he holds in high esteem, but vdth 
the way syl logist ic reasoning has regressed since the time of Aristotle. 
He i s particularly c r i t i c a l of Leibniz's application of the so-called 
(125) Hegel, L o ^ , op. c i t . , I I , p.508; Logic, op. c i t . , p.664. 
(124) V . I . Lenin, Raloso iMcal Notebooks. London, I96I, p,181; 
"Aristotle described the logical forms so comidetely that 
'essentially' there has been nothing to add". 
(124) G.R.G. Vwce, A Study of Hegel's Logic. Oxford, I967, pp.209-11. 
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'icalculus of combination" to the syllogism. This he rejects for 
the reason that the true nature of real i ty and experience cannot be 
accounted for in purely quantitative, mathematical terms as not only 
Leibniz, but a l l pre -cr i t i ca l metaphysics had attonpted to do.^ "''^ ^^  
I t i s perhaps of interest to note that this i s fundamentally the same 
crit ic ism v/hich Hegel had earl ier voiced against Schelling who he said 
had only made quantitative divisions within his absolute and was 
therefore restricted to a merely abstract, formalistic grasp of 
rea l i ty . 
The significance of this for the pol i t ica l dimension of Hegel's 
thou^t i s that the state, philosophically understood, forms a perfect 
syllogian in which individuality, particularity and universality are 
fused together i n a rational whole. Just as the figures in the 
syllogism are not three independent judgements but have a mutually 
determining relationship, so are the three organs of the government -
the monarch, the executive and the legislature - not s t r i c t ly demarcated 
from one another, but are organically interrelated at the level of 
practice. I t i s thus on logical grounds that Hegel rejects Montesquieu's 
"false doctrine" of the separation of powers v;hich he regards as a product 
of the ref lect ive understanding rather than philosophical reason.^^^^^ 
Follov/ing the same structure as the syllogism, the different organs of 
the government are neither completely independent of nor subordinate 
to one another, but co-operate in the common goal of securing the freedom 
and rationality of the whole. V/ithin this ^llogism the figure of 
individuality corresponds to the monarch whose vrill i s the crowning 
moment of a l l acts of state. The figure of particularity corresponds 
( 1 2 6 ) Hegel, Logik. op. c i t . . I I , p p . 3 3 1 - 3 2 ; Logic, op. c i t . . p . 6 8 5 . 
( 1 2 7 ) Philosophy of Right, op. c i t . . paragraph 2 7 2 . 
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to the executive branch of government or the c i v i l service vrhich 
carries out the monarch's vdl l by particularizing i t within the 
society. And the figure of universality corresponds to the 
legislature vMch i s the pol i t ica l meeting grovmd of the monarch, 
the executive and the Estates Assembley vdio vrark together to frame 
a universal, objective codified system of lai^s v/hich govem social 
behaviour. We ±iall see presently in more detail precisely how the 
various organs of the government actually undertake their allotted 
functions and the significance which each has vrithin Hegel's 
philosophical interpretation of experience. 
For riavt i t need only be said that understood from a philosophical 
standpoint, the state becomes the paradigm of freedom and rationality 
and as such the solution to the problem of alienation and estrangement 
vMch had perplexed Hegel since his youth. The particular form of 
unhappy consciousness with which Hegel had been concemed i s the 
separation of the private man and the public man, bourgeois and 
citoyen, v/hich had plagued man throughout; history. In the ancient 
Greek and Roman republics, for example, i t was the role of the cit izen 
v/ho had priority over the mere private individual who was in point of 
fact relegated to the status of a dave. The ancients recognized no 
distinction betvreen the particular w i l l of the individual and the 
\iniversal w i l l of the community, but submerged the fonner entirely 
within the la t ter : 
- In the states of antiquity-^-(he remarks) --the 
subjective end simply coincided vfith the state's 
w i l l . . . the ultimate thing vrith them -aas the wi l l 
of the state-. (128) 
The r i se of Christianity, however, completely reversed this relationship. 
(128) I b i d . , addition to paragraph 26l. 
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For the Christian, i t was the private w i l l and conscience which 
triumphed over a l l public, p o l i t i c a l considerations. Of course 
t h i s purely subjective attitude toward r e a l i t y was, according to 
Hegel, quite i n keeping with the debased p o l i t i c a l circumstances 
i n vMch C h r i s t i a n i t y arose. And as Date as the Rienomenology 
Hegel discussed e a r l y C h r i s t i a n i t y as a sort of slave ideology i n 
which men having despaired of finding happiness i n t h i s world, 
projected t h e i r dreams of freedom into the beyond. S t i l l whatever 
i t s contingent h i s t o r i c a l origins Hegel views t h i s right to subject-
i v i t y as i n sane sense the principle of the modem vrorld which has 
manifested i t s e l f i n various forms u n t i l reaching i t s zenith i n 
contemporary bflrgerlische Gesellschaft. I t i s only i n the modem 
state, however, that the pa r t i c u l a r aims and interests of the individual 
are given a universal end so that the individual gains personal s a t i s -
faction i n furthering the ends of the conmunity as a whole: 
The essence of the modem state i s that the \miversal 
' be bound up ;d.th the complete freedom of i t s particular 
members and with private well-being ... Thus the 
universal must be furthered, but subj e c t i v i t y on the 
other hand must a t t a i n i t s f u l l and l i v i n g development. 
I t i s only when both these moments subsist i n t h e i r 
stirength that the state can be regarded as articulated 
and genuinely organized, (129) 
In t h i s manner the modem state l a y s the material foundation for sur-
mounting man's sense of estrangement as i t r e t a i n s the Greek notion 
of community and shared experience, but mediates t h i s vath respect for 
the i n f i n i t e worth of the individual inherited f3:om Christianity. !I!he 
re s u l t i s that when looked upon philosophically the state does not 
appear as something "positive", that i s an a l i e n i n s t i t u t i o n to which 
man i s mechanically subordinated. Rather i t appears as a suitable 
(129) I b i d . , addition to paragraph 260. 
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place i n vdiich nian can l i v e and work i n haimony with h i s fellov/s. 
I t i s a place i n which man can be reconciledo 
The f i r s t moment of the government which Hegel treats i s the 
monarch. Except for a b r i e f period i n h i s youth when he coquetted 
v/ith the republican ideas of the French Revolution, Hegel remained 
a devoted monarchist. Hegel's views on the monarch, i t has been 
remarked, seem to v a s c i l l a t e somev/hat even within the Hiilosophv of 
Rigjit i t s e l f since sometimes he speaks of the power of the monarch 
as constrained by the equally legitimate pov/er of the executive and 
the l e g i s l a t u r e and sometimes he speaks of the monarch as the sole repos-
iitprylLof^ sovereign pov;er to which everything else must ultimately 
r e f e r . Consequently over the years a vast l i t e r a t u r e has arisen 
debating whether Hegel favoured absolute monarchy or a more limited 
constitutional variety. The evidence, a l b e i t with certain q u a l i f -
i c a t i o n s , generally points to the l a t t e r , although appeal to the 
evidence alone has done l i t t l e to diminish the fervour of some of the 
more committed participants i n t h i s debate. I n a sense, hov/ever, t h i s 
whole argument rather misses the point as i t t r e a t s Hegel's viev/s on 
monarchy as a set of i n s t i t u t i o n a l recommendations rather than a 
philosophical r e f l e c t i o n upon a given mode of experience. Hegel's 
purpose qua philosopher i s not to make p r a c t i c a l proposals about the 
r o l e of the monarch, but to elaborate the concept of monardayand show 
i t s place \7ithin the over - a l l explanation of human experience. 
Unhappily, Hegel f a i l s to provide a satisfactory deduction of 
the monarch, but establishes i t by a t h i n l y v e i l e d analogy. Since, 
he says, a state i s alv;ays a single state, an individual, i t must 
have an individual at i t s head, hence the monarch. ^ ^^^^ Thus the 
( I 3 0 ) l b i d . , paragraph 279. 
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monarch represents the figure of individuality, of self-determination 
to v:hich Hegel says: 
-everything else reverts and from which everything 
else derives the beginning of i t s a c t u a l i t y . This 
•absolute self-determination constitutes the d i s t i n c t i v e 
p r i n c i p l e of the power of the crown as such-^. 
The monarch i s , then, the visib]e symbol of national unity and i t i s 
within h i s person that sovereignty i s vested. The modem monarch i s , 
for Hegel, not a despot v;ho controls the state t h r o u ^ a r b i t r a r y force, 
but a constitutional figurehead bound by rule of law, Hegel, therefore, 
r e j e c t s the t r a d i t i o n a l claims of monarchs to sovereignty on the grounds 
of divine r i ^ t . The divine r i ^ t argument may have been adequate i n 
primitive states such as Oriental despotism v/here there i s an immediate 
unity of r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s and the despot i s himself looked upon as 
a god, but i t w i l l not suf f i c e i n the modem times where church and 
state have become differentiated, ^''"^ ^^  S i m i l a r l y Hegel r e j e c t s the idea 
of an elected monarchy as a "confused notion". The idea of an election 
appears to him as a foEn of contract betvreen the monarch and the people 
which can simply be rescinded as soon as one of the parties f e e l s the 
other i s not l i v i n g up to i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The powr of the 
monarch ivould not be the r e s u l t of h i s individuality and self-deter-
mination, but v/ould r e s t i n something outside himself, the w i l l of the 
people, ^"^ ^^ ^ For Hegel, only a hereditary monarchy v/hich provides a 
" r i g i d l y determined" successor to the throne i s i n keeping with the 
majesty of the office. Unfortunately here too Hegel accomplishes the 
deduction of hereditary monarchy by a clever b i t of sophistry v/hereby 
(151) I b i d . , paragraph 275. 
(152) I b i d , , addition to paragraph 281. 
(133) Ibid., paragraph 281. 
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he l i n k s up the king's sexual a c t i v i t y , the production of a son to 
carry out the business of kingship, with the povrer of individual 
self-detemination. ^ •^ ^^ ^ I t i s t h i s sort of reasoning which has led 
many c r i t i c s to the conclusion that Hegel' s views on monarchy betray 
the higjiest ideas of philosophy and degenerate into a crude apologia 
for the given state of a f f a i r s . 
I t be r e c a l l e d that i n h i s Jena vnritings Hegel had viewed 
constitutional monarchy as the highest and most developed form of 
state. This i s s t i l l h i s position i n the Philoso-phv of Right, but 
with a s l i g h t q u a l i f i c a t i o n . As TO have seen, Hegel's vievfs on 
monarchy i n Jena were strongly influenced by the Napoleonic 
experience, and indeed he had gone so f a r as to c a l l Napoleon the 
modejm Theseus who.",, he hoped could bring about the national 
r e v i v a l of Germany, I n the years since then,however, Hegel began 
to take a f a r l e s s heroic view of the monarch, a re f l e c t i o n , no 
doubt, of the more se t t l e d and stable European scene during the 
Restoration. For Hegel, even v/hile the monarch represents the 
princi p l e of individuality, he also has a share of the un i v e r s a l i t y 
of legislatxire vdiich i s primarily concerned with the fornrulation of 
lav/s. Nevertheless i t i s not h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to i n i t i a t e new ]av;a 
This i s done by a sel e c t council of ministers who have a keen over-
sight of contemporary p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s and who are f r e e l y chosen and 
dismissed by the monarch, Pelczynski notes, however, that Hegel i s 
extremely elusive about the nature of t h i s body and nowhere i s i t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y discussed, ^ ^^^^ He does not mention howJarge t h i s body 
(154) OP. c i t . . I , p,242: "V/hat i s the f i n a l , fixed difference between 
one person and a l l others? The body. The highest function of the 
body i s sexual a c t i v i t y . Thus the h i ^ e s t constitutional act of 
the monarch i s h i s sexual a c t i v i t y because through t h i s he makes a 
king and c a r r i e s on h i s body. The bosy of h i s son i s the reproduc-
t i o n of h i s ovm body, the creation of a royal body", 
(135) Pelczynski, OP. c i t , , pol02. 
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i s or from where i t s members are recruited. Neither does he mention 
the r e l a t i o n between the f i r s t minister, i f any, and the r e s t of the 
council or between ministers and government o f f i c i a l s . I n the f i n a l 
a n a l y s i s the monarch has only to sign h i s name to the completed 
document a f t e r i t has been drafted by the ministers and submitted to 
the estates f o r i t s approval. Tf/hile he makes the f i n a l decision, t h i s 
decision i s only a formality: 
I n a canpletely organized state, i t i s only a question 
of the culminating point of formal decision ... (The 
monarch) has only to say 'yes' and dot the ' i ' , because 
the throne should be such that the significant thing i n 
i t s holder i s not h i s particular make-up ... In a we l l -
organized monarchy, the objective aspect belongs to lav; 
alone, and the monarch's part i s merely to set to the 
law the subjective ' I v d l l ' . (136) 
I t i s t h i s subjective element, t h i s " I w i l l " , which constitutes, for Hegel, 
the great difference between the ancient and the modem state, and 
expresses modem man's desire to become m s t e r of h i s fate. 
The second branch of the government i s the executive c i v i l service 
the function of vMch HegeL describes as subsuming the particular under 
the universal which simply means that i t i s responsible for the carrying 
out of policy decisions reached by the monarchvin council with h i s 
ministers, ^ ^^ "^ ^ As such,the c i v i l service has control over the legal 
machinery of society, eog, the police and the couarts of law, but as \ie 
have already examined the basic function of the bui«aucracy i n some 
d e t a i l , i t w i l l not be necessary to go over t h i s ground again, V/hat 
concerns us here i s the philosophical significance of the bureaucracy 
which on Hegel's account acts as a middle t e m or mediator between 
the monarch on the one hand and the estates of c i v i l society on the 
(136) Philosophy of Rifiht. op. c i t , , addition to paragraph 280. 
(137) I b i d . , paragraph 287, 
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other. I t i s only through t h i s middle term that the t\ro are fused 
i n a s y l l o g i s t i c unity, Hbvreve2?,as T,!"!. Knox has correctly 
observed, the bureaucracy i s only a mediator ftom the point of view 
of the monarch whose decisions i t administrates. Since the estates 
do not yet have a voice i n p o l i t i c a l decision making, they cannot 
recognize the bureaucracy as an adequate middle term between them-
selves and the monarch. ^"'"^ ^^  So long as the estates are excluded 
from p o l i t i c a l participation, then the monarch and the bvireaucracy 
appear as something a l i e n vMch attempts to subordinate the estates 
to i t s w i l l . I t i s thus to give the estates a p o l i t i c a l function 
within the community and thereby overcome the estrangement between 
c i v i l society and the state that Hegel deduces the necessity for the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . 
Even though the l e g i s l a t u r e a c t u a l l y consists of the monarch, the 
executive and Estates Assembley or the representatives of the " u n o f f i c i a l " 
estates of c i v i l society, i t i s upon the l a t t e r which Hegel focuses 
almost exclusive attention. As vre have j u s t suggested, Hegel under^ 
stands the enfranchisement of the members of the u n o f f i c i a l estates 
as a means of overcoming the bifurcation betvreen c i v i l society and the 
p o l i t i c a l s tate. Thus while the executive i s a mediating organ from 
the standpoint of the monarch, the Estates Assembley i s a mediator 
from the standpoint of the people as a vhole or what Hegel calls 
"empirical u n i v e r s a l i t y " . I n a sense, however, Hegel accomplishes 
t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between c i v i l society and the state through a 
subtle play on words. I t w i l l be recal l e d that the German word for 
estate i s Stand which hsB;both c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l connotations and 
Hegel makes i t appear as i f a genuine union betv/een these two sectors 
(138) I b i d . . po372. 
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has been created as i f simply by a fortuitous accident of language. 
S t i l l here i s the way i n which Hegel describes the mediating function 
of the Estates: 
Regarded as a mediating organ, the Estates stand 
between the government i n general on the one hand 
and the nation broken up into particulars (people 
and associations) on the other...they are a middle 
term preventing both the extreme i s o l a t i o n of the 
power of the crown, which otherwise might seem a 
mere arb i t r a r y tyranny, and also the is o l a t i o n of 
the pa r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of persons, s o c i e t i e s , and 
Corporations. Further, and more important, they 
prevent individuals from having the appesurance of a 
mass or an aggregate and so from acquiring an 
unorganized opinion and v o l i t i o n and from c r y s t a l l i z i n g 
into a powerful blockin opposition to the organized state.(139) 
Haying accomplished the deduction of the l e g i s l a t u r e , Hegel goes 
on to show that the Estates Assembly i s divided into an upper hereditary 
house for the members of the landed aristocracy and a lower house for 
the representatives of the Burgerstand. Hegel assumes i n a not 
ent i r e l y convincing manner, that the former, the independent lemd 
owner, because he i s free from the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the market place 
w i l l necessarily be best equipped for a responsible politicsuL position. 
I t was Marx, however, who f i r s t took objection to t h i s by pointing out 
that because the landowner acquires h i s property through primogeniture, 
he has no p o l i t i c a l obligation whatever. The independence engendered 
by inherited property i s not a freedom bestowed by, but a freedom over 
and above p o l i t i c s and the st a t e . I n t h i s fashion Harx holds that the 
(I'fO) 
state becomes the servant of private landed property. Furthermore 
(139) I b i d . , paragraph 302. 
(1^) JffiW, op.cit., I , pp.311-12. I t should be said that at t h i s time 
Marx was s t i l l speaking of private property i n terms of the landed 
aristocracy. Because he was, as yet^ unacquainted with p o l i t i c a l 
economy, he did not see that t h i s sort of property eventually 
becomes subordinate to i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l and i s subsequently 
converted into sm object for exploitation. 
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\ft)at Hegel says about primogeniture seems to contradict v/hat he had 
e a r l i e r s a i d about property i n h i s d i s a i s s i o n of Abstract Right. I t 
w i l l be r e c a l l e d that Hegel had deduced property from the free w i l l , 
showing by means of an A r i s t o t e l i a n argument that man has mastery 
over nature and thus the right to appropriate a l l things as h i s 
property. Under primogeniture, hoi-;ever, t h i s relationship betvreen 
man and nature i s reversed so that i t i s not the v d l l which 
appropriates property but property which appropriates the w i l l . The 
property, as i t remains constant from generation to generation, seems 
to have a w i l l and v o l i t i o n of i t s own, while the ovmer, as he acguires 
i t merely through the accident of b i r t h , seems a passive object vdio has 
no choice i n the matter. Since the man acquires the property inde-
pendently of h i s w i l l , i t i s i n a sense he who i s inherited by the 
land. I t should, however, be said i n Hegel's defence that he i s not 
unav/are of t h i s discrepancy and makes clear that he only approves of 
primogeniture insofar as i t frees a body of men ftom the contingencies 
of the business world and pennits them to enter the p o l i t i c a l arena. 
I f , moreover, the appropriate p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s do not e x i s t , 
primogeniture loses i t s rationale and becomes a "chain on the freedom 
of private r i ^ t s " . ^"'•^•'•^  
The lov/er house of the Estates Assembley consists of deputies 
elected by the three main branches of the business estate, craftsman-
ship, manufacture and trade. V/hat i s of interest here i s that Hegel 
resolutely opposes election on the basis of direct universal suffrage 
which he says i n ]arge modem states can only r e s u l t i n apathy and 
e l e c t o r a l indifference. Rather deputies are elected through t h e i r 
(141) Philosophy of R i ^ t . op. c i t , . addition to paragraph 306. 
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respective corporations which ensure' that actual s o c i a l interests 
are given p o l i t i c a l representation, Hegel describes t h i s as follovra: 
I n making the appointment, society i s not dispersed 
into atomic u n i t ^ collected to perform only a single 
and temporary act, and kept together f o r a moment and 
no longer. On the contrary, i t makes the appointment 
as a society, a r t i c u l a t e d into associations, communities, 
and Corporations, whidi although constituted already for 
other purposes, acquire i n t h i s way a connexion with 
p o l i t i c s , (142) 
Understood philosophically, elections mediate the r i f t bet\-feen man as 
a private individual and man as a c i t i z e n by giving the foimer a 
public, p o l i t i c a l status. Such an i n s t i t u t i o n was lumecessary i n the 
ancient iirorld where the public and private spheres had not yet become 
autonomous. I n modem times^ however, where bifurcation and discord 
have replaced c l a s s i c a l harmony, i t i s necessary to devise certain 
a r t i f i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s vMch i f they cannot bring back direct 
participatdry democracy can at l e a s t mitigate these antestaaisms by 
putting individual s e l f - i n t e r e s t s " i n correspondence" with the universal 
i n t e r e s t s of the community. Thus v;hat i s created i s not an immediate, 
natural harmony, but one mediated t h r o u ^ human a r t i f i c e . 
Even v;hile the l e g i s l a t u r e i s concemed v;ith the \iniversality of 
the ]av7s and the constitution, Hegel views the ro]fi of the Estates i n 
the formulation of the law as ssmewhat negligible. VMle the p a r t i c i -
pation of the Estates v^ithin the l e g i s l a t u r e i s essential i n securing 
the s o l i d a r i t y and homogeneity of the community, i n the f i n a l analysis 
they are only a deliberative body. I t i s t h e i r task to sanction policy 
decisions handed down by the king's ministers and while they may 
c r i t i c i z e and propose change^ i n the end they must give t h e i r mark of 
approval, Hegel never contemplated a major r i f t between the Estates 
and the government and indeed he seems naively to overemphasize the 
degree of s o l i d a r i t y betv/een them. I t i s the r e a l function of the 
(142) I b i d , , paragraph 3O8. 
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Estates to make the needs of the government i n t e l l i g i b l e to the 
people so that they w i l l see the government as a manifestation of 
t h e i r own v / i l l . 
The Philosophy of Right does not end vdth the constitutional 
structure of the state, but rather vith a b r i e f re sum/ of Hegel's 
l e c t u r e s on the Philosophy of History i n which the development of 
the state i s traced throughout time. History stands above the isolated 
autonomy of individual sovereign states and v/elds them together i n a 
higher unity. I t i s the culmination of the system of r i ^ t and, 
borrovang a phrase from S c h i l l e r , Hegel remarks that "vrarld history 
i s the vrorld's court of judgement".^^^^^ Since by now the general 
d r i f t of Hegel's philosophy of history should be clear, i t w i l l only 
be necessary to t r e a t i t here i n sianmary fashion, 
Hegel divides vrorld history into four major periods or epochs: 
Oriental, Greet, Roman and Germanic, I n the Oriental world mind i s 
completely immersed within an immediate substantiality so that there 
i s produced an undifferentiated form of experience i n which 
"individual persDnality loses i t s r i ^ t s and perishes", ^•'•^ '^^ I n h i s 
ear l y essay "The S p i r i t of C h r i s t i a n i t y and i t s Fate" the ancient 
Judaic theocracy seemed to Hegel the. paradigm of the oriental ^vorld, 
but i n h i s B e r l i n lectures i t i s clear that he i s r e f e r r i n g primarily 
to India and China. These states represent a form of theocratic 
despotism i n which p o l i t i c s has not yet been separated fmm rel i g i o n 
and vrheie the r u l e r i s a pr i e s t or even a god'.'. The rule of lav;, a 
fmidamental feattire of the modem world, i s unknovm i n these comitries 
(143) I b i d , , paragraph 341. 
(144) I b i d . , paragraph 355. 
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where personal povrer and arb i t r a r y caprice are standard p o l i t i c a l 
p r a c t i c e s . Despite i t s age, Hegel believes that the Orient has no 
r e a l h i s t o r y since even i n the present i t r e t a i n s the same basic 
p o l i t i c a l features as i t did i n the past. 
The Greek world represents, f o r Hegel, a significant advance 
over the Oriental, Greek democracy v;as a realm of beautiful 
freedom i n which the w i l l of the individual and the collective v d l l 
immediately coincide. The Greeks ]aiev; nothing of the division betvreen 
the private man and the public man, bour^ois and citoyen, that 
characterizes the modem vrorld. Greek democracy meant l i v i n g i n 
accordance xdth the customs and traditions of the community as l a i d 
down by the great l e g i s l a t o r s such as Theseus and Lycurgus, and 
unlike the modems for v/hom o b j e c t i v e moral choice i s a l l importanli 
the Greeks merely accepted these s o c i a l norms as something given. 
According to Hegel, i t was only luider the influence of the Sophists 
and l a t e r Socrates and Hato that t h i s immediate harmony between 
subjective consciousness and objective being began to deteriorate. 
Hato had argued that there i s a realm of ideas or forms which 
transcends the phenomenal realm of the polls that the philosopher's 
duty i s to grasp these notions even i f they f l y i n the face of 
conventional wisdom. I t was t h i s sort of thinking that led ultimately 
to the 'decline of the Greek v/orld and the r i s e of Christian 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . 
I n the Roman vrorld the organic unity of the Greek Volksgeist i s 
sundered and democracy degenerates into aristocracy v;here the r u l e r s 
seek only power and vrealth v M l e the people sink into a rabble. As 
i n h i s e a r l y essay "The P o s i t i v i t y of the Christian Religion" Hegel 
shows how property and the relationships betvreen property owners 
216 
became the main concem of men under the Roman Empire and as a r e s u l t 
of t h i s a new system of private law was created which acknov/ledged 
that the individual regards the state as an a l i e n power vMch he may 
use as an instrument to further h i s private i n t e r e s t s . Thus man i^ vas 
reduced to the "abstract l e g a l personality" discussed by Hegel i n the 
Phenomenology, I t was only under these debased circumstances v/here 
men \teTe reduced to the status of mere property owning individuals 
that C h r i s t i a n i t y with i t s promise of a genuine human community i n 
the hereafter was able to make any impact. However Ch r i s t i a n i t y spelt 
the death of the Roman Empire and v;ith i t the b i r t h of the "luihappy 
consciousness" v;hich, I have t r i e d to argue, i t i s the purpose of 
Hegel's philosophy to remedy. 
Only i n the fourth and l a s t stage of history, the Germanic world, 
i s man's sense of alienation and estrangement fiom r e a l i t y and 
experience overcome and true freedom realized. Hegel traces the devel-
opment of the Germanic vrorld fx>m the r i s e of Christianity, t h r o u ^ 
the Protestant Reformation and the Erench Revolution, and f i n a l l y to 
h i s own day the culmination of v;hich i s the form of state analyzed i n 
the Philosophy of R i ^ t . I t should be said, however, against any 
narrow n a t i o n a l i s t reading of Hegel such as that proposed by 
Rosenzweig that when Hegel speaks of the Germanic world (die German!sche 
Welt) he does not mean i t i n the parochial sense of deutsch, but rather 
to embrace the entire European theatre vMch i n the 1820s had 
coalesced i n a reactionary a l l i a n c e to prevent the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
another Napoleonic uprising. But even i f Hegel's Germanic state i s 
taken to include the v/hole of Vfestem European society, i t cannot be 
taken as the f i n a l end of h i s system of philosophy i f only because i t 
does not recognize i t s e l f as such. The state i s only something " i n 
i t s e l f " that i s a part of the f i n i t e world of things which i n 
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accordance with the laws of d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c must transcend i t s own 
r e s t r i c t e d material conditions and become something "for i t s e l f " that 
i s , an object of t h o u ^ t . Thus i t i s the function of philosophy to 
supply the state v;ith t h i s consciousness of i t s e l f . The true end of 
the Hegelian system i s , therefore, the dyad of the state alongside i t s 
philosophical conceptualization. Philosophy, i t should be said, could 
never have supplied t h i s self-consciousness before the r e a l i z a t i o n of 
the state. Thou^t can never precede the r e a l i t y i t seeks to explain, 
but must content i t s e l f with making ex post facto declarations. I n 
Hegel's ovm. vrords! 
V/hen philosophy paints i t s grey i n grey, then has a 
shape of l i f e grown old. By philosophyfe grey i n 
grey i t cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. 
The ov;l of Minerva spreads i t s v/ings only vdth the 
f a l l i n g of the dusk, (145) 
(145) I b i d , , p . l3 . 
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CONCLUSION 
i n the f i n a l analysis Hegel's greatness l i e s not so much i n the 
pa r t i c u l a r d e t a i l s of h i s system, but i n h i s claim to have put 
philosophy i n i t s f i n a l form. I n h i s lectures on the history of 
philosophy he presents a l l previous philosophies as h i s t o r i c a l 
approximations of h i s own a l l embracing system which woxild be, as 
i t viere, the l a s t vrord i n the community of free men. I n the perfect 
society vMch, Hegel argues, i s nov; coming into existence v;here 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are structured to express every facet of a 
developed human intelligence and v;here a l l traces of the unhappy 
consciousness have been dissipated, there and only there does 
philosophy, a t l e a s t i n the form of abstract speculation, come to an 
end. I n a situation v/here a l l the complex and contradictory a?)ects 
of thought and r e a l i t y have been resolved i n such a way as to make 
man's p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y both morally and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y satisfactory, 
further speculation i s no longer necessary. This i s why Hegel says 
that i n future philosophy w i l l refirain from teaching what the vrorld 
o u ^ t to be as such an exercise could only be f u t i l e and self-defeating. 
Philosophy can no longer in s t r u c t the vrorld how i t should be: " I t can 
only teach hovj the state, the e t h i c a l universe, i s to be understood". ^"'"^  
Despite h i s g l o r i f i c a t i o n of the modem state as the incarnation 
of reason and freedom, we know fmm hindsight that Hegel r a d i c a l l y 
(1) G.W,P. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T,M, Knox, Oxford, 1971, 
p,llo 
219 
underestimated the peculiar narrowness and limitations of the time 
and circumstances of the age i n which he l i v e d . These limitations 
as I'larx has pointed out, are those of a country which had participated 
i n the restoration of other nations without f i r s t having participated 
^2) 
i n t h e i r revolutions. ^ ' This vfas an insight also shared by Heine v;ho 
observed; 
'^ G^erman philosophy i s a great thing, an a f f a i r vMch 
concerns the entire human race aiid only our f a r 
distant descendants v d l l be able to judge i f we merit 
praise or blame for having conceived our philosophy 
before having made our revolution^. (5) 
Such of course was the fate of c l a s s i c a l German idealism. For Heine and 
I % r x and the generation of poets and philosophers who came of age i n the 
years shortly a f t e r Hegel's death, i t vras no longer a question of 
speculatively transforming a c t u a l i t y into r a t i o n a l i t y , but doing so i n 
practice. The point as they understood i t i s not merely to comprehend 
the vrorld, but to transform i t . As Marx put i t i n h i s famous eleventh 
t h e s i s on Feuerbach: "Philosophers have only interpreted the vrorld, i n 
various ways; the point, hoover, i s to change i t " . But t h i s , of 
course, i s another story. Vfe have now reached the end of ours. 
(2) Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Vferke. 39 vols., Berlin, 1956-, 
I f pp.379-80. 
(3) Quoted from Roger Garaudy, Pieu est mort; Etude sur Hegel, i k r i s , 
1970, p.430, 
(4) Marx/Engels, V/erke, op. c i t . . I l l , p .7. 
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